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Abstract 
This thesis serves as a critical account of the development of the theory of ideology; 
the aim is to contribute towards the rehabilitation of this theory, demonstrating that 
with certain refinements it remains of significant importance to contemporary social 
analysis. I argue that the principal flaws in the traditional theory of ideology 
associated with Marx are rooted in its own adoption of certain ‘ideological’ motifs 
from the philosophy of Hegel and of Feuerbach; in particular, a teleological 
conception of historical process and an idealised image of authenticity. These 
presuppositions will be shown to result in three problematic implications for the 
theory: the apparent need for a standard of truth from which to juxtapose ideological 
errors; the introduction of a dichotomy between an ‘ideological’ and an ‘authentic’ 
subject, and with it concurrent issues surrounding the nature of human agency; and 
the need to posit some sort of collective subject that is mystified or falsely represented 
in ideology. I argue that these problems can be surmounted using the aesthetic and 
psychoanalytic approaches to ideology, developed by Eagleton and Žižek in their 
respective adaptations of Althusser’s conception of interpellation. This shift entails a 
reformulation of ideology as being an affective rather than a cognitive phenomenon, 
and so is removed from the problem of true and false belief. The distinction between  
‘ideological’ and ‘non-ideological’ subjects is also challenged, and this entails a much 
more expansive conception of ideology, albeit one that is also more variable. The 
indeterminate notion of a collective subject embodied in ideological formations is 
explicated as being analogous to the modes of ‘intersubjectivity’ formed through 
aesthetic experience, and further developed using the psychoanalytic idea of fantasy. 
Finally, I argue that the conception of power implicit in the Marxian theory of 
ideology, epitomised in the struggle/repression opposition, should be replaced with 
the relational conception of power advanced by Foucault; that in this way the theory 
is able to account for ideology in all of its forms, and is not limited by any instances 
of economic reductionism or class essentialism. The application of this refined 
approach to three distinct and contrastive cases of ideological formations (Early 
Christianity, the contemporary European Far Right and the New Age Movement) is 
undertaken in order to demonstrate the enduring relevance and importance of the 
critique of ideology. 
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1	
Introduction 
 
The term ideology is commonly used in contemporary discourse, yet despite this the 
meaning of the term is not fixed. A cursory reflection on the varied contexts in which 
the term is deployed shows that its intended meaning can differ widely. On the one 
hand, when we suggest that someone is ‘ideologically motivated’, it could simply and 
rather innocuously be inferred that such a person is inclined towards a particular set of 
social and/or political beliefs and practices; on the other hand, it could be implied to 
mean that the person is ‘brainwashed’ or ‘radicalised’, manipulated to the extent that 
they are no longer capable of acting as ‘themselves’. This range of meaning 
introduces a problem of the relation between ideological identification and human 
agency, of identifying where the two can be said to begin and end. Of course, if a 
distinction such as this is to be made, the problematic relation between ‘ideology’ and 
‘knowledge’, or ideology and some sort of authenticity must likewise be determined 
and there is always the obvious danger that any such distinction is itself ideologically 
motivated. The apparent elasticity of the concept, and its potentially all-encompassing 
nature, have contributed towards its relative disfavour in philosophical circles today. 
Nevertheless, I wish to argue that the notion of ideology is invaluable for social 
analysis; that the problems to which the traditional theory of ideology addressed itself 
are real and enduring; and that, given certain refinements, such a theory is capable of 
clearly explicating the nature of ideology and its various effects.  
 
I will argue that the key problems with a theory of ideology are rooted in certain 
presuppositions that Marx adopted when developing the concept. For this reason the 
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thesis begins with an account of the philosophical progenitors of the idea. Chapter 1 
argues that the foundation for Marx’s theory of ideology can be found in aspects of 
Hegel’s conception of the phenomenological development of self-consciousness, in 
particular, its emphasis on the role of alienation in this development, in the form of 
both estrangement and externalisation. Within this schema, the nature of a given 
social organisation is fundamental in determining whether self-consciousness is 
perceived to be estranged from itself (and therefore prone to ideological 
(mis)identification) or rather, confirmed in its existence by perceiving in such an 
organisation aspects of itself in objectified form. It is a schema that assumes, quite 
rightly, that self-consciousness can only ever develop in a state of interdependence 
with others. What is more problematic is the assumption that some form of authentic 
reconciliation is possible, with the notion that self-consciousness is a finite 
manifestation of some form of collective subject. It will be argued that the 
indeterminate nature of this collective subject has been an enduring problem in the 
development of a theory of ideology. The idea that ideology is a misrepresentation of 
something authentic will be shown to have developed from the relation between the 
individual and objective spirit in Hegel, to species being in Feuerbach, and to 
collective social labour in Marx; in each case ideology can be construed as a 
phenomenon whereby the individual is in some sense estranged from this more 
natural mode of being. Following the ‘aesthetic turn’ outlined in Chapter 5, I will 
argue that ideology does not function as a barrier to a form of authenticity; but rather, 
that it is in the notion of authenticity itself, and the various ways in which it is 
conceived, that ideology can be found. 
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In Feuerbach, this theme of alienation and reconciliation is developed further in line 
with what becomes a theory of ideology in Marx. Here self-consciousness is 
conceived as being a divided subject, insofar as it is able to perceive itself in an 
individual and limited sense, as well as being able perceive itself in terms of its 
general mode of being (or ‘species being’). Feuerbach argues that religion can be 
understood as an externalised representation (or mystification) of this latter mode of 
being; I will argue that this is the basis for identifying ideology with some form of 
‘false consciousness’. I argue that, once this association is made, immediate 
difficulties arise in specifying the precise nature of what is to be juxtaposed with 
ideology. Marx inherits this problematic relation between ideology and false 
consciousness. In Chapter 2 I outline the theory of ideology as it develops in his 
works, and further demonstrate the ways in which it is influenced by Hegel and 
Feuerbach. I argue that these influences are responsible for introducing an ambiguity 
in Marx, as to whether ideology should be conceived in an epistemological or a 
political (functional) sense. Both approaches are clearly discernible in Marx, and I 
will argue that, if the consequences of each are to be accepted, the result is a counter-
intuitive conception of ideology that is both the expression of the interests of a 
dominant class and the form in which these interests are mystified. This alternating 
function leads to difficulties in determining what can be said to be causally 
responsible for the formation of dominant ideologies; and I will argue that the 
division between base and superstructure in Marx does not sufficiently resolve this 
problem. 
 
Despite these difficulties there is much to be valued in Marx’s theory of ideology. Its 
emphasis on the role of non-rational belief in the unity of culture, on the contingent 
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relation between certain mental conceptions and material conditions, and on the 
malleable role that a sense of alienation can play in the structures of social 
organisation, are all features that are worthy of further examination. Taking this into 
account, the purpose of Chapters 3 and 4 is to isolate the ‘ideological’ presuppositions 
informing Marx’s theory of ideology, in order to more clearly evaluate the problems 
to which the theory addresses. In Chapter 3 I will demonstrate that there is what can 
be termed a ‘motif of transformation’ underlying the work of Hegel, Feuerbach and 
Marx on ideology. In each case there is an assumption that historical process can be 
understood in a progressive or even a teleological sense and, connectedly, that self-
consciousness or human nature develops from a state of alienation, through various 
forms of ideological identification, towards a state of authenticity as yet unreached. It 
is a motif, then, that introduces both a dichotomy between an ideological and an 
authentic subject, and a need to posit a collective subject embodied in the historical 
process. I will argue that the effect of this invariably amounts to an untenable division 
between ideological and non-ideological conceptions. Chapter 4 examines the cultural 
landscape of the period between 1789 and 1848 in Europe, highlighting the 
dominance of certain ideas that were supportive of the motif of transformation. It will 
be argued that it is plausible to assume that the theoretical transformations described 
in the motif could have been perceived to be consistent with, or substantiated by, the 
material transformations taking place at the time. This argument is supported by the 
work of Rosen on the influence of the philosophical traditions of rationalism and 
providentialism on Western cultural assumptions in general, and the theory of 
ideology in particular. In the refined approach to a theory of ideology, outlined in 
Chapters 5 and 6, I will argue that every ideological formation contains a semblance 
of some form of providential reconciliation and/or authenticity; however, it does not 
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follow that this semblance should be read as an inverted or mystified representation of 
something concrete. Insofar as the traditional theory of ideology assumes this, I will 
argue that it is vulnerable to the same critique it presents us with.  
 
The advantage of incorporating aspects of aesthetic and psychoanalytic theory into 
that of ideology is that it dramatically realigns the conceptual framework of the 
traditional theory. The nature of a collective subject, for instance, is no longer 
conceived to be something that is internal or inherent to a social body, but rather a 
manifestation of communal feeling based upon a collective act of differentiation from 
something posited as other or external to the group; and in place of authentic or 
inauthentic representation, ideology is now conceived in the manner of aesthetic 
‘intersubjectivity’, and this will be shown to dissociate the theory from the problem of 
knowledge. In Chapter 5 I outline this conceptual realignment. The basis is to be 
found in Althusser’s conception of interpellation, and it will be argued that the 
development of this conception in the works of Eagleton and Žižek signifies an 
important breakthrough in the theory of ideology. This refined approach will be 
shown to dissolve the conceptual opposition between ‘ideological’ and ‘non-
ideological’ subjects, and consequently to entail a conception of ideology that is in a 
certain sense ubiquitous, albeit one that is also highly variable. I will argue that such a 
conception does not devolve into a form of relativism and is still compatible with a 
value-based critique of different ideological formations, the various possible 
functional roles of an ideological figure of the ‘Other’ will be shown to be a decisive 
aspect of such a critique. The nature of ‘ideological consciousness’, or the way in 
which the individual subject experiences ideology, will be shown to be explicable 
using methods of aesthetic and psychoanalytic theory; however, there remain some 
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difficulties in explaining the function of ideology on a broader, societal level. I will 
argue that these difficulties arise from the conception of power that is implicit in the 
traditional theory of ideology, that it is in regard to this conception that opponents of 
the theory can claim that it is reductive. In Chapter 6 I will argue that, within the 
context of the relational conception of power advanced by Foucault, the refined 
theory of ideology is not limited by such difficulties and capable of accounting for the 
functions of ideology in all of its forms.  
 
I will argue that, applied in this way, ideology can be conceived as a supplement to 
more general forms of discourse. It will be shown to be a unique form of discourse, 
for whereas discourse generally tends towards constant evolution and adaptation in 
the forms of exercising power, ideology utilises a semblance of stabilisation and 
constancy in order to exert itself. Consequently, it will be shown that ideological 
discourse is most active in the instances of a breakdown in hegemonic power, in 
situations where it is able to have the effect of an ostensible equilibrium in an 
otherwise volatile environment. It will be shown to follow that ideology can be read 
as being both one of the most potent and one of the most vulnerable forms of 
discourse. Its potency lies in its appeal to the aesthetic and psychological dispositions 
of individuals, for instance in the promise of some form of social harmony and 
stability. It will be argued, however, that such an effect is only possible insofar as 
ideology eschews from any radical transformations dictated by the dynamic and ever-
shifting relations of power that are expressed in apparatuses of knowledge, or 
discourse in general. In order to sustain itself, ideological discourse must make 
constant use of the mechanisms of transference and displacement that are outlined in 
Chapter 5. I will argue that it is from the numerous and divergent effects of such 
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mechanisms that a coherent ‘critique’ of ideology is still possible. In order to 
demonstrate the enduring relevance and effectiveness of a theory of ideology, the 
thesis concludes with the application of this refined approach to the analysis of three 
distinct cases of ideological formations; what will emerge is a conception of ideology 
that is still connected, but no longer reducible, to the political economy of the 
traditional Marxian theory. 
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 1 The Metaphysical Foundation for a Theory of Ideology 
 
1.1 Preliminaries 
“In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here it 
is a matter of ascending from earth to heaven… It is not consciousness that 
determines life, but life that determines consciousness” (Marx & Engels 1976, p. 42). 
 
Deprived of its context, the above quotation illustrates one of the central problems for 
a theory of ideology, namely the relation of consciousness to the external world. 
Taken in its pejorative form, the term ‘ideology’ often connotes a set of mystifying 
beliefs that falsely represent reality as it is, independent of any conceptual distortions 
we may interpose between it.1 An accusation of ideological thinking would thus imply 
the possibility of ascertaining an undistorted perspective of the external world from 
which to cast the judgment, and the improbability of being able to attain some such 
‘god’s eye view’ has haunted the epistemic approach to the concept of ideology since 
its inception. This problem relates to the conception of ideology as being intimately 
connected with a state of ‘false consciousness’, an inability to accurately perceive 
one’s own situation within a set of social relations, particularly with regards to forms 
of exploitation: “…[false consciousness] characterizes the generic and chronic kind of 
servitude that cannot even perceive its own situation. It may therefore coexist with a 
kind of illusory contentment” (Blackburn 2008). This ‘illusory contentment’, then, 
would be a function of ideology. The term ‘false consciousness’ originates in the late 
																																																								1	It will be shown that, traditionally, forms of cognitive misperception, or alienation, have also been 
implicit in the broader conception of ideology as a social or political construct. For instance, in the 
notion that ideologies function to both obscure and mollify relations of domination through the 
misrepresentation of a given social order. This aspect will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 2. 	
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work Engels and is absent in the works of Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx; however, I 
endeavour to show that aspects of their work represent a clear development towards 
this conception in rudimentary form. The concept of alienation is integral here, as the 
ideological subject of false consciousness would necessarily be alienated from his or 
her dormant potentialities, and it would follow that the goal of a ‘critique of ideology’ 
would be to enlighten the subject of ideology as to their real condition in order for 
them to live in a more authentic relation to their social environment. This chapter 
sketches the development of this inter-connected theme of alienation and forms of 
‘false consciousness’ in the work of Hegel and Feuerbach, and the way in which this 
culminates in a theory of ideology in Marx. Later I will suggest that, contrary to the 
idea that ideology represents a barrier to a form of authenticity, it may rather be the 
case that the very notion of authenticity underpinning Marx’s theory of ideology, 
what is traditionally juxtaposed to ideology, is itself ideological. 
 
The notion of ideology being a form of false consciousness can be situated within the 
broader tradition of attempting to overcome the metaphysical problem of the relation 
between mind and matter. Arguably one of the most thoroughgoing attempts at 
achieving this, breaching the gulf between subject and object and thus negating the 
spectre of ideology, was undertaken in the philosophy of Hegel. It is ironic, then, that 
the modern concept of ideology can be seen as having arisen from the critique of 
speculative philosophy in general, usually with Hegel decried as the latter’s 
champion. It should be noted outright, however, and it will be argued in the 
proceeding chapters, that to identify Hegel and Marx as being representative of 
idealism and materialism respectively is too simplistic. Hegel took care to argue that, 
just as particulars cannot be properly understood without reference to universals, so 
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too are universal concepts unintelligible unless they correspond to material 
particulars: “…Hegel also rejects a reductionism operating in…dogmatic metaphysics 
[;] …he denies that the world of appearances is ever mere appearance… ‘Reality’ 
cannot be cut off from the forms in which it ‘appears’” (Norman 1976, p. 42). Marx’s 
insistence on the social aspects of the development of consciousness also 
distinguishes him from the more empiricist-minded school of materialism, indeed it is 
arguable that he did not see himself as a materialist at all: “…Marx sometimes 
preferred to say that he was not a materialist, but a naturalist or humanist, and that 
‘consistent naturalism or humanism distinguishes itself both from idealism and 
materialism, constituting at the same time the unifying truth of both’” (Williamson 
2008, p. 127). Despite the fact that both thinkers minimise the ramifications of the 
mind/body problem by attempting to dissolve the apparent dichotomy between 
idealism and materialism, Hegel and Marx’s emphasis on the decisive role of 
consciousness and material activity respectively, testifies to the enduring nature of 
such divisions. With regard to the topic at hand, a break from this apparent deadlock 
(of whether consciousness determines material activity, or vice versa) will serve as 
the foundation for a theory of ideology, at least in its broadest sense. 
 
In tracing the thought of Hegel through to Marx, by way of Feuerbach, special 
attention will be paid to the evolving conception of the nature of alienation in their 
works. Whether it is alienation from the material world, from the self, from others or 
from society in general, alienation will be shown to be a persistent though malleable 
feature implicit in almost all conceptions of ideology up to the present. For the present 
I will demonstrate the development of this concept of alienation, and show how its 
critique and reformulation by Marx gives rise to what can tentatively be assumed to 
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be one of the fundamental problems of ideology: the extent to which knowledge is 
socially conditioned. 
 
1.2 The Interdependence of Self-Consciousness: Alienation in Hegel 
 
Immediate difficulties arise in the interpretation of Hegel if one attempts to abstract 
certain of his ideas without reference to his philosophical system as a whole. Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit endeavours to chart the development of consciousness from 
its most rudimentary forms towards its culmination in ‘Absolute Knowing’; as such, 
the errors of consciousness encountered along the way (i.e. the emergence of 
incomplete or prejudicial perspectives) are never dismissed out of hand as false, they 
are rather seen as necessary stages of this development whose identification and 
sublimation are essential in order to transition to a more comprehensive level of 
knowledge. Central here is Hegel’s notion of the ‘determinate negation’, whereby the 
positive element of an error is preserved in its negation; this is well illustrated in 
Hegel’s employment of the tripartite movement of thesis, antithesis and synthesis: the 
synthesis is inextricably linked to the thesis, and by extension truth can be said to be 
inextricably linked to error.2 To give an example, one may begin with a conception of 
free self-consciousness that includes the unperturbed expression of our natural desires 
and inclinations; it may then follow that this conception is contradicted by the 																																																								
2 The claim that Hegel makes use of a tripartite dialectic has been disputed by Kaufmann, who argues 
that such a reading is inconsistent with Hegel’s works: “What do we find if not a usable dialectical 
method? We find a vision of the world, of man, and of history which emphasizes development through 
conflict, the moving power of human passions, which produce wholly unintended results, and the irony 
of sudden reversals. If that be called a dialectical world view, then Hegel’s philosophy was 
dialectical… But the fateful myth that this perspective is reducible to a rigorous method that even 
permits predictions deserves no quarter, though by now half the world believes it” (1966, pp. 174-175). 
Kaufmann makes a strong case; yet even by his reading the genesis of the movement, even if it be in 
error, is still inextricably linked to the result; and so for the purposes here his argument is 
unproblematic.    
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demands of our rational will, which requires the occasional negation of these drives. 
This contradiction, however, does not entail a doing-away with our initial conception 
of free self-consciousness in favour of something that is other or externally given; 
rather our recognition of the antithesis and its proper relation to us retroactively alters 
our understanding of the initial premise, and this dialectical movement continues 
indefinitely. There is a certain affinity between this process and the interpretation of 
Bildung that Gadamer develops in Truth and Method. Bildung here differs from 
something like ‘cultivation’ in that it is not simply a means to an end, in the sense that 
we cultivate our latent talents and capacities. Rather it is defined as a continual self-
formation through the recognition and subsequent assimilation of the alien as our 
own, the very process of which being an end in itself (a sort of ‘being-in-becoming’): 
To recognize one’s own in the alien, to become at home in it, is the basic movement 
of spirit, whose being consists only in returning to itself from what is other. Hence all 
theoretical Bildung, even acquiring foreign languages and conceptual worlds, is 
merely the continuation of a process of Bildung that begins much earlier. Every 
single individual who raises himself out of his natural being to the spiritual finds in 
the language, customs, and institutions of his people a pre-given body of material 
which, as in learning to speak, he has to make his own. Thus every individual is 
always engaged in the process of Bildung and in getting beyond his naturalness, 
inasmuch as the world into which he is growing is one that is humanly constituted 
through language and custom (Gadamer 2013, p. 13). 
This notion of Bildung as a process of determinate negation permeates the philosophy 
of Hegel, and such a process is considered to be essential in order for the higher 
development of a consciousness that is in mediation with itself as objective spirit:  
It is therefore through culture [Bildung, in the original German] that the individual 
acquires standing and actuality. His true original nature and substance is the 
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alienation of himself as Spirit from his natural being… This individuality moulds 
itself by culture [Bildung] into what it intrinsically is… Although here the self knows 
itself as this self, yet its actuality consists solely in the setting-aside of its natural self  
(Hegel 1977, p. 298). 
Thus Hegel’s philosophy can be read as a rigorous call to go beyond or ‘estrange’ 
oneself from the ‘naturalness’ of initial impressions, to attempt to situate oneself in 
apparent points of opposition; only in this way can any inadequacy of our knowledge 
be ascertained and transcended to more adequate forms. This of course implies the 
critical challenging of accepted beliefs – a disposition which will later be shown to be 
quite antithetical to that of ideology. Nevertheless, I wish to argue that it is in Hegel’s 
considerations on self-consciousness in an early, unreflective and estranged state of 
development that the foundations for Marx’s theory of ideology can be found; and so 
although the scope of this study does not allow for a comprehensive analysis of 
Hegel’s Phenomenology in its entirety, it is hoped that a critical reading of the section 
on self-consciousness can be justified, not as a critique of the internal consistency of 
Hegel’s thought, but as a progenitor to the problem of alienation as it has developed 
in relation to the concept of ideology.  
 
Hegel begins his treatment of self-consciousness with a stage of development 
designated as ‘self-certainty’. What is essential about this aspect of consciousness is 
that its nature is derived purely from the inner workings of the subject, and this gives 
rise to a strictly dualistic perception of reality. There is an I, the existence and truth of 
which I can be certain, and then there is the external world I encounter, a not-I that 
seems to stand above and beyond me. Moreover, these external objects are perceived 
negatively from the standpoint of self-certainty, insofar as one’s certainty of self 
grows in proportion to the extent that it establishes itself in opposition to or at least 
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differentiated from something other; however, this entails that one’s independence is 
dependent on something outside the self, thus the situation is one in which self-
certainty is simultaneously developed and undermined. This antagonistic relationship 
between subject and object engenders a striving for unity, wherein consciousness can 
be made to feel at home in the world in which it finds itself; where it can effectively 
perceive its world, not this or that world. This state of affairs leads Hegel to associate 
this stage of self-consciousness with ‘Desire’: 
…self-consciousness is Desire in general. Consciousness, as self-consciousness, 
henceforth has a double object: one is the immediate object, that of sense-certainty 
and perception, which however for self-consciousness has the character of a negative; 
and the second, viz. itself, which is the true essence, and is present in the first instance 
only as opposed to the first object. In this sphere, self-consciousness exhibits itself as 
the movement in which this antithesis is removed, and the identity of itself with itself 
becomes explicit for it (Hegel 1977, p. 105). 
Consciousness, as understood as self-consciousness, implies a certain level of 
autonomy in that it is perceived to be sui generis; yet self-consciousness finds itself 
manifested in a corporeal form thoroughly dependent on an alien, external world for 
its continued existence, it is not self-generative. ‘Desire’, in this sense, denotes a 
conscious longing to take ownership of the external object and thus situate the 
primacy of existence within the self, to identify ‘itself with itself’. The initial response 
to this emergence of desire is to attempt to abolish the external object (to destroy or 
consume the object would obviously be the extreme variant of this impulse; it could 
also be argued that any will to control or manipulate the object is of the same category 
of desire). In so doing, the external object can be characterised as being essentially for 
consciousness, its inner characteristics negated in its new role as simple matter for an 
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autonomous self-consciousness, now objectively defined as an ‘abolishing agent’. 
However, this sense of autonomy will quickly be shown to be illusory:  
In this satisfaction [of abolishment], however, experience makes it aware that the 
object has its own independence…in order that this supersession [of the object] can 
take place, there must be this other. Thus self-consciousness, by its negative relation 
to the object, is unable to supersede it; it is really because of that relation that it 
produces the object again, and the desire as well (Hegel 1977, p. 109).  
In negating the object, self-consciousness will simultaneously negate its autonomy as 
an agent of negation. With each external negation self-consciousness loses the focal 
point from which it derives its essence;3 thus each negation necessarily engenders a 
new relation of subject to object, and the inability to surmount this predicament once 
again shifts the primacy of existence away from the subject and situates it in the 
external world. This whole process is closely related to Hegel’s use of the term 
‘Aufheben’, often translated insufficiently in English as ‘sublimation’:  
Aufheben (sublimate) means literally ‘pick up’… But this original sensuous meaning 
has given rise to two derivative meanings… ‘cancel,’ and ‘preserve’ or ‘keep’. 
Something may be picked up in order that it will no longer be there; on the other 
hand, I may also pick it up to keep it. When Hegel uses the term… [he means] how 
something is picked up in order that it may no longer be there just the way it was, 
although, of course, it is not cancelled altogether but lifted up to be kept on a different 
level (Kaufmann 1966, p. 159). 
																																																								
3 ‘Essence’ can here be understood in its traditional sense as being “…the basic or primary element in 
the being of a thing” (Blackburn 2008); it is the element of a thing which could not be taken away from 
it without negating the thing itself. For Hegel, the inability of self-consciousness to isolate this aspect 
of itself is a result of the fact that essence actually entails both identity and difference: self-
differentiation. As such, essence is always manifested in a relation to something else; thus it cannot be 
grounded in a way that it would be the same in all circumstances, and is neither timeless nor 
immutable: “…Essence we have understood as the inner necessity which first posits one property, then 
cancels it in favour of another, and then still another, and so on. Hence, in Hegelian terms, the 
underlying identity is the difference, the self-differentiation, that which deploys the different properties 
in their necessary relation to each other” (Taylor 2005, p. 261). 
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The abolishing agent is limited to an act of cancellation, lacking the aspect of 
preservation required for Hegelian sublimation. What is needed, it follows, is for the 
negation to come from without, from within the external object itself. Only if the 
otherness of the external can be negated in perpetuity can the autonomy of self-
consciousness, so defined, be maintained: “Man, as a being who depends on external 
reality, can only come to integrity if he discovers a reality which could undergo a 
standing negation, whose otherness could be negated without its being abolished” 
(Taylor 2005, p. 152). This standing negation, Hegel argues, can only be effected 
through the recognition and subordination of another self-consciousness: “Self-
consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness” (Hegel 
1977, p. 110). The evolution of this standing negation will be examined in the context 
of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic in the following section. 
 
The necessary dependence on another self-consciousness for self-consciousness’ 
development is an interesting feature in Hegel. Following Descartes it was commonly 
held that the primacy of the existence of the self was the foundation for knowing 
anything with a degree of certainty, a position which invariably leads to a solipsistic 
scepticism regarding the external world, given perception’s propensity for distortion. 
In Hegel this position is reversed. What consciousness is essentially confronted with 
is not self-certainty but alienation from an external world, its apparent dependence on 
which relegating it to the function of being an extension of such a world, and thus 
inessential. The movement towards recognition from another self-consciousness is 
thus an attempt to regain essentiality. It can be argued that this very problem of 
alienation from an external world necessarily presupposes the existence of a self, and 
this is true. However, what Hegel argues is that, without being able to conceptualise 
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oneself in an objective way, this sense of self is without sufficient content; and the 
ability to conceptualise oneself objectively requires the recognition of another 
consciousness. In order to show the force of this somewhat ambiguous claim, Richard 
Norman proposed a thought experiment that is worth quoting at length:  
…let us imagine a human being who has always lived in complete isolation and is 
unaware of the existence of other human beings… Begging certain questions about it, 
let us suppose that this being is able to act on the world in various ways, to gather 
plants and perhaps kill other animals for food, to use foliage and timber and stones to 
provide himself with shelter, and so on. Such a being might be regarded as conscious 
of himself in the minimal sense that he is aware of the world as existing for him and 
in opposition to him, as resisting him and requiring him to act on it. But he could not 
be aware of himself as an object in the world, in the way in which the plants and 
animals he feeds on, and the materials he uses, are objects in the world. He could not 
be aware of himself in this way because he could not be aware of himself as an object 
of possible awareness for other human beings (1976, p. 47).  
The attainment of recognition from another self-consciousness is of course something 
that falls outside the performative capacity of the desiring self-consciousness; it must 
be given to it. A resultant state of mutual recognition does not, however, arise 
spontaneously from this situation, it cannot as this “…is at a stage when men have not 
recognized themselves as universal, for to have done so is to see that recognition for 
me, for what I am, is recognition of man as such and therefore something that in 
principle should be extended to all” (Taylor 2005, p. 153). It follows that the need for 
recognition without acknowledging its reciprocal nature leads to conflict, as one self-
consciousness attempts to wrest its essentiality from another. Hegel, in the well-
known section on the master/slave relation, depicts this process. 
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1.3 The Master/Slave Dialectic  
 
Self-consciousness is by nature difficult to grasp: it is both a subject embodied in 
corporeal form and consciousness of this embodiment. The contingency of its 
physical form, its state of dependency on the external, has been made apparent to 
itself; and so autonomy is now sought by negating its physicality and finding refuge 
in itself as transcendental consciousness:  
The presentation of itself…as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in 
showing itself as the pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is not 
attached to any specific existence, not to the individuality common to existence as 
such, that it is not attached to life (Hegel 1977, p. 113).  
The apparent essentiality of the transcendental aspects of self-consciousness is given 
greater credence the more one displays a disregard for their corporeal embodiment, or 
indeed a disregard for corporeal embodiment as such; in the framework of recognition 
between self-consciousnesses this negation of objective particularity entails risking 
one’s life in a conflict with another. Through a life and death struggle self-
consciousness attempts to win recognition of itself as a pure being-for-self, 
transcendent of its physical embodiment, of which it is willing to sacrifice for the 
cause. Such a conflict, however, would invariably lead to the death of one or both of 
the combatants, and this outcome would lead us back to the situation of self-
consciousness defined as an abolishing agent: with no possible recognition to be 
obtained from a now deceased self-consciousness, the process would be destined to 
repeat itself ad infinitum. Thus what is needed is for one self-consciousness to submit 
itself to the other, in doing so its otherness would be negated, subsumed into the being 
of the victorious consciousness with the new status of thinghood; and so the 
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victorious self-consciousness’ essential relation to external life would be 
acknowledged whilst its autonomy remains intact, “…through this there is posited a 
pure self-consciousness, and a consciousness which is not purely for itself but for 
another, i.e. is a merely immediate consciousness, or consciousness in the form of 
thinghood…The former is lord, the other is bondsman” (Hegel 1977, p. 115). Thus 
enslavement is depicted as the next stage in the development towards the overcoming 
of alienation in Hegel. However, the master/slave relation will be shown to be more 
complicated than it at first appears. 
 
On the surface the master has overcome the apparent dichotomy between selfhood 
and material reality. The master represents pure being-for-self, insofar as it assumes 
itself to have taken control of its external environment through the mediation of the 
slave; material reality is no longer perceived as standing opposed and in resistance to 
it, but ready for its consumption. The slave fills the gap between subject and object, 
and the master’s ownership of the slave negates its foreignness. However, a cursory 
examination proves this to be illusory. Precisely because of the relation between 
master and slave, wherein the slave is construed as a dependent being, a being-for-
other, there can be no authentic recognition of the master’s being-for-self, and this 
engenders an unexpected reversal:  
In this recognition the unessential consciousness is for the lord the object, which 
constitutes the truth of his certainty of himself. But it is clear that this object does not 
correspond to its Notion, but rather that the object in which the lord has achieved his 
lordship has in reality turned out to be something quite different from an independent 
consciousness…He is, therefore, not certain of being-for-self as the truth of himself. 
On the contrary, his truth is in reality the unessential consciousness and its 
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unessential action…The truth of the independent consciousness is accordingly the 
servile consciousness of the bondsman (Hegel 1977, pp. 116-117). 
Given the position of subordination imposed upon the slave it seems counterintuitive 
to assert that the truth of independent consciousness is to be found here, yet it must be 
remembered that we are still dealing with self-consciousness in its early development, 
so neither slave nor master can be properly representative of authenticity. What Hegel 
argues is that, while the master withdraws into a reverie of self-involution by 
superficially separating itself from the problem of estrangement, implicit in the 
slave’s predicament are the pre-conditions for the development of an authentically 
independent self-consciousness. 
 
There are a number of reasons for locating the pre-conditions for authentic 
development in the position of the slave. Firstly, in the recognition of the master the 
slave has developed an idealised picture of being-for-self. In actuality the master does 
not represent such a being, as shown above, but the space for the conceptualisation of 
being-for-self is opened up for the slave in the act of recognition. The master has no 
such point of reference, in relegating the slave to the function of things its 
environment remains for it on the sub-human level, and so for it the status of being-
for-self remains ineffable; not only has the master failed to actualise being-for-self, it 
is further unable to authentically conceptualise such a state. The next important 
feature of enslavement is the slave’s confrontation with the fear of death, “For this 
consciousness has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or just at odd 
moments, but its whole being has been seized with dread; for it has experienced the 
fear of death, the absolute Lord…and everything solid and stable has been shaken to 
its foundations” (Hegel 1977, p. 117). Hegel regards the fear of death as being an 
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important stimulus for shaking oneself loose from an over-identification with 
individual particulars; in confronting the transitoriness of an individual existence the 
slave is forced seek truth outside of the self. Thus there is a shift of perspective in 
which an attempt is now made to identify those aspects of self-consciousness that 
could be perceived to be common to all, in a sense universal, and so unencumbered 
by the finite nature of the consciousnesses in which they manifest. Lastly, and perhaps 
most importantly, is the function of disciplined work. In work the slave is confronted 
with the resistance of an independent material reality that is shaped and transformed 
in conformity with the slave’s inclination. This form of self-expression allows Hegel 
to delineate the notion of alienation into both positive and negative forms: self-
externalisation as a response to self-estrangement. 
 
Hegel’s multi-faceted approach to the notion of alienation has been concisely 
articulated by Gavin Rae:  
 … ‘alienation’ translates two German words: ‘Entfremdung’ and ‘Entäusserung’… 
‘Entfremdung’ describes a process or state where consciousness is separated from, at 
least, one of the aspects that are required for consciousness to fully understand itself. 
In contrast, ‘Entäusserung’ describes the process whereby consciousness externalises 
itself in object form and, through this objectification, develops a better understanding 
of itself. To clarify… ‘Entfremdung’ will be translated as ‘estrangement’, and 
‘Entäusserung’ will be translated as ‘externalisation’ (Rae 2012, p. 31).    
Thus far alienation as estrangement has been the predominant problem for self-
consciousness, its attempts at abolishment and enslavement can be read as failed 
efforts in negating this attitude by actualising the more positive form of alienation as 
externalisation. Up until this stage externalisation has been sought in the self-
objectification that comes with authentic recognition between subjects, but in the 
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process of work a new means of self-externalisation can be achieved from within the 
external world itself. In the project of fashioning and transforming material objects 
the worker imprints certain ideas onto the world, and is thus met with a reflection of 
the self in the finished product. The enduring nature of the product can then function 
as the aforementioned ‘standing negation’ of the otherness of the external world, the 
worker can now see aspects of the self in the external world, is thus ‘at home’ in its 
surroundings, and Hegel would argue that this engenders a profound transformation in 
the development of self-consciousness: “…in transforming things we change 
ourselves. By creating a standing reflection of ourselves as universal beings we 
become such beings” (Taylor 2005, p. 156). This positive form of alienation as 
externalisation is implicit in the slave’s situation; however, it remains thoroughly 
incomplete. As a mediator between master and material reality the work of the slave 
is never that of an autonomous agent, and thus self-externalisation cannot be 
achieved. 
 
The master/slave relation has been shown to be non-conducive to the fulfilment of 
authentic self-consciousness, but from this relation the necessary criteria for such a 
development can be drawn. An authentic self-consciousness requires freedom, as the 
subject must be able to perceive itself as an autonomous agent. Yet freedom has been 
shown to require recognition, that is, the subject needs to be objectively recognised as 
an autonomous agent in order to confirm its independence. Disciplined work is 
necessary in order to overcome the sense of estrangement from the external world, 
because, in working on the world the worker is integrated into his/her surroundings 
(the ‘discipline’ here referring to the work’s conformity with a rational plan, unlike 
the arbitrary ‘work’ of the ‘abolishing agent’). Lastly, the fear of death is necessary 
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for the avoidance of simple self-identification; the realisation that one is a finite 
manifestation of consciousness reveals the universal nature of consciousness as such. 
Both master and slave exhibit only some of these attributes, and still only in 
incomplete forms. The master has freedom and recognition, but this is only partial 
recognition as it comes from the objectified slave, and therefore it is only partial 
freedom. The slave has experienced the fear of death and works on the world, but this 
work is the master’s bidding and so falls short of self-externalisation. What is needed 
is a situation in which all these attributes can be unified in a single consciousness: 
Recognition, freedom, work and discipline are, then, features of human experience 
which are necessary for the achievement of a full self-consciousness. To be properly 
and universally realised, they require the existence of a free society in which 
everyone is recognised as a person, and in which all men work freely, serving not the 
needs of an individual master but the needs of the whole community, and subject only 
to the discipline of reason (Norman 1976, p. 54).  
The implications of this are significant. Hegel has argued that the development of 
self-consciousness cannot be accomplished in isolation, that there are certain criteria 
necessary for this development and that these criteria can only be fulfilled within an 
ideal state, a society that reflects the nature of its various constituents in an organic 
whole. The emergence of such a state would thus do away with the dualistic barriers 
encountered so far: independence versus dependence, the finite versus the infinite, 
and estrangement versus externalisation. With such conditions Hegel argues that a 
sense of unity is possible between self-consciousness and Spirit or Geist, and in this 
way the essence of the former can be grasped in its relation to the latter; the 
description of this experience again recalls that of Gadamer’s interpretation of 
Bildung, being the movement of self-formation through the recognition and 
subsequent assimilation of the alien as one’s own:  
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What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is – this 
absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-
consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 
‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’ (Hegel 1977, p. 110). 
A troubling conclusion arises here: it seems to follow that self-consciousness, in its 
authentic sense, can only arise as the outcome of an ideal state – as a harmonious 
mediation between individuals and society is the only foundation for the prerequisite 
conditions detailed above. It is difficult not to infer, then, that there may be something 
‘inauthentic’ about the nature of self-consciousness prior to this sort of reconciliation. 
 
Returning to the problem of ideology as false consciousness (i.e. ideology as the 
inability to perceive the actual relations between people and their social environment), 
it follows that for Hegel all valuations, explanations and beliefs held by individuals 
prior to the establishment of an ideal state could be said to be in some sense 
ideological. This position can of course be evaded with the addendum that, for the 
speculative philosopher who comes to see all historical manifestations of individual 
and collective consciousnesses as progressing necessarily towards this ideal state, 
ideology is avoided; for it could be argued that it is enough to comprehend the 
direction of the movement of consciousness in order to infer its destination. 
Nevertheless, the implication that ideology would have to be so pervasive, given its 
rather negative connotation of false consciousness, is a disconcerting consequence; it 
would certainly appear that this concept is in need of some clarification. ‘Ideology’ as 
such is not something that Hegel deals with directly; however, in his treatment of 
alienated minds striving for truth in unity, the germinations for such a theory can be 
discerned. Before investigating how the notion of ideology is further developed by 
Feuerbach and Marx it will be worth undertaking a brief excursus on Hegel’s 
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discussion on Stoicism and scepticism, for it is arguably here that he comes closest to 
identifying specific ideologies, how and why they arise, and their shortcomings with 
regards to truthful representation. 
 
1.4 Stoicism and Scepticism as Ideological Responses  
 
Given that the emergence of Stoicism in Hegel’s Phenomenology arises as a 
dialectical consequence of the master/slave relation, it could be inferred that Hegel 
implicitly links Stoicism (and by extension certain forms of ideology) with 
inequitable and exploitative societies. Indeed, insofar as the position of the slave 
could be naturalised from a Stoic perspective, a decisive function of stoicism in this 
context would be to obfuscate the detrimental effect of exploitation on the 
development of consciousness – and so ideology as a potentially malignant construct 
could also be discerned here. It is not my claim that Hegel himself viewed Stoicism as 
a malignant construct, nor do I wish to suggest that there is a necessary correlation 
between ideology in itself and states of repression; it will, however, be argued in 
chapters 5 and 6 that a repressive state apparatus cannot sustain itself unless it is 
supplemented by an ideological formation, and so this is a very pertinent function of 
ideology. It should be noted that Hegel’s description of Stoic consciousness is not a 
precise summation of the principles of Stoicism, it can perhaps better be understood 
as describing a stage in the development of self-consciousness that is particularly 
adapted for or inclined towards an accommodation with Stoicism. With this in mind, I 
will first outline the emergence of Stoic consciousness in Hegel’s Phenomenology; I 
will then describe how this form of consciousness comports with the philosophy of 
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Stoicism itself, before suggesting ways in which Stoicism can thereby function in an 
ideological sense. 
 
To return to the master/slave relation; the slave has come to see, through the 
manipulation and transformation of matter, that thought underlies phenomena in 
general. The external world is no longer perceived to be in opposition to self-
consciousness, for insofar as self-externalisation is possible, external objects are 
subsumed to self-consciousness. However, given the slave’s function as a mediator 
between master and matter, the correlation between the particular thoughts of the 
slave and material reality is not drawn. There is rather an intuition that abstract 
thought in general is the essential determinate force behind phenomena, and that the 
specific instances in which this relation manifests are of secondary importance: 
“Thought underlies reality, but one cannot say in detail how, and so the particular 
content of the world is necessarily seen as contingent, as just given” (Taylor 2005, p. 
158). In perceiving the concrete particulars of materiality as mere contingency the 
slave has attained a sense of freedom or autonomy, for self-essence here is identified 
with thought that cannot be affected by and is not dependent upon anything outside of 
itself (Hegel presumably had in mind the Stoic virtues, which included prudence, 
justice, courage and moderation). Regardless of one’s social position, whether one is 
master or slave, there can be no impediments to the truth found in the universal 
concepts of abstract thought. Hegel’s critique of this apparent resolution can be seen 
to follow logically from a point raised in the preliminaries section to this chapter, that 
‘just as particulars cannot be properly understood without reference to universals, so 
too are universal concepts unintelligible unless they correspond to material 
particulars’. In withdrawing to the realm of abstract thought as a source of freedom, 
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one is only met with abstract freedom, a merely formal freedom without content; and 
this abstractness is said to extend to all Stoic valuations:  
To the question, What is good and true, …[Stoicism] again gave for answer the 
contentless thought: The True and the Good shall consist in reasonableness. But this 
self-identity of thought is again only the pure form in which nothing is determined 
(Hegel 1977, p. 122).   
In order to unpack Hegel’s claim here it will be necessary to investigate the tenets of 
Stoicism itself. 
 
At a glance it may appear strange for Hegel to assign to the Stoic consciousness a 
depreciation of matter in favour of abstract thought. This is because the Stoic 
ontology is completely materialist, they claim that for something to exist it must be 
able to act or be acted upon, and so must be a body. This materialist conception is 
inclusive of the force that animates bodies or endows them with qualities, what they 
call pneuma4 (in the case of humans, pneuma is manifested as the soul). In this 
context an abstraction would be akin to a necessary fiction or convenient designator, 
as all existents are essentially particular. However, given that all existing things are 
particular (the universe being a plenum), it follows that every particular thing that 
exists is in a direct or indirect causal relationship with everything else; and so this 
assumes a monistic theory of mind: in order to truly know ourselves we must relate to 
the whole, of which we are a part. The Emperor Marcus Aurelius expressed this 
doctrine as follows:  																																																								
4 “Because pneuma acts, it must be a body and it appears that the Stoics stressed the fact that its 
blending with matter is ‘through and through’ (Galen 47H, Alex. Aph. 48C). Perhaps as a result of this, 
they developed a theory of mixture which allowed for two bodies to be in the same place at the same 
time. It should be noted, however, that some scholars (e.g. Sorabji, 1988) think that the claim that 
pneuma is blended through the totality of matter is a conclusion that the Stoics’ critics adversely drew 
about what some of their statements committed them to. Perhaps instead they proposed merely that 
pneuma is the matter of a body at a different level of description” (Baltzly 2014).  
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Cease not to think of the Universe as one living Being, possessed of a single 
Substance and a single Soul; and how all things trace back to its single sentience; and 
how it does all things by a single impulse; and how all existing things are joint causes 
of all things that come into existence; and how intertwined in the fabric is the thread 
and how closely woven the web (Aurelius 1953, p. 91). 
This reference to the ‘whole’, then, would be the sort of abstraction that Hegel has in 
mind. Stoicism abstracts from the apparent discord observable in manifold 
phenomena to the notion that every particular thing is an emanation from this single 
substance. Thus Stoic consciousness only comprehends itself in its relation to God, 
the Universe or Nature (these terms being interchangeable); and so everything it 
encounters, including the emotions, is conceived to be in a very real sense contingent 
upon this abstraction.  
 
This monistic view appears to do away with the problem of alienation as self-
estrangement, it actually inverts this situation with a conception of ‘self’ that is 
inclusive of all things ‘other’. However, for Hegel the movement beyond a sense of 
self-estrangement necessarily implies the progressive development of one’s 
consciousness of freedom, and in this respect Stoicism may appear to be somewhat 
wanting. If it is true that all things derive from a single source and follow a single 
impulse, then we can all be said to live in a deterministic state that is arguably 
incompatible with the emergence of such freedom. Aurelius states that: “Whatever 
befalls thee was set in train for thee from everlasting, and the interplication of causes 
was from eternity weaving into one fabric thy existence and the coincident of this 
event” (Aurelius 1953, p. 263). In a sense, then, Hegel’s description of Stoic 
consciousness as entailing the conception of one’s conditions of existence as being 
‘simply given’, outside of one’s control and so inessential, is confirmed here. 
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However, the Stoics were not fatalists, and maintained that they were indeed free. 
Freedom in Stoicism consists in the doctrine of ‘assent’ – the superior or guiding 
aspect of the soul is always free to either assent to or dissent from the judgments we 
form from our initial impressions of the external world; and there is always the 
possibility of a range of different causal consequences that can follow from our 
valuations, which are entirely within our control:  
This borderline which objects cannot cross, this inviolable stronghold of freedom, is 
the limit of what I shall refer to as the ‘inner citadel’. Things cannot penetrate into 
this citadel: that is, they cannot produce the discourse which we develop about things, 
or the interpretation which we give of the world and its events (Hadot 1998, p. 107). 
Freedom is thus thoroughly subjectified, and so external circumstances cannot have 
an effect upon us without our assent. ‘Harmful’ circumstances are only harmful 
insofar as we judge them to be so, in which case they do indeed have a harmful effect 
upon the soul – for the Stoics hold that what is good for the soul is that which is in 
accord with its nature, and its nature cannot be disentwined from the causal network 
which lead to its present circumstances. It follows that to protest against one’s lot in 
life, or to invest oneself with negative emotions regarding it, is quite irrational and 
self-defeating – it would be to create discord in that which is naturally inclined 
towards harmony. Such feelings, then, are considered to be a result of false 
judgments: “Efface the opinion I am harmed, and at once the feeling of being harmed 
disappears; efface the feeling, and the harm disappears at once” (Aurelius 1953, p. 
73); “…Thou canst begin a new life! See but things afresh as thou usedst to see them; 
for in this consists the new life” (Aurelius 1953, p. 165). 
 
To the extent that Stoic valuations are self-contained and divorced from material 
practice Hegel can equate them with ‘contentless thought’, a pure or abstract form of 
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thought in which nothing is determined. It should be remembered that for Hegel the 
development of self-consciousness is a process that cannot be undertaken in isolation, 
it always implies an active relationship with something other than itself. Within this 
schema, then, the monism of Stoicism proves itself to be a severe form of atomisation 
in practice, in which the Stoic consciousness must revert to a state of empty passivity 
– theoretically removed from the external influences which nonetheless shape it. The 
Stoic conception of joy, described by Hadot, demonstrates this passivity:  
Living beings experience joy when they fulfil the function for which they are made, 
and act in accordance with their nature. As we have seen, man fulfils his function qua 
man, and follows his nature as well as universal Nature, when he consents to order: 
the order of the universe as fixed by Destiny; the order of the City of the World and 
of human beings, based as it is upon the mutual attraction of rational beings, and 
hence on the proper nature of mankind; and finally to the order of discourse, which 
reproduces the relation which Nature has established between substances and 
attributes, and above all between events which necessarily follow upon one another 
(Hadot 1998, p. 239). 
Joy here essentially consists in passive conformity, insofar as there is only one 
rational way of attaining it, and that is to consent to whatever material circumstances 
that one finds oneself in. Harmful emotions, and the non-virtuous acts that follow 
from them, are the result of straying from this path; and it goes without saying that the 
immediate victims of non-virtuous acts are always, in an objective sense, the actors 
and not the acted-upon – for in order to act non-virtuously the actor would have to be 
in the least accord with their nature. The philosophy of Stoicism undoubtedly 
provides consolation to the manifestation of consciousness outlined in Hegel’s 
master/slave relation. In doing so, however, the impetus towards overcoming this 
state in the actualisation of a rational social organisation is necessarily ceded to ‘Fate’ 
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or ‘Nature’, and so for Hegel the Stoic consciousness is incompatible with authentic 
freedom. 
 
It will be shown in chapters 5 and 6 that one of the primary functions of ideology is to 
ensure the reproduction of the social relations which govern a given society, and that 
this can be achieved insofar as these relations can be presented as being natural or 
universally applicable. To be successful, then, an ideological formation must be able 
to displace any antagonisms internal to the social order it supplements, and reinscribe 
them as the effects of something ‘other’. From this function it follows that Stoicism 
could be read as a particularly effective ideology, for there is seemingly no form of 
social organisation that it could not be adapted to (incidentally, this adaptability will 
be shown to be a feature it has in common with the Christianity of Paul). With regards 
to how one should assess the fortunes that may follow from a given social 
organisation, Aurelius writes:  
…Still it is a fact that death and life, honour and dishonour, pain and pleasure, riches 
and penury, do among men one and all betide the Good and the Evil alike, being in 
themselves neither honourable nor shameful. Consequently they are neither good nor 
evil (Aurelius 1953, p. 35). 
The claim here is that there are no external factors that are, in and of themselves, 
conducive to a good life – health, wealth and esteem are all equally compatible with 
both virtue and vice, and so from a moral point of view we should treat of such 
matters indifferently, one should rather: “Fit thyself to the environment that is thy 
portion, and love the men among whom thy lot is thrown, but whole-heartedly” 
(Aurelius 1953, p. 151). To stress Stoicism’s inherent susceptibility to ideological 
misuse is not to say that it is in itself without value – for someone in the formidable 
circumstances of the slave, for instance, Stoicism could indeed be seen to fulfil an 
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innate need for a sense of autonomous freedom. However, to the extent that it does 
this at the expense of, if not justifying, at least obfuscating an absence of freedom in 
actuality, it is an ambiguous construct. For Hegel, though, the essential problem with 
Stoicism is not so much its potential function on a societal level; rather, he considers 
that the logical extension of its implicit premises inevitably commits the Stoic to a 
form of scepticism that is ultimately untenable. 
 
This scepticism can be seen to arise as a consequence of the Stoic doctrine of assent: 
while the individual Stoic may be free to assent to or dissent from a judgment as 
being in conformity to Nature, there can be no neutral standard from which the truth 
of this judgment could be confirmed; so if two Stoics were to disagree as to whether a 
particular judgment is worthy of assent, because the Stoic mode of valuation is 
entirely self-referential, there could be no way to adjudicate. It can be argued, then, 
that it follows from the premises of Stoicism that opposed or even contradictory 
judgments could be considered to be equally valid. Problems of this nature lead the 
Pyrrhonist skeptic Sextus Empiricus to argue that it can never be confirmed that 
things ‘as they appear to us’ correspond to anything ‘external’; and so the only 
appropriate way of life is to suspend all judgment:  
We say that the causal origin of the Skeptic Way is the hope of attaining ataraxia [‘an 
untroubled and tranquil condition of the soul’]. Certain talented people, upset by 
anomaly in ‘the facts’ and at a loss as to which of these ‘facts’ deserve assent, 
endeavoured to discover what is true in them and what is false, expecting that by 
settling this they would achieve ataraxia. But the main origin of Skepticism is the 
practice of opposing to each statement an equal statement; it seems to us that doing 
this brings an end to dogmatizing (Sextus Empiricus 1996, p. 90). 
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Hegel argues that this sceptic turn introduces a new contradiction in the development 
of self-consciousness. For the sceptic, it is not simply the case that the concrete 
particulars of materiality are dismissed as accidental, contingent and inessential; but 
rather the very nature of their existence is called into question. This position appears 
to bring us back to a modified variant of ‘self-certainty’, in which the possibility of 
our apprehension of the external world is negated in toto. Hegel argues that such a 
position is simply untenable; in advocating or defending scepticism, even in the mere 
attempt to live by sceptic principles, one is continuously confronted with the 
contingencies of externality: 
[The sceptic consciousness] …affirms the nullity of seeing, hearing, etc., yet it is 
itself seeing, hearing, etc. It affirms the nullity of ethical principles, and lets its 
conduct be governed by these very principles. Its deeds and its words always belie 
one another and equally it has itself the doubly contradictory consciousness of 
unchangeableness and sameness, and of utter contingency and non-identity with itself 
(Hegel 1977, p. 125). 
The contradictions alluded to here by Hegel pertain to scepticism in both theory and 
practice. First of all, the ‘nullity of ethical principles’ that must follow from the 
suspension of all judgment is itself grounded upon an ethical principle of sorts – 
namely that the attainment of ataraxia is a goal worth striving for. Secondly, even if it 
were granted that it is hypothetically possible to suspend all judgment, it is not 
possible to suspend all action; and it is inevitable that we become accustomed to 
certain patterns of behaviour and sociability that we find to be more reasonable or 
justifiable than others. This incongruence was well observed by Hume:  
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds 
[of scepticism], nature herself suffices to that purpose… I dine, I play a game of 
backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four 
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hour’s amusement, I wou’d return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and 
strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther 
(Hume 1985, p. 316).   
 
Although the sceptic attitude is fated to negate itself by way of its contradictory 
nature, it serves the positive function of demonstrating the inseparable aspects of self-
consciousness. On the one hand there is the ‘Unchangeable’ aspect of self-
consciousness: its identification with the universality of abstract thought, with spirit 
(or, for the Stoics, with the superior or guiding aspect of the soul); and on the other 
hand there is self-consciousness’ ‘Changeable’ aspect: its finite and contingent 
embodiment. These essential and inessential aspects were previously conferred upon 
the figures of master and slave, with the simple being-for-self of the master being 
representative of the Unchangeable aspect and the being-for-other of the slave 
personifying the Changeable aspect. Now the tension between these two aspects is 
seen to be an inherent condition within each individual self-consciousness, there is a 
movement from external to internal division, and this internally divided subject is 
designated by Hegel as the Unhappy Consciousness. 
 
This stage of consciousness is designated ‘unhappy’ as it perceives itself to be 
inextricably cut off from its essential aspect, indeed each attempt at communion with 
the Unchangeable is necessarily thwarted by the Changeable:  
Whenever it seeks to negate the subjective Changeable aspect and affirm the 
objective Unchangeable aspect, because this act is an act of consciousness of which 
the subjective Changeable aspect is a part, consciousness’s negation of its subjective 
Changeable aspect is also an affirmation of its subjective Changeable aspect…The 
Unhappy Consciousness is this continuous movement… (Rae 2012, p. 32). 
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The futility of this movement, the inability to find genuine unity with the essential 
Unchangeable, leads self-consciousness to identify itself with the inessential 
Changeable. The result of this is that self-consciousness externalises its essential 
aspect, it perceives its true self as beyond it, as something to strive for; it is as such 
thoroughly evocative of a religious mentality. Whatever one makes of Hegel’s 
professed resolution of this tension, his positing of Geist that manifests itself in finite 
consciousness and must necessarily return to itself, the ontological gap within the 
divided subject defined here is an important foundation for the construction of 
ideology. For it will be argued that it is in this space that ideology can function to 
imbue the subject with a semblance of meaningful reconciliation. It is within this 
framework that Feuerbach establishes his critique of religion.  
 
1.5 The Deification of Human Ideals: Alienation in Feuerbach 
“Only in the misery of man lies the birthplace of God…God is what man desires to 
be; namely, his own essence and goal imagined as an actual being” (Feuerbach 2012, 
p. 221). 
 
Feuerbach incorporates Hegel’s application of the emergence of the divided subject 
and its concurrent self-externalisation, however, he does not view this as a mere 
transitional phase in the phenomenological development of consciousness, as 
something bound to overcome itself given its inherent positive content. Whereas 
Hegel views the divided subject as something that arises prior to and is partly 
overcome by an assimilation into a religious community, Feuerbach argues that a 
religious community, far from ameliorating the existential angst of the divided 
subject, actually functions to sustain and naturalise the predicament. According to 
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Feuerbach, all historical conceptions of a theistic God, and it will be shown that his 
notion of God is closely connected to Hegel’s conception of Geist, can be read as 
instances of the deification of human ideals. He maintains that the divine attributes 
predicated in the figure of God are essentially the objectification of the most revered 
attributes common to humanity in general:  
Hegel’s conception of Geist was thus transformed into something more like empirical 
social theory with a supposedly “emancipatory” potential to itself, a way of 
demystifying ourselves about what we were really trying to achieve. Even more 
contentiously, Feuerbach interpreted God to be only a human projection, a fiction 
“we” inserted into reality to make up for the deficiencies in the existing world5 
(Pinkard 2002, p. 311). 
The ideological function behind the objectification of human ideals in a 
transcendental subject would then be to disassociate humanity from its essential 
characteristics, and thereby displace any expectation that these characteristics ought to 
be manifested in a given society. What is attributed to God cannot be attributed to the 
individual, and if it is true that the attributes of God are essentially human ideals then 
humanity can be said to have cut itself off from its ideal aspects. This shift of 
perspective in Feuerbach could allow for the possibility to talk viably about the 
existence of ideology as false consciousness, to identify false consciousness in a 
specific case by case sense rather than the general sense discernible in Hegel; for if it 
can be convincingly demonstrated that theism represents a mystification of 
empirically identifiable human traits, then it no longer seems necessary to first 
establish a pure and undistorted epistemological perspective from which to juxtapose 
‘false’ derivations. Although the identification of false consciousness in this context 
																																																								
5 The structural role of ‘fiction’ in our actual social relations will prove to be a decisive feature in the 
reformulated conception of ideology I outline in chapters 5 and 6. 
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does not entail a simultaneous attainment of ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ consciousness, it 
does not necessarily follow that the only other option is to revert to a form of 
epistemic relativism – for here false consciousness is not related to knowledge in any 
objective sense, but rather to a particular mode of lived experience. 
 
Feuerbach argues that the origin of religion can be understood as a result of the 
essential difference between humanity and the other species, and that that difference 
lies in our mode of self-consciousness. “Religion has its genesis in the essential 
difference between man and the animal – the animals have no religion” (Feuerbach 
2012, p. 97). Feuerbach draws this distinction because he believes that animals are 
lacking in a certain aspect of consciousness peculiar to humanity; that although 
animals can be said to be conscious of themselves as individuals, as beings distinct 
from other beings and other perceptual objects, they are not conscious of themselves 
as manifestations of a particular species:  
Thus understood, the animal has a simple, but man a twofold, life… Man is in 
himself both ‘I’ and ‘You’; he can put himself in the place of another precisely 
because his species, his essential mode of being – not only his individuality – is an 
object of thought to him (Feuerbach 2012, p. 98). 
Again, this two-fold existence resonates with Hegel’s divided subject, with 
consciousness of individuality corresponding to the Changeable aspect and 
consciousness of mode of being corresponding to the Unchangeable aspect. However, 
Feuerbach differs from Hegel with regards to the emphasis imputed to this two-fold 
state; whereas Hegel argues that such a division is ultimately untenable given the 
experience of Geist, Feuerbach seems to attribute much more ontological significance 
or permanence to this state, suggesting that the historical persistence of religious 
feeling is explicable given our very nature. This difference entails a shift in Feuerbach 
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away from the realm of abstract thought, towards the practical, social affects that such 
thought engenders. For Feuerbach, consciousness of our essential mode of being, our 
Unchangeable aspect, “…is not only the basis, but also the object of religion” 
(Feuerbach 2012, p. 98). It is the basis of religion, for our identification with the 
individual Changeable aspect creates disunion with our essential mode of being, thus 
creating a need for reconciliation, a need that culminates in the inauguration of 
religious feeling.6 And it is the object of religion, for our externalised essential mode 
of being is precisely what constitutes religion as such. The argument that religion is 
an anthropomorphism, contentious as it may be, requires some clarification, and 
Feuerbach devotes a great deal of attention in pursuing this point.  
 
What are the defining attributes that constitute the essential mode of being for 
humanity? Feuerbach argues that they can be divided into three categories: ‘Reason, 
Will, and Heart’. Each and every aspect of the human condition can be classified as 
an instance of something thought, something willed or something felt. Moreover, 
regardless of the ways in which the individual person possesses, makes use of, or 
perceives these traits that together define his/her being, they are all essentially ends-
in-themselves: 
We pursue knowledge in order to know; love in order to love; will in order to will, 
that is, in order to be free… Only that which exists for its own sake is true, perfect, 
and divine. But such is love, such is reason, and such is will. The divine trinity in 
man, but transcending the individual man, is the unity of reason, love, and will 
(Feuerbach 2012, p. 99). 
																																																								
6 Feuerbach is solely concerned with religious phenomena. However, this existential impetus towards a 
form of reconciliation will be shown to inhere in all ideologies, both secular and religious; so for the 
sake of argument, the terms ‘religious’ and ‘ideological’ could be used interchangeably here. 
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So the being-of-humanity, what constitutes us, also exists in isolation from us. To 
demonstrate this Feuerbach goes through the ways in which we experience our mode 
of being. Regarding love, he asks whether we in fact possess love, or are possessed by 
love, affected by it from outside; and the same can be considered of the other 
emotions, do we experience jealousy or anger as arising from an internal source, or do 
they rather have their origin in externality from us, such that we are able to talk of 
being affected, transformed or hindered by them? The faculties of reason and will 
may seem relatively innate, yet Feuerbach asks us to contemplate a state in which we 
are deeply immersed in thought, to the extent that we lose track of time and a sense of 
our surroundings, “…is it you who controls reason, or is it rather reason that controls 
and absorbs you” (Feuerbach 2012, p. 100)? The tools employed and developed by 
reason are also conferred upon us, language is acquired, and education is gradually 
accumulated; it may be argued that we are innately endowed with the potential to 
reason,7 nevertheless reason, in itself, is extrinsic. With regards to will, Feuerbach 
asks us to picture a scenario in which we have employed this faculty with the aim of 
self-improvement or advancement: is this an innate drive, “…or is it rather the energy 
of will, the power of morality which imposes its rule over you and fills you with 
indignation of yourself and your individual weaknesses” (Feuerbach 2012, p. 100)?   
 
In short, our Unchangeable aspect or essential mode of being, that without which we 
are without content, is external to the individual; or rather the extent of its existence 
exceeds that of the individual consciousnesses in which it manifests. It follows that 
the conceptual distinction between the inessential and essential aspects of self-
consciousness represents a quantitative but not a qualitative difference. These 
																																																								
7 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1. 13.  
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reflections allow Feuerbach to contribute an important insight into the 
phenomenological development of consciousness: “Thus, man becomes conscious of 
himself through the object that reflects his being; man’s self-consciousness is his 
consciousness of the object” (Feuerbach 2012, p. 101); and it follows that the 
“…power of the object over him is therefore the power of his own being” (Feuerbach 
2012, p. 102). It is at this point that the concept of false consciousness is particularly 
relevant to Feuerbach. It would arise from a situation where, when confronted with 
personal limitations of character, the individual mistakenly attributes these limitations 
to the being-of-humanity itself; in doing so our proper relation to this mode of being 
would be distorted and its source would be displaced, onto the religious (or 
ideological) object. But, Feuerbach argues, the fact that we are even aware of these 
limitations of being is ample evidence that this shift is unwarranted: 
The measure of being is also the measure of the understanding. If the being 
concerned is limited, its feeling and understanding would be limited, too. But, to a 
limited being, its limited understanding is not a limitation… In keeping with this, if 
you therefore think the infinite, you think and confirm the infinity of the power of 
thought; if you feel the infinite, you feel and confirm the infinity of the power of 
feeling (Feuerbach 2012, pp. 104-105). 
It is from a misconception, then, an identification of the individual with the whole, 
that the space becomes open for the deification of essences, and this could be 
considered to be a form of ‘false consciousness’. False consciousness would then be, 
in the Hegelian sense, total identification with our finite Changeable aspect, and 
subsequently separation from the Unchangeable aspect. It would therefore represent 
the distortion of both aspects – for, as Feuerbach argues, it is the Unchangeable aspect 
that gives content to the Changeable. In not recognising the dual nature of 
consciousness, then, the possibility of false consciousness could be said to arise; and 
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as is the case with any form of consciousness, false consciousness requires an object; 
the object of false consciousness can, for our purposes, be identified with the 
emergence of ideology in a metaphysical sense. It is in this manner that Feuerbach 
undertakes his critique of religion. 
 
1.6 False Consciousness and Ideology: Feuerbach’s Critique of Religion 
 
The object of religious feeling differs from all other objects of the senses; it is unique 
in that as object it cannot be separated from the consciousness of that from which it is 
conceived (and again, this would be pertinent to any ideological formation construed 
in this manner): “…in the case of the religious object, consciousness and self-
consciousness directly coincide. A sensuous object exists apart from man, but the 
religious object exists within him…” (Feuerbach 2012, p. 109). As such, 
consciousness of the religious object and consciousness of the self8 amount to the 
same thing. However, awareness of this correspondence is precisely what is lacking in 
religion as such. The religious object is felt internally but conceived externally. 
Although in this regard the concept of self-alienation9 is particularly relevant to 
religion, it does not follow that this is entirely negative. As mentioned above, 
Feuerbach argues that individuals come to know themselves through perceiving the 
objects that reflect their being; so even if these objects are deified, and thus can 
tentatively be called ideological, it should not be assumed that this is inherently 
retrogressive, “…it would be better to say that religion is the first, but indirect, self-
consciousness of man” (Feuerbach 2012, p. 110). The notion that religious belief 																																																								
8 The term ‘self’ may be too generic in this sense. Feuerbach seems to have in mind the way in which 
we come to define ourselves, rather than the emergence of any immediate or practical self-knowledge; 
as such the term ‘self-identity’ would perhaps be more suitable.   
9 In both forms: as ‘estrangement’ from essence and ‘externalisation’ of essence.	
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could be false, yet also tend towards advancement of a sort, is developed by 
Feuerbach in his evaluation of the historical development of religions.   
 
Feuerbach argues that what in early religions was taken to be objective truth is in later 
religions regarded as false and anthropomorphic. He uses the example of monotheistic 
condemnation of pagan idolatry, arguing that from the perspective of monotheism, 
paganism represents the worshiping of one’s own essence; and he notes that although 
this feature is readily recognised in ‘other’ religious traditions, it has been the case in 
religiosity that the very same critique has rarely been directed inwardly:  
Every progress in religion means, therefore, a deepening of man’s knowledge of 
himself. But every religion, while designating older religions as idolatrous, looks 
upon itself as exempted from their fate. It does so necessarily, for otherwise it would 
no longer be religion (Feuerbach 2012, p. 110).  
So what is it that could allow for a retrospective appraisal of older religious traditions 
as being ‘all too human’ without extending this critique to one’s contemporary beliefs 
and practices? Feuerbach has alluded to the answer above, namely, ‘that the divine 
attributes predicated in the figure of God are essentially the objectification of the most 
revered attributes common to humanity in general’. Thus humankind, if it were to live 
in a hypothetical ‘state of nature’, would come to worship nature as divine. With the 
advent of significant cultural and technological advancements, there comes with them 
a revaluation of divinity: “Where man lives in houses, he encloses his gods in 
temples. A temple expresses the value which man attaches to beautiful buildings” 
(Feuerbach 2012, p. 118). This phenomenon extends to subjective evaluations, 
shaping the way in which morality is conceived: “God, therefore, symbolises 
humanity’s own unfulfilled ideal of moral perfection and at the same time 
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compensates humanity for its moral shortcomings...” (Pines 1993, pp. 98-99). This 
last observation, that the deification of moral ideals can function as compensation for 
individual moral shortcomings, creates problems for the previous argument that 
religious belief can be false yet tending towards advancement; for if moral perfection 
is conceived of as being transcendent there leaves little incentive for self-
improvement in that area. And so it could be argued that, on the contrary, there is an 
element of stasis present in religious belief. It is in this respect that one can see just 
how far ideology could be removed from the self-propelling adaptability associated 
with Bildung. In any case, the full force of Feuerbach’s critique of religion is arguably 
in his treatment of the ways in which the Deity has historically been conceived, for it 
is here that he attempts to demonstrate that, deprived of their anthropomorphic 
influences, such conceptions have in fact no content of their own. 
 
Feuerbach argues that for something to exist in an authentic sense it must go beyond 
the conceptual: “All existence, that is, all existence that really is existence, is 
qualitative, determinate existence” (Feuerbach 2012, p. 112). A concept, or 
abstraction, does not have this concrete existence; it is limited in its dependence on 
that from which it has been abstracted. With this in mind Feuerbach asks us to 
consider the implications of the not uncommon practice of positing God as a being 
who is unknowable. It seems to follow that the positing of such a being is at the same 
time the negation of such a being: “By positing God as unknowable… [One] negates 
God in practice…but he does not negate him in theory… [But this] is only a negative 
existence…a being that, in view of its effects, is indistinguishable from non-being” 
(Feuerbach 2012, p. 112). A subtler approach to the conceptualisation of God is to 
		
44	
argue that although the predicates of God are anthropomorphic and limited, it does 
not follow that this entails a limitation of God itself; rather, given the limited and 
imperfect nature of human understanding, it could only be possible for God to appear 
to us in a limited and imperfect form. Although this approach may be less prone to the 
charge of contradiction, it still leaves the figure of God itself as a somewhat empty 
abstraction: 
It is not at all possible for me to know whether God as he is in and for himself is 
something different from what he is for me. The manner in which he exists for me is 
also the totality of his existence for me (Feuerbach 2012, p. 113). 
Feuerbach argues that these approaches rely on a mistaken dichotomy between 
subject and predicate, a division that allows us to talk of existence and essence in 
isolation of each other. A recurrent argument in Feuerbach’s writing is the question of 
what is the subject if not the sum of its predicates – deprived of its predicates, what is 
left of the subject? To this Feuerbach would argue that only an empty abstraction is 
left, and thus only an imaginary existence. This point is articulated well by Thornton: 
…the existence of any entity and its possession of attributes are necessarily 
connected; the distinction between the entity which exists, and its attributes, is merely 
a conceptual one. We are therefore frequently misled into thinking that we can accept 
that the predicates which we ascribe to God are anthropomorphisms, while denying 
that God himself, the subject, is an anthropomorphism, because we mistake this 
conceptual distinction for an ontological one (Thornton1996, pp. 111-112). 
The unacknowledged shift from the conceptual to the ontological could, for our 
purposes, be identified as an instance of false consciousness. And it follows that any 
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tradition or belief system arising from such a shift could, if the connection between 
false consciousness and ideology is maintained, be classified as ideological. 
 
To further demonstrate that a distorted ontological shift has taken place it is important 
to recall what has been said about divinity; for something to be divine it must exist as 
an end-in-itself, and such has been the common conception of God: God represents 
perfection, existing in and for itself. Yet as Feuerbach points out: “The concept of 
God depends on the concept of justice, kindness, and wisdom…” (Feuerbach 2012, p. 
119). Deprived of one or more of these attributes, God is no longer divine, thus no 
longer ‘God’10. The attributes predicated in the figure of God, on the other hand, do 
fit the criteria of divinity: “Justice, wisdom, and, in fact, every determination which 
constitutes the divinity of God, is determined and known through itself; but God is 
known and determined by the predicates” (Feuerbach 2012, p. 119). And so false 
consciousness in this sense would imply not only an unwarranted shift from the 
conceptual to the ontological, but also an inverted logic in the attributing of value to 
the subject over the predicates. Before moving on, an important criticism of 
Feuerbach’s critique of religion should be noted; it concerns Feuerbach’s almost 
dogmatic insistence on treating religion in a purely scientific manner and is worth 
quoting in full: 
Religion is, as… [Feuerbach] clearly saw, a fundamentally important and intriguing 
human phenomenon – and he was surely right in stressing the centrality of man 
himself to this phenomenon – but it is a gross misconception to think that religion can 
be understood by the literal application to it of standards of rationality which are 																																																								
10 This example of course refers to the God of the New Testament; however, it could be applicable to 
other Deities provided the relevant attributes are taken into account.  
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pertinent and appropriate for purely factual discourse. As a form of life, religion can 
rather be comprehended only in terms of the internal logic which governs it, and 
which both sets it apart from, and determines points of interconnections with, other 
forms of life (Thornton 1996, pp. 118-119). 
The value of religion, its effect on the individual and society in general, is of 
fundamental importance regardless of its epistemic validity, and this extends to any 
and all ideologies. As such it is an aspect that ought not to be dismissed, and will be 
investigated in greater detail in the forthcoming chapters. 
 
It has been the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate the grounds on which a 
connection can be made between the concept of ideology and that of false 
consciousness, and to suggest that the epistemic limitations stemming from the mind-
body problem do not necessarily invalidate such an approach. The investigation thus 
far has been confined to speculative reflections on the relation of consciousness to the 
external world, however, ideology in its common usage implies more than just the 
notions of true or false belief. Perhaps of greater importance are questions related to 
how and why ideologies come into existence, how they function, and to what extent 
they influence social dynamics. It is this practical aspect that concerned Marx, who in 
expanding on the notion of false consciousness in this direction paved the way for a 
more concrete definition of ideology. The contribution of Marx to the establishment 
of a theory of ideology is the subject of the following chapter. 
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2 The Theory of Ideology in Marx 
 
2.1 An Epistemological or Political Approach? 
 
It would be fair to say that the traditional understanding of the notion of ideology was 
most firmly established in the writings of Marx and Engels:11 “For most people, the 
term ‘ideology’ is closely bound up with Marxism, and their reactions to the term are 
largely determined by the association” (Mannheim 1936). However, it is also the case 
that many differing definitions regarding what is meant by ideology, in use today, are 
a direct result of the ambiguities inherent in the Marxian treatment of the subject. 
There is a notable shift of emphasis from Marx’s earlier to later writings regarding the 
sources and functions of ideology. His earlier writings are primarily concerned with 
the depiction of ideology as being something internally operative within the subject, 
as an illusion or misperception that can arise within the broader development of self-
consciousness; and to that extent it continues with the tradition outlined in the 
previous chapter. In his later writings ideology is viewed more as a necessary result of 
our relation to specific social formations, as a natural reflection or justification of 
these formations. As such ideology seems to transform from a subjective to an 
objective phenomenon. Having said this, it is not as though Marx has come up with 
two or more distinct concepts here, as there are elements of the different approaches 
adhering throughout all of his treatment of ideology. These shifts in emphasis do, 
however, work to preclude the establishment of a fixed definition of ideology in 
																																																								
11 The term ‘ideology’ was actually coined by Destutt de Tracy in 1796; however, it has come to mean 
quite the opposite of its original signification as a rational ‘science of ideas’. See: (Eagleton 2007, p. 
66).  
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Marx, as the two perspectives suggest that the concept may have conflicting 
functions. These ambiguities,  
…stem in effect from the equivocation…in the work of Marx between ideology as 
illusion, and ideology as the intellectual armoury of a social class. Or, to put it in 
another way, they reflect a conflict between the epistemological and political 
meanings of the term. In the second sense of the word, what matters is not the 
character of the beliefs in question, but their function and perhaps their origin… 
(Eagleton 2007, p. 90). 
Thus far, the notion of ideology has been considered in an epistemological sense; 
insofar as ideology can be equated with a form of false consciousness, it seems to 
follow that the truth or falsity of a belief must be an important aspect of any analysis 
of ideology. The function of a belief can, however, be analysed quite independently of 
its specific content; and if it is assumed that a belief’s function is what is decisive in 
ascertaining whether it is ideological, the question of its truth or falsity may be 
superfluous. Both the epistemological and political approaches to ideology are 
discernible in Marx. An important aim of this chapter, then, is to establish whether the 
differing approaches represent a genuine inconsistency in Marx, or whether they are 
simply expressive of the complex and multi-dimensional structure of ideology. 
 
It should be noted that such an overall appraisal entails a deviation of sorts; an 
attempted amalgamation of the young and mature Marx with regards to ideology has 
not been the common practice within the Marxist tradition. A preferred method, 
popularised by Althusser, has been to talk of an ‘epistemological break’ having 
occurred between the two eras, thereby bifurcating the Marxian theory of ideology 
into two distinct, somewhat incompatible, approaches. This point is well made by 
Larrain: 
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On the one hand is a tradition normally associated with German historicism and 
idealism, which strongly emphasises the philosophical Marx and relies upon the 
works of his youth. The concept of ideology, consequently, is mainly worked out in 
the context of The German Ideology, and Marx’s economic works are either 
disregarded as irrelevant for the concept or considered a dangerous reversal of former 
philosophical achievements. On the other hand, a tradition of positivist origin, to 
which some forms of structuralism can be associated, emphasises Marx as a scientist 
and economist and relies upon the works of his maturity (1979, p. 36). 
This latter tradition of course, in a likewise manner, relegates the works of the young 
Marx on ideology as irrelevant to the concept proper. So it will be one of the key aims 
of this chapter to determine whether such a ‘break’ in Marx is necessary. In order to 
comprehend Marx’s alternating conception of ideology, and whether the break is 
justified, it will be necessary to trace his development of the subject through to his 
mature works. Marx’s early works on the matter will be explored primarily through 
an interpretation of ideology as put forward in his Theses on Feuerbach and The 
German Ideology; this will be juxtaposed with how the concept developed further 
within sections of his A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy and Capital. 
This division is a divergence from that which was proposed by Althusser, who argued 
that The German Ideology belongs within the corpus of Marx’s ‘scientific’ work, 
subsequent to the ‘epistemological break’:  
In 1845, Marx broke radically with every theory that based history and politics on an 
essence of man… This rupture with every philosophical anthropology or humanism 
is no secondary detail; it is Marx’s scientific discovery. It means that Marx rejected 
the problematic of the earlier philosophy and adopted a new problematic in one and 
the same act (Althusser 1969, p. 227). 
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I do not think that The German Ideology is at all representative of a radical break 
from the concerns of Marx’s early writings. As it will be shown, the text can be read 
as a continuation of Marx’s earlier project and does indeed contain elements of an 
epistemological conception of ideology within a humanist framework.  
 
2.2 ‘…As in a Camera Obscura’: Ideological Inversions 
“A clever fellow once got the idea that people drown because they are possessed by 
the ‘idea of gravity’. If they would get this notion out of their heads by seeing it as 
religious superstition, they would be completely safe from all danger of water. For his 
entire life he fought against the illusion of gravity while all statistics gave him new 
and abundant evidence of its harmful effects” (Marx 1967, p. 405). 
 
The ‘clever fellow’ to whom Marx refers in the satirical passage above is intended to 
figure as a representative of the Young Hegelians, a prominent group of radical-left 
leaning Hegelians that Feuerbach was affiliated with. Marx himself was initially 
sympathetic to the group; however, by the time of writing The German Ideology, he 
had come to consider them to be advocates of a ‘pseudo-revolutionary’ philosophy. 
The passage contains what is in essence the realignment entailed in a functional 
approach to ideology. It is one thing to unmask or deconstruct the logic of an idea, for 
instance to demonstrate the superstition underlying a religious doctrine; it is quite 
another thing to ascertain the function a doctrine may have when it is put into practice 
– the danger of the former approach is that it is prone to neglect the extent to which 
false ideas may themselves engender or be symptomatic of something very real. What 
Marx is suggesting is that the effects of a doctrine are as real as that of gravity, 
regardless of their inner coherence. It follows that a critique that confines itself to the 
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level of notional ideas is a superficial one, as it leaves the conditions which engender 
and sustain such ideas untouched; or as he put it in his Theses on Feuerbach: “The 
philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is, to change 
it” (Marx 1967, p. 402). 
                                        
This shift of emphasis in Marx has consequences for the notion of ideology that 
resulted from the investigation in chapter 1. To return to the discussion on Feuerbach; 
I concluded with the supposition that ideology as false consciousness is born from a 
shift within consciousness whereby a conceptual distinction is perceived as being an 
ontological division. It seems to follow, then, that it is enough to comprehend this 
shift for what it is, an instance of reification, in order to rid oneself of ideological 
influence. What can be inferred from this is that the whole operation, namely, the 
establishment of the ideological consciousness, the comprehension that this is an 
error, and the subsequent return to authenticity, takes place within the individual 
mind. Implicit in this view is an interpretation of consciousness as being inherently 
independent, although it may be prone to misperception regarding the ontological 
status of its different aspects. What is missing in Feuerbach’s analysis is a proper 
consideration of the socio-historical contingencies at play when a conception of self-
consciousness is developed. For instance, Feuerbach is aware of the historical 
relativity with regards to humanity’s relation to the religious object, but this 
contingency is lacking in his treatment of our relation to consciousness as such. Our 
perception of the religious object, or rather our perception of our ideal aspects, alters 
in conformity to the socio-historical period it finds itself in; but the agent of 
perception remains stable, and so universal, in the sense that the idealists convey 
when attributing consciousness as being the primary determinate of material life. It is 
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this conception that Marx seeks to disclaim, and it is in this context in which the 
following quote, alluded to at the beginning of chapter 1, is meant: 
The phantoms formed in the human brain, too, are necessary sublimations of man’s 
material life-process which is empirically verifiable and connected with material 
premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, and all the rest of ideology and their 
corresponding forms of consciousness no longer seem to be independent. They have 
no history or development. Rather, men who develop their material production and 
their material relationships alter their thinking and the products of their thinking 
along with their real existence. Consciousness does not determine life, but life 
determines consciousness (Marx 1967, p. 414). 
It is the inversion of the last line, Marx argues, which has been and remains the true 
source of ideology. It is not that ideology is a subjective distortion or 
misapprehension of something authentic – it is rather the case that ideology is the 
illusory representation of an objectively distorted authenticity, a reflection of 
something quite real. 
 
In his Theses on Feuerbach Marx sets out to clarify what he sees as the limitations 
inherent in Feuerbach’s philosophy. He points out that Feuerbach, and to an extent 
Hegel before him, treats the phenomenon of self-alienation as an objective fact, 
intrinsic to the human condition. The establishment of a religious world in opposition 
to a secular world arises in response to this alienation. The progressive conceptions of 
this phenomenon – alienation from essence in the form of a deity to alienation from 
species essence – still consider this schism within the subject to be quite natural and 
even foundational for the development of self-consciousness. Marx believes this is 
unfounded:  
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…[Feuerbach’s] work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. 
But the fact that the secular basis becomes separate from itself and establishes an 
independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by the cleavage and self-
contradictoriness of the secular basis… [It follows that] after the earthly family is 
found to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then be theoretically and 
practically nullified (Marx 1967, p. 401). 
If the ideals exemplified in the religious world are abstractions from the secular world 
then it follows that the secular world is not commensurable to its ideals, for the 
holy/earthly distinction is only possible insofar as what is ideal is utterly 
disproportionate to what is given. Feuerbach fails to appreciate the consequences of 
his critique because he views self-alienation as inherent to the individual; it only 
follows, then, that society as a whole should reflect this state. But Marx argues that 
this picture is upside-down, society does not reflect a human essence, but rather the 
human essence, if it can so be called, is to be found as the result of individuals’ 
relation to society: “Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. 
But the essence of man is no abstraction inhering in each single individual. In its 
actuality it is the ensemble of social relationships” (Marx 1967, p. 402). If the human 
essence (or rather, that which gives content to or is the object of self-consciousness) is 
conceived of as the ensemble of social relationships then the phenomenon of self-
alienation and religious feeling is no longer necessary, but rather a reaction to specific 
social circumstances. He continues: “Feuerbach does not see, consequently, that 
‘religious feeling’ is itself a social product and that the abstract individual he analyses 
belongs to a particular form of society” (Marx 1967, p. 402). So religious feeling 
according to Marx is a result of self-alienation, but this in turn is a result of particular 
social formations, and so is open to critique and possible change. It is now necessary 
to turn to Marx’s conception of the material foundation of this phenomenon. 
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In The German Ideology Marx argues that self-consciousness is inextricably linked 
with concrete existence, i.e., ‘actual life-process’. What distinguishes us from other 
animals is not some innate quality of the mind, he argues, but the fact that we are able 
to produce our own means of subsistence. It is from this act of production, the means 
of which increasing and diversifying with the historical development of societies, that 
the space becomes open for the conceptualisation of meaning; but importantly: 
“…these meanings are constitutive of…[human] activities, not secondary to them. 
Human existence…is purposive or ‘intentional’ existence; and these purposive 
conceptions form the inner grammar of our practical life, without which it would be 
mere physical motion” (Eagleton 2007, p. 73). Accordingly, the bifurcation of 
consciousness on the one hand and the material world on the other is misplaced. The 
two are necessary counterparts of the same phenomenon: we are always conscious of 
a material world shaped by human activity. Marx argues that even the most seemingly 
clear philosophical examples of the mind/matter distinction are not immune from the 
contingencies of historical development; he makes this case in the following passage 
with regards to Feuerbach and ‘sense-certainty’: 
…[Feuerbach] does not see that the world surrounding him is not something directly 
given and the same from all eternity…it is a historical product, the result of the 
activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the 
preceding one… Even the objects of the simplest “sensuous certainty” are given to 
him only through social development, industry, and commercial relationships. The 
cherry tree, like almost all fruit trees, was transplanted into our zone by commerce 
only a few centuries ago, as we know, and only by this action of a particular society 
in a particular time has it become “sensuous certainty” for Feuerbach (Marx 1967, p. 
417). 
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It should be reiterated that Marx is not simply inverting the idealist notion that 
consciousness is the impetus of material activity: the fact that we are conscious of a 
material world shaped by human activity does not negate the role of consciousness in 
the act of shaping, as material activity in and of itself is just as empty as isolated 
consciousness. However, while attempting to distance himself from both idealist and 
materialist schools of thought, Marx maintains that in the last resort it is the life-
process, material activity, that gives consciousness content; and he maintains this 
because he argues that consciousness, properly speaking, is a social product. 
 
In order to demonstrate this Marx argues that language ought to be seen as the 
necessary corollary of consciousness, that it is indeed ‘practical consciousness’, the 
expression of reflective consciousness, and that both arise “…from the need and 
necessity of relationships with other men” (Marx 1967, p. 421). That consciousness 
necessarily finds expression in language, Marx argues, is evidence of its social nature, 
he continues: 
Consciousness is thus from the beginning a social product and will remain so as long 
as men exist. At first consciousness is concerned only with the immediate sensuous 
environment and a limited relationship with other persons and things outside the 
individual who is becoming conscious of himself… [But] this sheeplike or tribal 
consciousness receives further development and formation through increased 
productivity, the increase of needs, and what is fundamental to both, the increase of 
population (Marx 1967, p. 422).  
Developing concurrently with the increase of productivity, of needs, and of 
population, is an increase in the division of labour, and it is this that Marx identifies 
as the genesis of alienation. In the initial phase of consciousness development thought 
and material activity are considered to be much more directly interwoven, as the 
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extent of the division of labour is slight; Marx argues that the division at this stage is 
more or less limited to natural or accidental contingencies, such as the different roles 
assumed in the act of procreation, those roles arising from differences in mental and 
physical strength, and so on (Marx 1967, p. 422). But it is inevitable that with 
increases in population, productivity and needs there arises a shift whereby the 
activity performed for the sake of individual or familial needs comes into conflict 
with the needs of the community, and vice versa. So here we have a material 
foundation for some of the mystified dichotomies encountered so far: Changeable-
Unchangeable-aspects and existence and essence as representations of the conflict 
between individual and communal interests. This conflict is still conceived by Marx 
to be the source of alienation, but unlike the aforementioned representations it situates 
both sides firmly in the realm of objective, material activity:  
The communal interest does not exist only in the imagination, as something ‘general’, 
but first of all in reality, as a mutual interdependence of those individuals among 
whom the labour is divided. And finally, the division of labour offers us the first 
example for the fact that man’s own act becomes an alien power opposed to him and 
enslaving him instead of being controlled by him (Marx 1967, p. 424). 
The effects of the division of labour are not limited to a sense of alienation but, 
relatedly, associated by Marx with the rise of ideological consciousness. 
 
How does this arise? Marx argues that with the growth of a particular society there 
comes with it technological developments which drastically enhance the means of 
production, fewer people are then needed for direct manual labour; thus the division 
of labour increases concurrently with the growing gap between labour and industry; 
alongside this phenomenon there is the emergence of class conflicts, essentially 
concentrated on the disparities between those who have ownership and control of the 
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means of production and those who do not. The division of labour and the emergence 
of class relations entail that one’s immediate practical activity or occupation is not 
directly related to one’s means of subsistence, as the latter is associated with wages or 
the accumulation of capital. The extent to which this division is conceived to be 
absolute, where one’s practical activity is conceived as being independent or removed 
from the social relations of production, is the extent to which ideological 
consciousness is made possible:  
For this ideological subdivision within a class, 1. Occupation becomes independent 
through the division of labor; everybody thinks of his craft as the true one. Because it 
is determined by the nature of the craft itself, one necessarily has illusions about the 
connection of his craft with reality (Marx 1967, p. 472). 
The apparent separation between occupation and social relations of production is most 
pronounced where there arises a division between mental and material labour; mental 
labour certainly has the appearance of independence, however Marx is at pains to 
stress that this form of ‘independence’ must itself assume as natural (or irrelevant) the 
divisions of labour necessitated by the particular mode of production which gives rise 
to its possibility (unless, of course, the mental labour in question addresses this 
relation). For Marx, the problematic result of this conceptual estrangement is that it 
can give rise to a class of ‘ideologists’ who, in their ‘estranged activity’, actually 
function as the unwitting apologists of a particular mode of production; and Marx is 
quite relentless in attributing this function to many of his contemporaries working in 
the fields of political economy and academic philosophy. This mental or ‘ideological’ 
alienation arising from the material alienation in the division of labour is said to 
develop as follows:  
The division of labour is a true division only from the moment a division of material 
and mental labour appears. <<The first form of ideologists, priests, is concurrent. >> 
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From this moment on consciousness can really boast of being something other than 
consciousness of existing practice, of really representing something without 
representing something real. From this moment on consciousness can emancipate 
itself from the world and proceed to the formation of ‘pure’ theory, theology, 
philosophy, ethics, etc. (Marx 1967, pp. 422-423).  
Thus we have the first sketches of Marx’s conception of ideology, the mistaken 
assumption of the autonomy of theoretical ideas, their dissociation from the material 
conditions of which they are a reflection; it is the absence of the recognition that the 
possibility for ‘pure’, abstract ideas, only arises as a result of the formation of specific 
relations of production contingent on specific historical developments. The socio-
historical relativity of ‘ideological’ ideas is negated and they tend to take on the form 
of universality, for the material conditions of those espousing such ideas do not 
overtly reveal their genesis. Thus:  
…[Marx] produced…a theory of the class character of consciousness, i.e. of the 
limits of its intellectual horizon which reflect or reproduce the limits of 
communication imposed by the division of society into classes (or nations, etc.). The 
basis of the explanation is the obstacle to universality inscribed in the conditions of 
material life, beyond which it is only possible to think in imagination… Ideological 
consciousness is, first, the dream of an impossible universality (Balibar 1996, p. 48). 
The consequences of this conception of ideology are problematic. If the sphere of our 
understanding is fixed by, or even simply reflective of, our social role within a given 
mode of production, and our only recourse from this situation is in the imagination, 
then the limits of our ‘intellectual horizon’ are troublingly restrictive. There is a 
danger that in dismantling the faux-universality of ideology in this way, Marx comes 
close to introducing a form of class essentialism that could be equally oppressive; for 
it could be argued that what follows from this is that it is a matter of little importance 
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whether one’s thoughts are ideological or non-ideological: either we live with the 
naïve illusion of self-determined universal ideas or accept that our thoughts are 
simply representations of a material life-process beyond our direct control; neither 
option offers the hope of affective change. The determinism at the heart of such a 
conception is also at odds with the ‘purposive’ or ‘intentional’ nature of human 
consciousness earlier identified with Marx. 
 
The model of ideology as illusion is given much needed refinement in a later passage 
of The German Ideology, making it more compatible with Marx’s notions of the 
interdependence of thought and action. Here the function of ideology is broadened to 
include its role in political struggles and permutations, and thereby restore some 
much-needed agency to the ideological subject:  
In every epoch the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling ideas, that is, the class that 
is the ruling material power of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual 
power. The class having the means of material production has also control over the 
means of intellectual production, so that it also controls, generally speaking, the ideas 
of those who lack the means of intellectual production. The ruling ideas are nothing 
more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships grasped as 
ideas, hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one and 
therefore the ideas of its domination (Marx 1967, p. 438).   
This new approach appears to invert the implications of the previous passages; 
ideology now, far from being thoughts dissociated from and ineffectual towards 
material activity, becomes the guiding force of material activity. Ideology is here 
conceived of as a collection of ideas that are systematically utilised to maintain the 
status quo of exploitative relations of production between people. In order to 
demonstrate this Marx asks us to compare and contrast the guiding values aligned 
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with the various forms of government practiced by the ruling classes over the ages; he 
notes that the idea of ‘honour’ and ‘loyalty’ was espoused during the age of 
aristocracy, that ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ arise as dominant ideas concurrently with 
bourgeois rule, but also that the absence of a definitive ruling class does not negate 
the role of ideology in social manipulation: “For example, in an age and in a country 
where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for domination and 
where control is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the 
dominant idea and is expressed as an ‘eternal law’” (Marx 1967, p. 438). The function 
of ideology is the same in all of these formulations: to attempt to naturalise the social 
order of a given time by way of demonstrating that it is the expression of universal 
ideas; but unlike the abstract universals of the ideology as illusion model, these ideas 
are directly interwoven with the fabric of material relations of production, whether 
they be for the purposes of establishing, maintaining, or overturning a given social 
order. The pertinence of this function of ideology is still clearly discernible today; 
David Harvey proposes that we consider the likely reaction to a hypothetical Wall 
Street protester who declares that, “Growth Is Bad, Stop It Now”:  
…would that be considered an anticapitalist sentiment? You bet it would. You would 
be dismissed, however, not necessarily for being anticapitalist but for being 
antigrowth, because growth is considered both inevitable and good. Zero growth 
signals serious problems… We all happily sit around and say growth is good, 
technological change is good and so capitalism, which requires both, must also be 
good. This is the sort of common belief system that Gramsci often referred to as 
‘hegemony’ (Harvey 2010, pp. 200-201). 
Ideology as a hegemonic belief system or set of guiding values certainly retains 
aspects of the illusion model; for to be most effective it requires a similar inversion in 
which the conditions for a particular mode of production are reconceptualised as the 
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goal. But this sort of hegemony also implies and can only arise from a struggle with 
points of opposition, and the unfolding history of transformations in hegemonic ideals 
(from the preponderance accorded to honour and loyalty, to equality, to individual 
liberty…) attests to the fact that it is never fixed or absolute but rather a site of 
contestation. It could be, then, that the ‘class character of consciousness’ implied by 
the illusion model is not necessarily an essentialist concept, insofar as it is granted 
that the intellectual limits imposed by our material conditions are themselves 
constantly evolving.   
 
There still remains a certain discrepancy in the two approaches as to how ideology is 
conceived to function. For the illusion model ideology is a set of distorted and 
dissociated mental conceptions, the ideological subject is unaware of the actual 
relation between these conceptions and their material foundations; it would appear to 
the subject, then, that the extent to which these conceptions are expressive of 
hegemonic interests is incidental, the ‘unintended consequences’ of one’s belief. The 
political model implies a much more direct relation between one’s mental conceptions 
and material interests, as ideology is here conceived as the predominant apparatus 
through which these interests are expressed. The discrepancy has been noted by 
Eagleton:  
…this political model of ideology does not entirely square with the more 
epistemological conception of it as thought oblivious to its social origin. What is it, 
then, that makes ideas ideological? That they are cut loose from their social 
moorings, or that they are weapons of a dominant class? And does the latter 
necessarily entail the former (2007, p. 79)? 
It would have to be said that the latter does not necessarily entail the former; if the full 
implications of the two approaches are combined we have a counterintuitive scenario 
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in which ideology is both the expression of the interests of a dominant class and the 
form in which these interests are mystified. If no awareness of the social moorings of 
ideological thought is granted to the subject of ideology, the question immediately 
arises as to what, then, is responsible for the formation of dominant ideologies 
(appeals to some sort of historical telos or ‘invisible hand’ come to mind as possible, 
rather ‘ideological’ sounding, answers to this problem). I think it more plausible to 
argue that the discrepancy between Marx’s political and epistemological conceptions 
of ideology could perhaps be representative of two poles encompassing a spectrum of 
ideological effects; that ideology could range from the simple and overt expression of 
interests, to the conscious or unconscious obfuscation of these interests, through to the 
voluntary acquiescence to opposing interests as a result of ideological obfuscation or 
‘false consciousness’; that the effects of ideology could thus vary from subject to 
subject depending on the socio-historical circumstances. It should be noted that the 
general tendency of ideology towards the naturalisation of a particular social order 
would remain the same in all these instances; whether a set of ideological beliefs is 
cynically espoused as instrumental tools of manipulation or whether the beliefs are 
held to be valuable in and of themselves, the general effect is the same. Conjoining 
the political and epistemological approaches to ideology would then have the effect of 
loosening the epistemic restrictions of the latter and thereby leave open the possibility 
of non-ideological thought; for the political model’s emphasis on the historical 
transformations of social orders guided and reinforced by class struggle and 
ideological thought still allows for the active engagement of the subject in the 
contestation of ideas. Whether this resolution is sufficient is debatable, and it appears 
that Marx himself was dissatisfied with these results, for in his later writings he 
continues to attempt a more internally-consistent, concrete conception of ideology.  
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2.3 Base and Superstructure 
 
In his Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy Marx continues 
to deviate from the illusion model of ideology, although some of its central tenets are 
retained. He begins again by asserting that social being, or material activity, is the 
determinate force behind consciousness as such; human beings are, in the first place, 
forced into relations with one another in order to produce the necessities required for 
their subsistence. This basic state of affairs exists prior to and independent of the will 
or considerations of the individual person. What Marx is arguing is that any genuine 
conception of political economy needs to take this as its starting point, for he 
maintains that everything else is a mere extension of it:  
The sum total of these relations of production [between people]…constitutes the 
economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The 
mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life 
process in general (Marx 1951, pp. 328-329). 
It is here that Marx introduces the formula of base and superstructure as the guiding 
principle of ideological discourse, and with it there are some not insignificant changes 
to the concept. The economic base is presented as the field in which our 
aforementioned ‘actual life-process’ or ‘concrete existence’ develops, it contains the 
sum total of a given society’s means of production (raw materials and instruments of 
production) and labour power; and what arises from this is an ideological 
superstructure which governs how these social relations are ordered. That the 
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superstructure is ideological can be inferred from the proposition that ‘definite forms 
of social consciousness’ correspond to it, and not to the base.12  
 
However, this new formulation appears to imply a shift in the ontological status of 
ideology. It was previously argued, for instance, that the notions of ‘freedom’ and 
‘equality’ could be said to be ideological insofar as it could be demonstrated that it 
was illusory to believe that they actually corresponded to material reality (what made 
the notions ideological was precisely their separation from an economic base); but 
this argument cannot apply to ideology as it develops in the superstructure. What 
comprises the superstructural apparatus, its legal, political, religious and myriad 
cultural institutions, is not a product of false consciousness; it all manifestly exists. So 
what is it that makes the superstructure ideological? Presumably, it is in the implied 
neutrality of the institutions at work within it. To recall, it was the tendency of both 
the epistemological and political approaches to ideology that particular mental 
conceptions, or expressions of interests, were reconceptualised as being universal 
ideas. It would follow that what makes the superstructure ideological is not so much 
that it mystifies or distorts a given set of social relations, but rather that it naturalises 
such relations. Marx’s argument is that the actual function of these institutions is to, 
in a sense, manipulate or condition our mental conceptions into the acceptance of a 
contingent set of relations of production, which are governed by the economic base. 
The primacy that Marx affords to the economic base is grounded in the fact that, 																																																								
12 The precise nature of what Marx intended by this ‘correspondence’ between base and superstructure 
has been widely contested: for the view that the base is the primary element in this relation, see: 
(Cohen 1978, pp. 134-174); for the similar, yet qualified, view that though the base and superstructure 
are causally reciprocal, the base is ‘determinant in the last instance’, see: (Althusser & Balibar 1970, 
pp. 56-60). For the view that base and superstructure are distinct constructs, yet do not relate to each 
other in a causal or deterministic sense, see: (Harvey 2010, pp. 189-201) and (Eagleton 2000). Finally, 
for the view that the distinction between base and superstructure is in itself untenable, see: (Plamenatz 
1954, pp. 21-28), (Acton 1962, pp. 177-178) and (Thompson 1995, pp. 191-218). I will return to the 
ambiguity of the base/superstructure relation shortly. 
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historically, drastic changes to the economic base have resulted in similarly drastic 
changes to the superstructure. An example of this is given in the first volume of 
Capital (1990, pp. 877-895). Here Marx outlines the ‘prelude to the revolution’ in the 
mode of production in England (from feudalism to capitalism), which he argued to 
have occurred during the late 15th and early 16th centuries. He notes that the rapid 
expansion of wool manufacture in Flanders led to a corresponding rise in the price of 
wool in England. These circumstances contributed towards the dissolution of the 
bands of feudal retainers, a process which involved the large-scale expropriation of 
agricultural land in order for it to be converted from arable land into pasture (the mass 
eviction of the peasants from the land that this entailed contributed towards the 
development of a ‘relative surplus population’, which Marx argues to be a condition 
for the development of a capitalist mode of production). These developments arose in 
contradiction to the relations of production as stipulated by feudal law, which held 
that both lords and peasantry were entitled to the land. However, the reorganisation 
suited the changes in the composition of the means of production; and so after a 
period of (Marx would say futile) legislative struggle, the superstructure was 
transformed so as to legitimise the new relations of production – primarily through the 
passing of the Enclosure Act in 1773. Thus Marx argues: “The economic structure of 
capitalist society has grown out of the economic structure of feudal society. The 
dissolution of the latter set free the elements of the former” (Marx 1990, p. 875), and 
with this development there coincides a necessary transformation of our mental 
conceptions to the extent that they are conditioned by the superstructure, in which the 
accepted meaning of property rights and relations is drastically altered. 
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Marx consequently argues that it has been an historical precedent and, more 
controversially, a necessary condition of the society of his day, that the material 
productive forces of a society will tend to develop to such an extent that they come 
into direct conflict with the existing relations of production; it is here that the 
ideological superstructure is no longer able to sustain the status quo and, without such 
support, there is by necessity a transformation of these relations:  
With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is 
more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction 
should always be made between the material transformation of the economic 
conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural 
science, and the legal, political, religious, esthetic or philosophic – in short, 
ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out 
(Marx 1951, p. 329). 
So the ideological superstructure actually serves the double-function of legitimising a 
given society or becoming the space for contesting its transformation, depending on 
the relative equilibrium or conflict between its mode and relations of production. But 
Marx does not conceive of this as an unending process, rather, he envisions it as 
leading necessarily to the formation of a communist society free of exploitative 
relations of production; thus a society without need of an ideological superstructure to 
sustain it. It would appear to follow that it is in such circumstances that the 
development of non-ideological consciousness would be made possible.13 
 
The base/superstructure model of ideology introduces some new difficulties; the first 
problem relates to determination – in what sense is the base primary, and is it always 																																																								
13 It should be noted that this thesis, arguably Marx’s most contentious, is consistent with the 
implications of Hegel’s dialectic of the master/slave relation. Here as well, the development of 
authentic self-consciousness only arises as the outcome of an ideal state; the nature of what such a state 
would be is of course debatable.  
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so? The transition from feudalism to capitalism seemed to clearly entail instances of 
the political and legal superstructure being determined by changes in the economic 
base; however, once this transition has occurred, and provided that the new mode of 
production is relatively stable, the result would appear to be that the superstructure 
now determines the economic base. Moreover, if the changes to the economic base 
are principally changes in the relations of production, i.e. changes in the ownership 
and control of the means of production (or changes in property relations), and given 
that these relations are essentially legal (or superstructural) in character, it is 
questionable whether a ‘base’ can ever really be distinct from a ‘superstructure’: “For 
a system of property is more properly called a legal than an economic phenomenon, 
and therefore belongs to the Marxian ‘superstructure’ and not to the Marxian ‘basis’” 
(Plamenatz 1954, p. 25). G. A. Cohen provides a sound response to this objection, he 
argues that it is incorrect to regard the production relations that Marx associates with 
the economic base as being relations of ownership, that they are rather relations of de 
facto power or effective control: “Marx must have meant that…[the producer] first 
enjoyed over his instruments an effective control structurally analogous to, but 
unaccompanied by, legal ownership” (Cohen 1989, p. 96). The fact that in a stable 
and law-abiding society economic relations are expressed through superstructural 
rights does not contradict the claim that such rights arise from or are expressive of 
economic relations determined by the base; indeed, Cohen notes that effective legal 
rights always already entail de facto power and effective control. It is in this way that 
Cohen is able to argue that the superstructure has a distinct yet contingent existence in 
relation to the economic base, that it serves as a necessary functional explanation for 
the latter’s organisation: “legal structures rise and fall according as they promote or 
frustrate forms of economy favoured by the productive forces. Property relations have 
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the character they do because production relations require that they have it” (Cohen 
1978, p. 231). Cohen’s reformulation has the advantage of preserving the base and 
superstructure as distinct phenomena, and gives a plausible account of the way in 
which the former is primary; however, it does so at the expense of seriously limiting 
the scope of what can be assigned to the superstructure, and thereby neutralises the 
exhaustiveness of the base/superstructure model as a representation of ideological 
formations. It is arguable that Marx did not sufficiently demarcate what was intended 
by the term ‘superstructure’, hence the difficulties in interpretation, but it is certainly 
true that it was intended to encompass a great deal more than the legal and political 
institutions that Cohen addresses. As quoted above, Marx refers to an ‘entire immense 
superstructure’ including its ‘…legal, political, religious, esthetic or philosophic – in 
short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict [within the 
base] and fight it out’. While Marx would likely argue that many a mental conception 
of your average priest or metaphysician was ideological, the reason for this could 
hardly be simply because they are an expression of dominant property relations (even 
if that may indirectly be the case).  
 
Another problem with assigning primacy to the economic base in the formation of 
ideological superstructures is the inconvenient fact that historically (and particularly 
in the 20th century), vastly different superstructural apparatuses have arisen from the 
same capitalist mode of production; these apparatuses have ranged in various degrees 
from the expression of democratic to fascistic organisational principles, and it is hard 
not to infer from this that there is more to the explication of these differences than 
what the base/superstructure model allows. The variety, or, it could be argued, the 
unpredictability of the nature of the superstructures compatible with this economic 
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base discredits the notion that the contradictions inherent to the latter will inevitably 
lead to the revolutionary transformations that Marx envisioned. Indeed, Seyla 
Benhabib has noted that this discrepancy has been one of the primary concerns of the 
revisionist Marxism of the Frankfurt School:  
The core of what has come to be known as the ‘critical social theory of the Frankfurt 
School’ in the English-speaking world since the late 1960s is this analysis of the 
transformation of liberal nineteenth-century capitalism into mass democracies on the 
one hand and totalitarian formations of the national socialist sort on the other 
(Benhabib 2012, p. 73). 
It may still be granted that, in any case, the superstructure always functions to 
reinforce the economic base. However, it no longer seems plausible to conceive of it 
as arising from or being determined by the economic base alone, although it may be 
that even this relatively modest claim is too presumptuous. If it is assumed that bases 
need superstructures to function, and yet there is no necessary tendency for a given 
base to be corresponded with any specific superstructure, then the benefit of their 
demarcation must be called into question. To return to the criticism of the 
base/superstructure model advanced by Plamenatz: there still appears to be an 
insufficient justification for the designation of these two aspects of social relations as 
being in some sense autonomous (this autonomy implied by the language that the 
‘one’ arises from the ‘other’). H.B. Acton has rejected the legitimacy of a division 
between a society’s base and its superstructure outright:     
…we have already argued that there is no such thing as purely ‘economic’ behaviour, 
but that moral, as well as legal (or quasi-legal) and political factors are involved in 
production and exchange. It is now necessary to point out that, in saying this, we are 
saying that moral, legal, and political ideas, outlooks, theories, are involved in 
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production and exchange, for moral, legal, and political behaviour is conscious 
behaviour that requires thought and talk (1962, pp. 177-178). 
If Acton is correct, and his conclusion is certainly plausible, then it seems 
meaningless to talk of base and superstructure as being distinct from one another and 
thus a theory based on their division would be necessarily inconsistent. If this were 
the case, it would seem that Marx has not progressed far from his earlier writings in 
attempting a more concrete, scientific approach to the theory of ideology. 
 
It can be seen, then, why it is that the base/superstructure model has been criticised 
for being unable to account for the complexities of contemporary societies. However, 
in response to such criticism, a novel approach to the model has been advanced by 
Terry Eagleton, who maintains that it is still of inherent value. Eagleton agrees with 
critics in that the formula, as put forward by Marx, can be rightfully attacked for 
being “…static, hierarchical, dualistic and mechanistic…” (Eagleton 2007, p. 82), but 
argues that a nuanced approach of interpretation can and should be applied. He argues 
that it is mistaken to attempt to somehow demarcate certain institutions or practices as 
belonging to either the base or the superstructure of a society; that what should be 
drawn from Marx’s model is rather an emphasis on the relational nature of the 
ideological superstructure; the way in which the superstructure functions in regards to 
the base determines its ideological nature. It is not a matter of being an expression of 
it but a matter of being in collusion with it. He gives the example of the ways in which 
we can approach a text:  
You can examine a literary text in terms of its publishing history, in which case, as 
far as the Marxist model goes, you are treating it as part of the material base of social 
production. Or you can count up the number of semicolons, an activity which would 
seem to fit neatly into neither level of the model. But once you explore that text’s 
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relations to a dominant ideology, then you are treating it superstructurally. The 
doctrine, in other words, becomes rather more plausible when it is viewed less as an 
ontological carving of the world down the middle than as a question of different 
perspectives (2007, p. 83). 
If applied with a perspectivist approach, it does seem plausible that the 
base/superstructure model could be redeemed. In another example of its relevance 
Eagleton points towards the status of money; on the one hand we are taught from an 
early age that it lacks inherent value, that ‘the best things in life are free’, and yet it 
serves as a foundation for society itself and permeates, in some way, almost all social 
relations. Eagleton argues that these two facts would form quite a paradox for an 
observer unassimilated to such a system:  
first, …[money is] so utterly vital a good that it engage[s] almost everybody’s 
energies most of the time, and second, …[it is] held in hearty contempt. …[The 
observer] would soon find himself puzzling over the performative contradiction 
between what we said about money and what we did with it, or, if you prefer, over a 
certain discrepancy between material base and moral superstructure (Eagleton 2000, 
p. 231). 
So here it is not the status of money in itself that determines its position within the 
base/superstructure model but the perspective from which it is contemplated, and the 
extent to which its determinant function in social organisation is obfuscated would 
presumably determine whether it falls within the ideological superstructure. This 
approach has the advantage of circumventing any deterministic reading of the 
base/superstructure model; again, though, the question arises as to whether this 
signifies an advance on Marx’s earlier treatment of ideology. If most any practice or 
institution can be considered to be belonging to the economic base from one 
perspective, the superstructure from another, then it seems that all the model has 
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achieved is a refined formulation of the tension between thought and material activity 
discussed in The German Ideology, with less emphasis on the determining role of 
material activity. 
 
2.4 The Problem of Ideology 
“Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, 
but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remain unknown 
to him; otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process” (Engels 1972, p. 
648).  
 
The term ‘ideology’ is largely absent from Marx’s magnum opus, Capital. In this 
work the main notion previously attributed to his theory of ideology, alienation 
through mystification and/or naturalisation, is now applied to a new concept – that of 
the ‘fetishism of commodities’. In short, commodity fetishism implies that people 
come to see the products of their labour as having value in and of themselves, which 
leads to a situation where human relations are governed by ‘things’, rather than the 
opposite, more natural state of affairs. The similarities between this concept and what 
was said in The German Ideology are apparent in the following excerpt:  
In order…to find an analogy [with commodity fetishism], …we must take flight into 
the misty realm of religion. There the products of the human brain appear as 
autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both 
with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with 
the products of men’s hands. I call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the 
products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities… (Marx 1990, p. 
165). 
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Despite the familiar theme of alienation, Marx is now focussed on a much more 
specific, definable phenomenon; most of the epistemic problems related to the theory 
of ideology are no longer applicable here, and for that reason the concept of 
commodity fetishism will not be pursued further. 
 
From the preceding investigation in can be seen that, insofar as Marx concerns 
himself with the concept of ideology, there is no clear break between his early and 
later works, the alternating ways in which Marx approaches ideology occur and recur 
throughout his work, and are more likely a reflection of the heterogeneous nature of 
the concept itself. Having said that, there does seem to be some tension between the 
two main approaches to the concept discernible in Marx. To summarise the 
investigation thus far: first, there is the illusion model; here ideology is taken to 
include morality, religion, metaphysics and any ‘Weltanschauung’ conceived of as 
being autonomous, and in many passages, this definition is extended to consciousness 
itself. The idea being that material activity, or relations of production, is the 
determinate factor behind the conceptions we make of the world. To consider the 
inverse to be the case would then be an example of ideological thinking. Second, the 
functional (or political) model; this is best illustrated by Marx’s argument that ‘the 
ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas’; here ideology serves the 
function of naturalising exploitative relations of production by assuming them to be 
the expression of abstract or universal ideas.14 In both cases, ideology implies a 
‘misrepresentation’ of the actual state of affairs. Where they differ is that in the 
former instance, material activity is seen as determining consciousness, and in the 
latter the reverse seems to be the case. Now it need not be assumed that therefore 
																																																								
14 The base/superstructure model can be read as a refined formulation of this approach. 
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these two approaches are contradictory; it could be argued that, depending on the 
socio-historical circumstances, a society could be in thrall to one or the other of these 
conceptions; it would follow then, that the illusion model represents a state in which 
ideological influence is especially strong, and therefore the tensions within the 
material base are effectively masked. In a less stable, conflictive environment, the 
functional model of ideology would be operative, presumably with the intent of 
affecting its stronger variant. This seems to be a possible resolution to some of the 
discrepancies in Marx’s treatment on the subject of ideology. One glaring flaw 
remains, however, and it pertains to a problem in the very pursuit of establishing a 
theory of ideology. 
 
On the face of it, it seems that any coherent theory of ideology necessarily implies 
some sort of standard from which to juxtapose ideological errors. Even if a standard 
of truth is unnecessary, as with the functional approach, the possibility of some sort of 
non-ideological perspective is certainly implied by the theory. In identifying various 
ideological forms, Marx invariably contrasts them with that ‘which can be determined 
with the precision of natural science’ (1951, p. 329). Thus the underlying assumption 
of Marx’s theory of ideology is that the scientific method is free from any ideological 
influence, an assumption that seems overly optimistic at best. So without a solid 
epistemic foundation and, as Barth points out, not without some unsubstantiated 
assumptions of his own, Marx appears to be left vulnerable to the very same 
criticisms applied to the ‘ideologists’:  
Underlying [Marx’s] …political and economic criticism of contemporary German 
conditions is an idea of man and of social justice; and history, too, insofar as it 
culminates in the self-restoration of man in classless society, is the realisation of the 
idea of justice and of a real humanism. Were one to treat this idea in the same way as 
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Marx treated the political and philosophic ideologies of feudal and bourgeois society, 
then the ideology of the proletariat, too, would have to be unmasked as the interest-
conditioned ideology of a single class. Thus, Marx’s theory of ideology turns back 
against him (1976, p. 110). 
Are these criticisms enough to invalidate a theory of ideology? I do not think so; 
Marx’s investigation sheds a powerful light on the extent to which external influences 
affect our thought processes. The fact that his theory is not immune from the self-
same criticism, or that a veritable criteria of truth has not been established, does not 
do away with this; on the contrary, it invites the question as to whether perhaps all 
thought is in some sense ideological. Although Marx sets out as a critic, he is still 
very much working within the conceptual framework and tradition adopted by 
Feuerbach and Hegel before him; all three talk of an almost teleological process of 
transformation, whereby human nature develops from a state of alienation to one of 
authenticity. I suggest that there may in fact be certain ideological influences that 
explain this common schema. To that end, in the following two chapters, this 
investigation will turn to a genealogical account of these ideas. 
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 3 A Motif of Transformation 
 
3.1 Alienation, ‘Ideology’ and Authenticity 
 
The previous two chapters have demonstrated how Marx’s theory of ideology has 
parallels with and can be seen as a continuation of aspects of the works of Hegel and 
Feuerbach. It was argued firstly that, though Marx’s theory is in no way self-
sufficient, it raises unavoidable questions about the autonomy of our thought 
processes, and the extent to which they are externally determined. Secondly, it was 
suggested that there is a recurrent theme at play in the works of all three writers 
discussed: a teleological process of transformation, whereby consciousness or human 
nature progresses from a state of alienation, through various forms of what could be 
called ideology, and towards a state of authenticity, as yet unreached. Given this 
observation it seems appropriate, following the criticism of Hans Barth, to turn 
Marx’s theory of ideology against his own writings and those of his predecessors, so 
as to properly investigate the potentially all-encompassing nature of ideological 
thought processes. In order to do this, it will first be necessary to begin again by 
clarifying how this motif of transformation is clearly discernible in Hegel, Feuerbach 
and Marx, the present chapter will address this topic. The following chapter will 
suggest that the motif of transformation has clear parallels with the actual state of 
affairs in the contemporary Germany of Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx; and that the 
tumultuously evolving nature of that period’s political, religious and cultural 
landscape could be read as a defining influence on this philosophical affinity. 
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Although I argue that the motif of transformation is characteristic of the three 
philosophers under discussion, this should in no way imply a renunciation of the 
significant divergences undertaken by them with regards to their aims, their methods, 
and their conclusions. The texts deemed pertinent to the concept of ideology, 
examined so far, do have a disparate publishing history, spanning a period from 1807 
to 1859; and so the potential ideological influences behind these reflections on 
ideology must likewise differ in certain respects. Nonetheless, I think that the 
similarities are worthy of further examination. Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx differ in 
their conceptions of the precise cause, and historical emergence, of alienation; but that 
this state has emerged necessarily is a supposition of which they seem to be in 
agreement. What I argue could be read as their conceptions of ideology, will likewise 
be shown to have certain differences, yet here I believe them to be in the most 
agreement. Of more interest are their conceptions of authenticity, for despite the 
shared trajectory it is here that they diverge the most, ranging from an organic state 
arising naturally from a properly philosophic understanding of absolute spirit, to a 
more self-sufficient form of humanism free of religious mystification, to a classless 
society free of exploitation. Obviously, given the different conceptions of 
authenticity, the assumed path towards such a state must likewise differ; Marx’s work 
on the relationship between thought and action outlined in the previous chapter is 
relevant here.  
 
3.2 Hegel 
“The state consists in the march of God in the world, and its basis is the power of 
reason actualising itself as will” (Hegel 1991, p. 279). 
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For Hegel, alienation in both its positive and negative forms is always intimately 
connected with the schism between particularity and universality, between the internal 
and the external. This movement between subject and object, which Hegel views as 
central to the development of self-consciousness, was outlined in chapter 1, but more 
can be said of it in order to clarify its role in the motif of transformation. First of all, 
in terms of the origin of alienation as estrangement, Hegel seems to consign this to 
humanity’s prehistory: all genuine historical attempts at the formation of society have 
had, at least implicitly, the abolition of the alienation of the ‘divided subject’ as a 
fundamental goal. For Hegel argues that the emergence of the divided subject is 
ontologically prior to any formation of a family, tribe, Volk or State: there is no 
nostalgic yearning for an imagined state of nature in Hegel. Historically, he argues, 
the trouble has been in attaining an authentic mediation, with the subject repeatedly 
coming to identify with one aspect of consciousness, individual or universal, which in 
turn necessarily engenders a striving for the other, the situation of the ‘unhappy 
consciousness’ referred to in chapter 1:  
For the estrangement per se, it makes no difference whether man considers himself 
absolutely independent or absolutely dependent upon a distant God, whether he views 
himself as an isolated individual or as an existence en masse, whether he is turned 
totally outward or totally inward; for each of these extremes already implies the other, 
and ‘the more independent and separate the internal becomes, so likewise the more 
independent and separate the external becomes’ (Löwith 1965, p. 162). 
Löwith goes on to note that, as Hegel takes the situation of the divided subject to be 
the presupposition of philosophy, unity is then its inherent goal (ibid, p. 163). It is in 
this way that Hegel links the course of world history with philosophy in general, with 
each epoch seen as a manifestation of Reason’s attempted sublimation of its 
alienation from itself, of its drive towards a self-sufficient reconciliation. 
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What can tentatively be called ideology in Hegel, then, is any outlook containing the 
mistaken assumption that self-sufficiency can be attained with the abandonment of 
this striving for unity, with a total identification with just one aspect of consciousness. 
This being the case with the ideologies of ancient Stoicism and skepticism outlined in 
the first chapter, ideologies that are incapable of withstanding their own 
presuppositions: 
Neither stoicism nor skepticism, however, was capable of sustaining itself – 
skepticism (as the truth of stoicism, as that to which one is driven when one attempts 
to cash out the Stoic attempts at a free life) ends up dissolving itself, since it 
ultimately has to submit its own freedom to doubt to the same kind of skeptical 
questioning to which it submits everything else, and, in doing so, exposes itself to 
itself as being only the result of the contingent thoughts of a particular individual 
(Pinkard 2002, p. 231).  
Although these ideologies are self-contradictory, it need not be assumed that their 
conception was irrational. Hegel maintains that it is the work of Reason to attempt to 
rationalise the world around it, to identify oppositions and apparent contradictions and 
work towards their reconciliation, to “…legitimate existing reality by conceiving it 
philosophically” (Hyppolite 1969, p. 108). Stoicism and skepticism are self-
contradictory, but only insofar as the Roman world they belong to is itself self-
contradictory, for they serve as the latter’s rational reflection. Hegel sees the downfall 
of ancient Rome as the inevitable symptom of a situation in which the average 
individual is completely alienated from universal life, a situation he paints in 
colourful terms:  
The dissolution of the whole ends in universal misfortune and the demise of ethical 
life, in which the individualities of nations [Völker] perish in the unity of a pantheon, 
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and all individuals [Einzelnen] sink to the level of private persons with an equal 
status and with formal rights, who are accordingly held together only by an abstract 
and arbitrary will of increasingly monstrous proportions (Hegel 1991, p. 379). 
It could be said, then, that for Hegel an ideology would be comparable to an 
incomplete philosophy; one that may accurately formulate an individual’s relation to a 
contingent historical epoch, but which fails to come to an understanding of the 
individual’s relation to universality as such. Collective comprehension of this failure, 
then, leads to revolution. In a passage that seems to anticipate the central argument of 
Marx’s concept of ideology in The German Ideology, Hegel, in the preface to his 
Philosophy of Right, writes:  
As far as the individual is concerned, each individual is in any case a child of his 
time; thus philosophy, too, is its own time comprehended in thoughts. It is just as 
foolish to imagine that any philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as that 
an individual can overleap his own time or leap over Rhodes (Hegel 1991, pp. 21-22). 
What prevents Hegel from drawing a materialist conception of thought from this is 
precisely his emphasis on the motif of transformation. For he sees in each successive 
epoch he examines, the so-called Oriental, Greek, Roman and Germanic realms, a 
closer approximation to the truth of the mediation and unity of particularity and 
universality. Only in the development towards the modern state, he argues, does the 
individual come to recognise his/her particularity and relation to the external, not as 
two opposing extremes, but as two interdependent aspects, each reinforcing the truth 
of the other. Thus it is important to examine Hegel’s conception of the state, for with 
its realisation, the possibility of ideological thought would presumably be impossible. 
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3.3 The Hegelian State  
 
That the state is presented as the quintessential criterion for the development of 
freedom and self-consciousness generally is not antithetical to Hegel’s overall 
philosophy. Among the notes taken from Hegel’s lectures on the Philosophy of Right 
is the following passage:  
The state in and for itself is the ethical whole, the actualization of freedom, and it is 
the absolute end of reason that freedom should be actual…Any discussion of freedom 
must begin not with individuality [Einzelheit] or the individual self-consciousness, 
but only with the essence of self-consciousness; for whether human beings know it or 
not, this essence realizes itself as a self-sufficient power of which single individuals 
[die einzelnen Individuen] are only moments (Hegel 1991, p. 279). 
An interesting consequence arises from this. As Hegel argues that the state in and for 
itself is the actualisation of freedom and the essence of self-consciousness, it follows 
that it is a necessary condition that one must be a member of a state in order to be 
free. Having said this, it is not the case that any manifestation of the state will suffice 
for the actualisation of this freedom; it was precisely the merely formal freedom and 
abstract rights derived from membership in the Roman realm of antiquity that 
precluded the development of authentic self-consciousness. It is essential that the 
individual comes to see his/her particular ends as being in harmony with the ends of 
the state. The opposition between duties and rights, Hegel maintains, disappears with 
the recognition that one’s rights can only be actualised through the state, hence ones 
duties towards the state are synonymous with the exercising of ones rights: “…[the 
state’s] strength consists in the unity of its universal and ultimate end with the 
particular interest of individuals, in the fact that they have duties towards the state to 
the same extent as they also have rights” (Hegel 1991, p. 283). 
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In order to understand Hegel’s peculiar conception of the organic development of the 
state, leading up to its authentic culmination in the actualisation of freedom, it should 
be read in conjunction with his more general conception in the Philosophy of History. 
World history is here presented as a gradual movement towards a progressively more 
comprehensive consciousness of Freedom; Hegel capitalises Freedom here in order to 
distinguish it from freedom in the sense of arbitrary will or caprice, in order to be 
genuinely conscious of one’s Freedom the individual must be able to encounter the 
universal aspect of consciousness as being manifested concretely in the rational 
organisation of the state. Again, this ‘idea’ of Freedom is seen as being implicit in all 
states throughout history, and it is argued that it has been the role of the historical 
process that peoples become conscious of and work to resolve and sublimate the 
contradictions arising between the various manifestations of the state and the 
authentic idea behind them; further, it is argued that this gradual transformation 
should be understood in teleological terms:  
In actual existence Progress appears as an advancing from the imperfect to the more 
perfect; but the former must not be understood abstractly as only the imperfect, but as 
something which involves the very opposite of itself – the so-called perfect – as a 
germ or impulse. So – reflectively, at least – possibility points to something destined 
to become actual… [thus] the instinctive movement – the inherent impulse in the life 
of the soul – to break through the rind of mere nature, sensuousness, and that which is 
alien to it, and to attain to the light of consciousness, i.e. to itself (Hegel 1956, p. 57). 
Thus history, conceived here as the development of the consciousness of Freedom, is 
not an unending process, and indeed Hegel appears to argue for its imminent 
consummation: “The History of the world is none other than the progress of the 
consciousness of Freedom…the Eastern nations knew only that one is free; the Greek 
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and Roman world only that some are free; while we know that all men absolutely 
(man as man) are free…” (Hegel 1956, p. 19). Corresponding to this somewhat crude 
geographical differentiation are certain forms of political governance, each being 
reflective of the degree to which a particular society has attained to this ideal of 
Freedom. Thus, according to Hegel’s schema, the Eastern civilisations are to be 
distinguished by the institution of various forms of despotism; the Greek and Roman 
world, where ‘some’ are free, is consistent with the formation of democratic and 
aristocratic rule; finally, after transitioning through the stages of feudalism, we 
approach an organisation suitable for the recognition that ‘all’ are free: constitutional 
monarchy, incidentally being a system of governance not too dissimilar from the 
Prussia of Hegel’s day. 
 
3.4 Ideological Reflections on Slavery in Hegel? 
 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the motif of transformation in the work of 
Feuerbach it may be interesting to note what appears to be a conspicuous 
inconsistency in Hegel’s treatment of slavery. The institution of slavery is antithetical 
to the Hegelian philosophical system in its developed form; as discussed earlier in the 
section on the master/slave dialectic, this holds true for both slave and master with 
regards to the development of self-consciousness. In reference to ancient Greece 
Hegel contends that the institution of slavery contributed to the development of an 
‘aesthetic democracy’ by releasing the citizens from the necessity of mechanical 
labour; as a consequence, he implies that it was also a significant factor in the fall of 
Greece, as its existence necessarily inhibited the development of authentic morality:  
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Slavery does not cease until the Will has been infinitely self-reflected – until Right is 
conceived as appertaining to every freeman, and the term freeman is regarded as a 
synonym for man in his generic nature as endowed with Reason. But here [in ancient 
Athens]…we still occupy the standpoint of Morality as mere Wont and Custom, and 
therefore known only as a peculiarity attaching to a certain kind of existence (not as 
absolute and universal Law) (Hegel 1956, p. 255). 
One of the fundamental advancements Hegel attributes in the main to the rise of 
Christianity is precisely this insight, that each individual, as a finite instantiation of 
absolute spirit, is fundamentally of the same nature, and thus:  
…under Christianity Slavery is impossible…each unit of mankind is an object of the 
grace of God and of the Divine purpose: ‘God will have all men to be saved.’ Utterly 
excluding all speciality, therefore, man, in and for himself – in his simple quality of 
man – has infinite value; and this infinite value abolishes, ipso facto, all particularity 
attaching to birth or country (Hegel 1956, p. 334). 
Keeping these remarks in mind it is interesting to examine Hegel’s analysis of the 
Trans-Atlantic slave trade contemporaneous to his time, in which “…Negroes are 
enslaved by Europeans and sold to America” (Hegel 1956, p. 96). It seems that the 
logical response to this would be either to consider this state of affairs to be evidence 
of a serious regression in the world-historical process, or perhaps even to be a cause 
for the abandonment of the idea that progress is essentially the latter’s guiding force. 
Hegel considers neither of these options. Rather, in order to account for this deviation 
from the historical development of the consciousness of freedom, Hegel simply 
dismisses the peoples of Africa as being hitherto ‘unhistorical’ and therefore removed 
from having any effect on the stage of history proper. Acknowledgement of the 
detrimental effect of slavery on the slave-owners and the cultures that institutionalise 
it, of such importance in the Phenomenology of Spirit, is absent in the Philosophy of 
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History with regards to the Atlantic slave trade. Likewise, the positive element 
attributed to the position of the slave in the master/slave dialectic of the 
Phenomenology is absent here as well. The whole phenomenon, it is implied 
uncharacteristically by Hegel, is to be seen purely as a result of African ‘character’:  
…it is manifest that want of self-control distinguishes the character of the Negroes. 
This condition is capable of no development or culture, and as we see them at this 
day, such have they always been. The only essential connection that has existed and 
continued between the Negroes and the Europeans is that of slavery. In this the 
Negroes see nothing unbecoming them, and the English who have done the most for 
abolishing the slave-trade and slavery, are treated by the Negroes themselves as 
enemies. For it is a point of first importance with the Kings [in Africa]…to sell their 
captured enemies, or even their own subjects; and viewed in the light of such facts, 
we may conclude slavery to have been the occasion of the increase of human feeling 
among the Negroes (Hegel 1956, p. 98).  
 
It may be tempting to dismiss the above remarks as being simply a case of the 
Eurocentric racism so pervasive in Hegel’s time, and while this is most likely true, it 
may not be all there is to it. Habermas has argued that a central deficiency in 
totalising philosophical systems such as Hegel’s is the tendency for otherwise 
unrelated phenomena to be subsumed and relegated to positions of lesser importance 
than the overall narrative. With regards to the relation of the individual to the state he 
quotes Dieter Henrich who argues that “… ‘The individual will, which Hegel calls 
subjective, is totally bound to the institutional order and only justified at all to the 
extent that the institutions are one with it’” (Habermas 1990, p. 40); what results from 
such an outlook, argues Habermas:  
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…[is that] when the ‘state’ of the Philosophy of Right gets elevated to the ‘reality of 
the substantive will, to something rational in and for itself,’ this has the consequence 
(already perceived as provocative by Hegel’s contemporaries) that political 
movements that press beyond the boundaries drawn by philosophy offend against 
reason itself  (Habermas 1990, pp. 40-41). 
In a like manner, if a phenomenon such as the Trans-Atlantic slave trade occurs, a 
phenomenon which falls outside of the boundaries drawn by a philosophy of history 
synonymous with a progressive development of the consciousness of freedom, then 
such a phenomenon can be said to offend against reason, to have no connection to the 
overall, substantive, development of the world-historical process. It could be said, 
then, that the effect of attempting to subsume everything under a great philosophical 
system can easily result in making one blind to any and all anomalies that contradict 
the narrative; that it could perhaps, quite ironically, result in what could be called 
‘ideological tunnel-vision’. It can be argued that this tendency to totalise in Hegel is a 
feature that must be shared by any and all ideologies, insofar as it has been shown that 
the strongest variant of an ideological formation is the universalisation of contingent 
mental conceptions; thus ideology entails an inherent tension: a dominant ideology 
must be presented as being both sufficiently self-contained but also ‘an’ ideology, 
differentiable from other conceptions; as Plamenatz rightly notes:  
Even a ‘total ideology’ is limited; it consists of the ideas and beliefs of a particular 
people or group of peoples, or a particular epoch… Even if it is held to include all 
their ideas and beliefs, and therefore to be quite literally a total ideology, it is still 
only one such ideology among others (Plamenatz 1970, pp. 27-28).  
Of course what needs to be inferred from all this is that the more ‘total’ an ideology is 
conceived, the more fully it is representative of a subject’s worldview, the greater is 
the likelihood of selective bias when a judgment is formed; and that this danger may 
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not be limited to ideology in its ‘totalitarian’ manifestations, but is rather a 
potentiality inherent to ideology as such.   
 
3.5 Feuerbach 
“…[W]hat is impossible, inconceivable, to one age, is to the coming age conceivable 
and possible. My life is bound to a limited time; not so the life of humanity. The 
history of mankind consists of nothing else than a continuous and progressive 
conquest of limits…” (Feuerbach 2008, p. 127). 
 
In contrast to Hegel and Marx, Feuerbach places less emphasis on the historical 
necessity of the emergence of alienation and ideology for the development of self-
consciousness, in part because he views the former phenomena almost exclusively in 
relation to religious sentiment and religious sentiment cannot be said to be a 
universally lived experience; the contrast between the ‘heathen’ and ‘Christian’ 
philosophies of antiquity is frequently referred to in his writings. Also, the distinction 
made between alienation and ideology is less discernible in Feuerbach, for here the 
emergence of alienation simultaneously implies the emergence of ideology in the 
form of religious sentiment. Nevertheless, given the historical fact of religion and 
Feuerbach’s progressive genealogical account of it, conceiving of it as he does as 
being affected and determined by the progression of human society in general, it can 
be said that Feuerbach’s philosophy shares the same motif of transformation as that of 
Hegel and Marx. The nature and cause of alienation and ideology in Feuerbach, the 
shift in perspective from the conceptual to the ontological and resulting ‘false 
consciousness’, has been covered in chapter 1. However, more can be said of the 
psychological disposition that this engenders, as well as the implied subsequent 
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potential detriment for society. For the assurance of a historical progression towards a 
state of authenticity is less forceful in Feuerbach, and the possibility of regression 
hinted at; here at times the tone is of a polemical imploration for change, for instance 
in place of the Lord’s Prayer:  
Think, therefore, with every morsel of bread which relieves thee from the pain of 
hunger, with every draught of wine which cheers thy heart, of the God who confers 
these beneficent gifts upon thee, - think of man! …[and] in thy gratitude towards man 
forget not gratitude towards holy nature! (Feuerbach 2008, p. 227).  
 
In The Essence of Christianity Feuerbach examines the consequences that follow from 
the deification of human ideals entailed in religious sentiment. Of particular 
significance with regards to Christianity, but applicable to monotheism in general, is 
the belief in the active role of Providence and its relation to prayer as well as the 
immortality of the soul. It is argued that these beliefs, among others, signify a longing 
for limitless subjectivity, a state of being at odds with the limits experienced in actual 
existence. As noted, Feuerbach maintains that the origin of this distinction between 
the limited and limitless is in our dual consciousness of individual and species being. 
The essence of the individual lies in the species itself, yet in the religious sentiment 
this essence is conceived of as being transcendent and inhering in a personal God; as 
such essence is considered to be distinct from and, in this life at least, unattainable to 
the individual; the limitations imposed upon the individual by the species itself, by 
nature, are duly negated. Faith in the coming of a perfectly limitless heavenly 
existence, as the truth of humanity, entails a devaluation of this temporally limited 
existence. In a passage anticipating the problematic theme of nihilism common to the 
late nineteenth century, Feuerbach writes:  
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Where the heavenly life is a truth, the earthly life is a lie; where imagination is all, 
reality is nothing. To him who believes in an eternal heavenly life, the present life 
loses its value, - or rather, it has already lost its value: belief in the heavenly life is 
belief in the worthlessness and nothingness of this life (Feuerbach 2008, p. 134). 
So the religious sentiment could contain within it a certain contempt and indifference 
to the progress or otherwise of the historical process. On the other hand, as Feuerbach 
argues, if the religious sentiment is properly analysed and understood for what it is in 
essence: an anthropomorphic representation of all ideals pertaining to humanity as 
such, over and above each individual; then the possibility for authentic self-
consciousness is made open. It follows that an ideology could potentially function as 
either a cause or a curative for the problem of nihilism, and that this will depend on 
how closely the ideology’s conception of authenticity is relatable to or practicable for 
one’s actual life. Interestingly Nietzsche, a much more vehement critic of Christianity 
than Feuerbach, associated nihilism not with Christianity’s proliferation but with its 
decline, suggesting that the vacuum that this could leave in place of our sense of 
values, meaning and purpose is of serious existential import:  
God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. ‘How shall we comfort 
ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that 
the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood 
off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, 
what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great 
for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it’ (GS 125)? 
For both thinkers, then, an ideology can be read as a quite natural, possibly necessary, 
corrective against the encroachment of nihilism; however, both would further insist 
that, unless the ideology entails an affirmation of one’s life as it is, it can only ever be 
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a transitory measure; hence the importance Feuerbach attributes to an ‘authentic’, 
anthropological reading of religious sentiment. 
 
For Feuerbach a life conducive to the development of authenticity must be one in 
which the individual plays an active role in both his or her immediate existence as 
well as that of the society, or some representation of the species, to which the 
individual finds his/herself; where the meaning or truth of the individual is found in 
the whole and the truth and meaning of the whole is found in the successive 
generations of individuals which constitute it. Fundamentally, where this state of 
affairs is actually apparent, where the organisational principles that govern the whole 
are not themselves conducive to a feeling of alienation amongst individuals, where 
there is no longer a need for religious mystification:  
The more empty life is, the fuller, the more concrete is God. The impoverishing of the 
real world and the enriching of God is one act. Only the poor man has a rich God. 
God springs out of the feeling of a want; what man is in need of, whether this be a 
definite and therefore conscious, or an unconscious need, - that is God. Thus the 
disconsolate feeling of a void, of loneliness, needed a God in whom there is society, a 
union of beings fervently loving each other (Feuerbach 2008, p. 62). 
The necessary condition of the individual being ‘at home’ in and not distinct from 
society at large in order for authentic self-consciousness is one which Feuerbach 
inherits from Hegel and which will be further developed by Marx. Hegel’s conception 
of an ideal State, given that it both subsumes and develops itself upon central tenets of 
Christianity, is not embraced by Feuerbach, though it must be noted that Hegel’s 
understanding of Christianity and the nature of his idea of God is itself open to 
interpretation and certainly not orthodox. So the question remains as to the precise 
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means by which the emergence of this state of identification with oneself in both the 
individual and general sense can be attained in Feuerbach. 
 
That the demystification of the essence of religious sentiment is enough to inaugurate 
this state of authenticity is not an explicit claim made by Feuerbach in The Essence of 
Christianity; however, the lack of any alternative or subsequent prescriptions leads 
one to consider that this may be the assumption. On the other hand, the idea that 
religious mystification may be a genuine reflection of real antagonisms or 
contradictions in actual existence, a point of serious importance to Marx, is certainly 
touched upon by Feuerbach; and he does argue that the emergence of an authentic 
humanism can be conceived to be the result of the disappearance of these antagonisms 
and contradictions. The precise nature of this humanism, however, remains 
ambiguous; primarily, his stance serves to reiterate the notion that the aims of the 
individual and that of society are essentially the same (or at least ought to be), thus a 
view towards their interdependence is necessary for growth: 
In general, whatever a man makes the essential aim of his life, he proclaims to be his 
soul; for it is the principle of motion in him. But through his aim, through the activity 
in which he realizes this aim, man is not only something for himself, but also 
something for others, for the general life, the species. He therefore who lives in the 
consciousness of the species as a reality, regards his existence for others, his relation 
to society, his utility to the public, as that existence which is one with the existence of 
his own essence – as his immortal existence (Feuerbach 2008, p. 141). 
As a general claim there is nothing objectionable here, though whether it could be 
used as a foundation for a particular set of ethical principles remains questionable. 
The problem is that Feuerbach does not specify as to what sort of ‘activity’ would be 
best suited to realise one’s ‘essential aim’ in life; it could even be inferred that any 
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activity would suffice, provided it was undertaken by someone who lives ‘in the 
consciousness of the species as a reality’ – thus we circle back to a very abstract and 
idealised notion of authenticity. Despite this Gagern has argued that Feuerbach’s 
philosophy is indeed constitutive of what he calls an ethical humanism of strict 
confinement. The confinement here refers to the fact that Feuerbach’s humanism 
focuses on each individual in his or her immediate experience, in the setting free of 
each individual’s innate moral and intellectual forces; Gagern argues that this can be 
contrasted with ‘all metaphysical optimism, all utopianism and all nihilism’ – for here 
the ethical imperative is simply the process of disillusionment with the prevailing 
systems of religious and philosophical beliefs in order to be able to develop the 
essential capacities that always already inhere within us: “…Feuerbach…held that 
there would never be a fundamental change in the relations between humans as long 
as any kind of belief or ideology supplied the powerful with excuses and deviated the 
hopes of the weak” (Gagern 1971, p. 140). Gagern does, however, concede that this 
humanistic conception is limited, insofar as the optimal conditions and activities that 
this process of disillusionment would presumably produce are in no way self-evident:  
…[H]ow does this social-organic complex, which is the Feuerbachian individual, 
ever arrive at the understanding of the values that make a possible behavior optimal? 
The answer obviously is that he cannot. All he can do is sharpen his natural instincts 
for his own sake, generate a feeling of sympathy for fellow man, and accept the 
results of the sciences as guiding principles for his actions (Gagern 1979, p. 44). 
It is difficult to see how this resultant, rather general, conception of humanism can be 
sufficiently differentiated from other ethical stances. Of more interest, I would argue, 
is the question of whether such a conception could function as a practical guideline 
for the type of reconciliation that Feuerbach argues for, and if not, what could? How 
is the finite individual to be genuinely reconciled, in any given concrete instance, with 
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his/her infinitely evolving species being? Feuerbach’s lack of detail on this matter left 
him open to the rebuke of fellow Young-Hegelian, Max Stirner, who argued that 
Feuerbach, far from overcoming the problem of alienation, had merely replaced one 
‘object’ of alienation with another:  
As Stirner would have it, Feuerbach is merely the most recent representative of those 
preachers of pathological obsessions and fixed ideas. In this instance, the “spook” 
now being presented as a “higher essence” is termed “man”. …And so, just as 
Feuerbach’s “genetico-critical examination” had earlier revealed Hegelian philosophy 
to be a covert theology, so Stirner revealed Feuerbach’s humanism as a covert 
religion (Stepelevich 1978, pp. 457-458).  
While this criticism may appear to be unwarranted, given that Feuerbach was arguing 
against the separation of essence into ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ aspects, arguing that these 
aspects were ‘two sides of the same coin’ as it were, his lack of elucidation on the 
precise nature of species being and its relation to the individual prevents a genuine 
way out of the problem.     
 
Despite these difficulties, Feuerbach was of significant importance in emphasising 
that material activity is the fundamental expression of essence, insofar as it relates the 
individual to society and vice versa, and this was a supposition wholly endorsed by 
Marx. Yet whereas Feuerbach writes of an authentic state as being a realisable aim 
within a humanist, demystified, framework; Marx contends that, at present, this 
conception of authenticity is simply not possible, with or without the existence of 
religious sentiment. He maintains that authenticity is unattainable within a system of 
capitalist production, an insight that is developed from his unique conception of the 
phenomenon of alienation. 
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3.6 Marx 
“The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that for man the supreme being is 
man, and thus with the categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which 
man is a debased, enslaved, neglected and contemptible being…” (Marx 1992, p. 
251). 
 
Marx’s theory of alienation is introduced in the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844. Here he argues that the concept of alienation examined by 
Feuerbach should be read as a mystified expression of a genuine or concrete 
phenomenon: alienated labour. Thus the notion that the cause and potential 
rehabilitation of the alienated individual should be sought in a distorted 
conceptulisation and its rectification is mistaken. People envisage their essence in a 
religious manner, as external or beyond, precisely because in a capitalist system based 
on the production of commodities, human essence is estranged, is alienated. In order 
to understand this one must consider Marx’s conception of essence or human nature. 
Following Hegel and Feuerbach Marx does not view essence as something static or 
immutable; on the contrary, essence is conceived as being the development of genuine 
human activity: self-expression, creativity and the realisation of innumerable dormant 
potentialities. The relation of Marx’s conception to the teleological presumptions of 
his predecessors is made clear by Erich Fromm, an important figure in the 
highlighting of the humanist orientation in Marx’s work, who writes that according to 
Marx:  
…[M]an…change[s] in the course of history; he develops himself; he transforms 
himself, he is the product of history; since he makes his history, he is his own 
product. History is the history of man's self-realization; it is nothing but the self-
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creation of man through the process of his work and his production (Fromm 1972, P. 
26). 
Fromm goes on to note the essential importance that labour must then have for this 
conception of essence as self-actualisation:  
Labor is the self-expression of man, an expression of his individual physical and 
mental powers. In this process of genuine activity man develops himself, becomes 
himself; work is not only a means to an end - the product - but an end in itself, the 
meaningful expression of human energy; hence work is enjoyable (Fromm 1972, pp. 
41-42). 
Thus given the centrality of labour to essence it can be seen how its alienation must 
entail in general an individual’s loss of, or in the least dissociation from, an authentic 
relationship to society at large. Marx argues that the alienated labour of modern 
capitalism results in four interrelated consequences: the worker is alienated from the 
product of his/her labour; in the division of labour the worker is alienated from the 
very production of his/her product; as essence is conceived of as being self-
actualisation through labour the worker is alienated from his/her essence; and finally 
as a result of the above the workers are alienated from one another. Thus alienated 
labour entails alienation from nature or the external world, from others and from 
oneself.  
 
The worker is alienated from the product of his/her labour insofar as the object of 
labour, work, does not belong to the worker but must be sought out and received, if 
possible, from an external source, from one who owns the capital to purchase labour-
power; thus labour itself is treated as a commodity to be bought and sold. Given that 
the means of subsistence is in almost all cases a product of labour, it follows that one 
must first be a worker in order to subsist; so the possibility of living as a physical 
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subject is now a consequence of labour rather than life being the possibility for 
labour; thus labour is forced labour and what ideally should be self-confirmation and 
actualisation of life is transformed into an alien force over and above it. The 
alienation of the products of labour is inextricably linked to the alienation of 
production itself; the worker is forced to sell, or alienate, his/her labour-power in 
exchange for wages, thus the products of labour are alienated and therefore 
inconsequential to the worker. Marx argues that this system leads to a situation where: 
“Life itself appears only as a means of life” (Marx 1992, p. 328); and vice versa one’s 
means of life becomes the totality of life itself:  
The result is that man (the worker) feels that he is acting freely only in his animal 
functions – eating, drinking and procreating, or at most in his dwelling and 
adornment – while in his human functions he is nothing more than an animal. It is 
true that eating, drinking and procreating, etc., are also genuine human functions. 
However, when abstracted from other aspects of human activity and turned into final 
and exclusive ends, they are animal (Marx 1992, p. 327). 
 
The third consequence of alienated labour is then, by extension, related to the 
worker’s alienation from his/her essence itself, from species being. Marx acquired the 
notion of essence as species being in the form of self-actualisation from Feuerbach, 
however, unlike Feuerbach he is much more precise in the specification of the means 
by which this self-actualisation can take place. For Marx, self-actualisation is the 
process by which people appropriate and transform nature into something reflective of 
their own being, actual self-objectification; he argues that the universality of 
humanity, what differentiates it from other species, is in the possibility of extending 
this self-objectification throughout the whole of nature:  
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The universality of man manifests itself in practice in that universality which makes 
the whole of nature his inorganic body, (1) as a direct means of life and (2) as the 
matter, the object and the tool of his life activity… It is therefore in his fashioning of 
the objective that man really proves himself to be a species-being. Such production is 
his active species-life (Marx 1992, pp. 328-329). 
These two manifestations of universality are estranged from the worker as a result of 
alienated labour, primarily in their forced separation: “Firstly it estranges species-life 
and individual life, and secondly it turns the latter, in its abstract form, into the 
purpose of the former, also in its abstract and estranged form” (Marx 1992, p. 328). 
Species-life, transformed into a process of repetitive and menial labour, serves the 
sole purpose of maintaining the subsistence of individual life; yet this individual life, 
estranged from species-life, is necessarily reduced to a state of mere subsistence; the 
separation of these two aspects entails their mutual alienation from the individual. The 
possibility for authentic self-objectification through the direct appropriation and 
transformation of nature in its myriad possible manifestations, from the satisfaction of 
immediate biological needs to aesthetic expression, is accordingly cut off from the 
wage-labourer. 
 
It follows quite naturally from the reduction of all life-activity to the satisfaction of 
the bare means of subsistence for each individual that individuals are subsequently 
estranged from one another. Marx argues that a society based upon the production of 
commodities will be mired with instances of abstract individualism and endless 
competition, the atomisation of society:  
The alien being to whom labour and the product of labour belong, in whose service 
labour is performed and for whose enjoyment the product of labour is created, can be 
none other than man himself. If the product of labour does not belong to the worker, 
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and if it confronts him as an alien power, this is only possible because it belongs to a 
man other than the worker. If his activity is a torment for him, it must provide 
pleasure and enjoyment for someone else. Not the gods, not nature, but only man 
himself can be this alien power over men… Every self-estrangement of man from 
himself and nature is manifested in the relationship he sets up between other men and 
himself and nature (Marx 1992, pp. 330-331).  
The outward manifestation of these systematised relations of alienation, Marx 
contends, is private property; private property is the result of a particular organisation 
of the relations of production, not its cause; however, he maintains that once this form 
of alienation has reached its culmination then both phenomena, alienated labour and 
private property, enter into a reciprocal relationship, the one providing the possibility 
for the other: “…[Private property] is (a) the product of alienated labour and (b) the 
means through which labour is alienated, the realization of this alienation” (Marx 
1992, p. 332). It follows for Marx that for authentic labour, and thus authenticity in 
general, to be possible, private property must be abolished. The purported role of 
ideology in sustaining a system of alienation has been covered above; however, the 
precise manner in which Marx envisages a coming state of authenticity, and the 
difficulties therewith, need to be addressed. 
 
3.7 The Communist Ideal 
“In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall 
have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the 
free development of all” (Marx & Engels 2002, p. 244). 
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Given the various and in many ways disparate interpretations of Marx’s idea of 
communism, both in theory and practice, it is perhaps best to begin by identifying 
precisely what Marx did not mean by the concept. In the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts Marx is at pains to disassociate his views from what he considers to be 
the ‘crude communism’ of the contemporaneous utopian socialists. In particular, he 
argues against the notion that the abolition of private property can be achieved 
through the implementation of equal wages for all. Contrary to its aim, he maintains 
that this development would in fact amount to a system of private property in its 
complete or extreme form; whereby everything and anything without the capability of 
being possessed by everyone in the form of private property tends towards 
destruction:  
…[Crude communism] wants to abstract from talent, etc., by force. Physical, 
immediate possession is the only purpose of life and existence as far as this 
communism is concerned; the category of worker is not abolished but extended to all 
men; the relation of private property remains the relation of the community to the 
world of things… (For crude communism) the community is simply a community of 
labour and equality of wages, which are paid out by the communal capital, the 
community as universal capitalist (Marx 1992, pp. 346-347).  
The assumption that Marx argued against the atomising and alienating effects of 
extreme competition in favour of a general process of levelling, including in terms of 
individual talents, is thus a mistaken one. In The Communist Manifesto the abolition 
of private property is given further clarification. The appropriation of property in 
general, the appropriation and/or consumption of various products of labour, is not 
that which is intended by the abolition of private property; the assumption that the 
latter entails the deprivation of the enjoyment of the product of one’s own labour is 
likewise mistaken; indeed, Marx argues that the modes of production which made 
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such appropriations possible, such as those of the ‘petty artisan’ and the ‘small 
peasant’, are themselves to a large extent abolished with industrialised capitalist 
production. What is meant by the abolition of private property is the abolition of the 
existing relations of property, whereby wage labour is used to create capital, capital 
which exploits wage labour, and can only increase “…upon condition of begetting a 
new supply of wage labour for fresh exploitation” (Marx & Engels 2002, pp. 235-
236). Insofar as the abolition of private property is limited to a revolution in the 
relations of property it is not without historical precedent:  
All property relations in the past have continually been subject to historical change 
consequent upon the change in historical conditions… All that we want to do away 
with is the miserable character of this appropriation, under which the labourer lives 
merely to increase capital, and is allowed to live only in so far as the interest of the 
ruling class requires it (Marx & Engels 2002, pp. 235-236). 
 
Despite these clarifications there remains a certain level of ambiguity with regards to 
the communist ideal, not just in terms of its positive implementation but also in 
defining, precisely, what is meant by it. Marx is indeed contemptuous of utopian 
formulations of the future developments of societies. One cannot, however, help but 
notice a sense of utopianism in his own descriptions of communism, descriptions 
which remain for the most part on an abstract level. For instance, here is the idea as 
introduced in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts: 
Communism is the positive supersession of private property as human self-
estrangement, and hence the true appropriation of the human essence through and for 
man; it is the complete restoration of man to himself as a social, i.e. human, being, a 
restoration which has become conscious and which takes place within the entire 
wealth of previous periods of development. This communism, as fully developed 
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naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it 
is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature, and between man 
and man, the true resolution of the conflict between existence and being, between 
objectification and self-affirmation,15 between freedom and necessity, between 
individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be 
the solution (Marx 1992, p. 348). 
Such grandiose proclamations are of course susceptible to criticisms from the 
standpoint of pragmatic considerations. Perhaps, though, the difficulty in establishing 
a concrete definition lies in the fact that Marx is attempting to identify a stage in 
historical development hitherto unreached, and is mindful of Hegel’s insight into the 
inability of one being able to ‘overleap one’s own time or leap over Rhodes’. Unlike 
some of his contemporary socialist thinkers, who Marx charges with attempting to 
find justifications for their views by way of identifying particular historical precedents 
of communal life, Marx argues that the contradictions inherent in the current relations 
of production will necessarily give rise to something new, the precise nature of which 
to be divulged in the course of history. Here perhaps an objection based on the 
‘actually existing socialism’ of the twentieth century could be raised as evidence of 
Marx’s failure; however, the dearth of un-alienated labour that such regimes 
produced, and the class antagonisms that were retained and used to sustain them (the 
concentration of power in the revolutionary vanguard and CPSU in the USSR, in the 
CPC in China, etc.), can be used to support the argument that such systems are far 
removed from being the embodiment of the precepts endorsed by Marx; indeed, that 
they are much closer to being the realisation of the ‘crude communism’ of which he 
was highly critical, which he saw as an extreme variant of the existing exploitative 
																																																								15	The apparent resolution of the conflict between objectification and self-affirmation will be shown to 
be constitutional to the notion of ideological interpellation outlined in Chapter 5.	
		
102	
property relations and thus not something new or revolutionised but merely developed 
in a different direction. 
 
It is true that Marx comes close to outlining a positive plan for the implementation of 
authentic communism in The Communist Manifesto,16 however, it must be noted that 
these measures were intended to be temporary in nature. Marx acknowledged their 
despotic character and considered them to be in themselves inadequate for sustainable 
economic activity. Also, although Marx maintained that these measures would be 
generally appropriate for ‘the most advanced countries’, it is important to take 
seriously his qualification that “…[these] measures will of course be different in 
different countries” (Marx & Engels 2002, p. 243); given their complex structures and 
the diversity of levels of development in various nation states Marx was wary of 
endorsing a universally applicable approach to the implementation of the communist 
ideal. Although the above may be enough to discredit the idea that one can turn to 
particular historical instances of self-proclaimed communism and their myriad faults 
in order to discredit Marx, a stronger line of criticism remains, and this relates to the 
very tenability, on a theoretical as well as a practical level, of a system based around 
the idea of a ‘free association of producers’; an association commensurable to the 
needs of all at the expense of none, an apolitical system of government. This is the 
																																																								
16 I refer here to the ten measures outlined for the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’: “1) Abolition of 
property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes. 2) A heavy progressive or 
graduated income tax. 3) Abolition of all right of inheritance. 4) Confiscation of the property of all 
emigrants and rebels. 5) Centralization of credit in the hands of the State, by means of a national bank 
with State capital and an exclusive monopoly. 6) Centralization of the means of communication and 
transport in the hands of the State. 7) Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by 
the State; the bringing into cultivation of wastelands, and the improvement of the soil generally in 
accordance with a common plan. 8) Equal liability of all to labour. Establishment of industrial armies, 
especially for agriculture. 9) Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual 
abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equable distribution of the population 
over the country. 10) Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children’s factory 
labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, &c., &c.” (Marx & 
Engels 2002, pp. 243-244).  
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ideal situation envisioned to arise from the development and subsequent sublimation 
of a dictatorship of the proletariat: “When, in the course of development, class 
distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands 
of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political 
character” (Marx & Engels 2002, p. 244). The question here, and this too is of central 
importance to an analysis of Hegel, is of the very possibility, or perhaps even 
desirability, of a genuine reconciliation of the conflict between public and private 
interests.  
 
H.B Acton justifiably views this overcoming of the disparity between the public and 
private realms with scepticism; however, his central point of contention appears 
questionable. Acton is correct to note that Marx extolled the ideals of autonomy and 
self-determination, and that he argued that these traits were precluded under 
capitalism and only possible in a completely transparent social system, “…under the 
conscious control of co-operating individuals. His principal aims seem to have been 
independence, creativity, self-awareness and co-operation” (Acton 1967, pp.125-126). 
It is also true, and was duly noted by Acton, that with regards to crime Marx 
emphasised that people’s actions are to a large extent shaped by their social 
circumstances and thus the origins of criminality should be sought in the situations 
which give rise to it, not as an inherent disposition of ‘criminal’ individuals. 
However, Acton considers this approach to be, at best, deeply misguided and this is 
the foundation of his rejection of Marx’s ideal. His criticism is worth quoting at 
length: 
It is clear that Marx’s ideal was that of unrepressed, completely fulfilled individual 
men. It was an ideal which commended itself to many of the “philosophers” of 
eighteenth-century France. The difficulty in it, of course, is that some men, if 
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unrepressed, would injure other men, and their fulfillment would be at the expense of 
other men’s fulfillment. Professor L. G. Crocker, in his An Age of Crisis (1959), 
points out that this emphasis on self-interest reached its supreme expression in the 
words and works of the Marquis de Sade who wrote: “Give me a being in the world 
who by his nature can be exempt of all humanity’s ills; not only will that being not 
feel any kind of pity, he will not be able even to conceive it.” Why should not the 
man who enjoys cruelty perpetrate it? Because, of course, it causes others to suffer 
unwanted pain. Then the sadist must be held in check and this means rules, laws, 
morality, punishment, sadists who have to repress their sadism. No doubt Marx 
believed that no one is naturally a sadist, that it is society alone that makes men cruel. 
But we do not know that this is so and therefore we do not know what would happen 
in a society of unrepressed men. Fulfillment is a dangerous as well as a vague ideal. 
If, as Marx held, the fulfillment must be that of men united together for their common 
good, then much that individuals would want to do has to be repressed, and we are 
back with duty and renunciation once more (Acton 1967, pp. 128-129). 
What is immediately striking about this passage is the extent to which, as a defence of 
capitalist institutions, it simply mirrors what Marx finds at fault with them. Acton 
links Marx’s notion of fulfillment with that of complete and unrepressed drives,17 
arguing that the danger inherent in the overthrow of capitalist institutions is that the 
fulfillment of one individual may come at the expense of another, fulfillment from 
one perspective equates to injury from another; this situation, of course, is precisely 
what Marx demonstrates to be an institutionalised necessity in capitalist commodity 
production, not a dark prospect to be avoided by its conservation:  
Under the system of private property… Each person speculates on creating a new 
need in the other, with the aim of forcing him to make a new sacrifice, placing him in 
																																																								
17 This is an idea that closely resembles Hegel’s references to ‘arbitrary’ or ‘capricious’ freedom, of 
which Marx was certainly aware and which seems far removed from his notion of authenticity. 
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a new dependence and seducing him into a new kind of enjoyment and hence into 
economic ruin. Each attempts to establish over the other an alien power, in the hope 
of thereby achieving satisfaction of his own selfish needs (Marx 1992, p. 358).    
At best, Acton’s line of criticism assumes as fact that people are inclined towards 
injurious and exploitative actions towards others, an assumption indeed hard to prove 
with the preclusion of radically alternative social formations, and thus that there is a 
need for legislation protective of individual rights. This is, however, where Acton’s 
criticism is indeed questionable, and it relates to the liberties taken with his 
interpretation of Marx’s critique of the juridical system. 
 
Acton assumes that by relegating current legal and political institutions, as well as the 
morality on which they are based, to the ideological superstructure, Marx thereby 
negates the possibility of them having any authentic foundation at all. However, 
Marx’s point is simply that, insofar as these institutions work to sustain and naturalise 
exploitative relations of production through the latter’s mystification, they are 
ideological. It is hard to see how the dissolution of these institutions, as they stand, 
would necessarily imply unrestrained instances of sadism, as a prohibition on sadism 
is in no way related to production or property relations at all. Moreover, it is strange 
to base a critique of Marx’s ideal on primarily moralistic grounds, given that it is 
precisely the ability to be able to make authentic moral choices which guides Marx’s 
theory, and which he maintains to be an impossibility whilst one is in a state of 
alienation; this point is well made by Fromm:  
For Marx alienation corrupts and perverts all human values. By making economic 
activities and the values inherent in them, like “gain, work, thrift and sobriety,” the 
supreme value of life, man fails to develop the truly moral values of humanity, “the 
riches of a good conscience, of virtue, etc., but how can I be virtuous if I am not alive 
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and how can I have a good conscience if I am not aware of anything?” In a state of 
alienation, each sphere of life, the economic and the moral, is independent from the 
other, “each is concerned upon a specific area of alienated activity and is itself 
alienated from the other” (Fromm 1962, pp. 49-50).  
Although the above remarks may absolve Marx from some arguably unjustified 
criticisms, there remains the essential difficulty in conceiving of an authentic relation 
between the individual and the notion of ‘collective social labour’, such that the 
private and public spheres are no longer alienated from one another. This difficult 
reconciliation is likewise at the heart of Hegel’s as well as Feuerbach’s notion of 
authenticity. In his On Voluntary Servitude Michael Rosen raises the unavoidable 
question of the precise manner in which this collective subject is supposed to 
encapsulate and decide upon “…the objective weight to be given to each individual’s 
subjective perception of need…[also taking into account that] opportunities must be 
given for tastes to develop and change” (Rosen 1996, p. 221). The difficulty here is 
analogous to that faced by Marx’s theory of ideology; in the same manner as the lack 
of specificity regarding an objective criteria for truth limit the validity of the notion of 
ideological false consciousness, so too does the ambiguity surrounding the notion of 
collective social labour make it difficult for a genuine juxtaposition between alienated 
and unalienated life. Rosen concludes that:  
Just as Hegel leaves it open how it is that the individual comes to identify himself 
rationally with Geist (does everyone have to be a philosopher to recognize himself in 
it?) so Marx offers no account of how these two subjects – the individual producer 
and the social Gesamtarbeiter – are supposed to communicate with one another18 
(Rosen 1996, p. 222). 
																																																								
18 One can include the relation of the individual to Feuerbach’s species-being here. 
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The nature of a collective subject under a designation such as culture, the different 
ways in which this subject communicates with the individual, and the incisive role of 
ideology in sustaining this relationship will be explored in chapter 5 in an attempt to 
formulate a more cohesive theory of ideology. It will be argued that much of the 
difficulties encountered so far have resulted from the attempt to conceptualise a 
collective subject as being something internal or inherent to a group, rather than 
viewing it as a manifestation of communal feeling based upon a collective act of 
differentiation from something posited as other or external to the group; this 
realignment dramatically changes the landscape traversed thus far. 
 
It has been shown that Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx share a motif of transformation: 
the history of human societies is one of a gradual, though by no means consistently 
advancing, development. They are about encountering and overcoming various forms 
of alienation, temporarily hindered by ideologies concerned with stifling or regressing 
this development, yet nonetheless they involve a necessary trajectory towards a state 
of authenticity. The assumption in all cases is that the subject of history moves 
beyond the immediate comprehension of the individuals of whom it is composed of, 
and that this subject is rational. The claim that Marx’s theory of ideology is 
permeated by this motif in no way implies that it ought to be rejected outright; the 
essential connection between alienation and ideology, for instance, is not affected by 
this teleological undercurrent; even today, when the topic of ideology is discussed in 
its myriad forms, the susceptibility of alienated youths falling under its sway is 
widely accepted. The task then is to identify the various factors informing this motif 
of transformation, for it will be shown that the motif is not a peculiar idiosyncrasy of 
the three writers under discussion but a popular cultural assumption of the time, in 
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order to purge the theory of ideology of its bias and identify what remains relevant for 
further analysis. This will be the purpose of the next chapter. 
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4 The Ideology Behind The Theory of Ideology 
 
4.1 Concrete Transformations 
 
While it would be a mistake to look for direct causes of the motif of transformation in 
an analogous manner to the base and superstructure model, given the latter’s 
limitations highlighted in chapter 2, it remains of importance to investigate the 
concrete transformations which spread across Europe during the period in which 
Hegel, Feuerbach and the early Marx were writing. It can be no coincidence that the 
bulk of this body of work emphasising the necessity of progress was composed 
between the years 1789 and 1848; a period referred to as ‘the age of revolution’ by 
Eric Hobsbawm. The unprecedented scope and unforeseeable limits of the 
technological advancements emanating from the industrial revolution in Britain, 
combined with the apparent potentiality of Enlightenment ideals to become actual 
with the example of the French revolution, cannot but have had a profound influence 
on the writers under discussion. The events of this period are of particular interest in 
their possibility of giving at least a partial explanation for the three main, though 
divergent, conclusions drawn from the motif of transformation: the perfectibility of 
the State in Hegel, humanity’s continuous and progressive conquest of limits in 
Feuerbach, and the inevitability of communism arising from the disintegration of 
capitalist production in Marx. 
 
The political landscape of the Holy Roman Empire in which Hegel was brought up 
was one of utter fragmentation, inequality and segregation:  
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There was no single law [in the German states of the eighteenth century], …but 
instead a complex patchwork of legal jurisdictions exercised by rulers, the church, the 
nobility, guilds, municipalities, and others. Nobles, clergy, burghers, craftsmen, 
peasants: all enjoyed different rights (rights that were limited and highly specific) and 
were subject to different jurisdictions, according to the ‘estate’ to which they 
belonged (Blackbourn 2003, p. 3). 
These vestiges of feudalism were not confined to the German states and were of 
course antithetical to the liberalism inherent in much Enlightenment thought, of 
immense popularity among the educated classes in Europe at the time. The initial 
reception of many abroad to the French revolution, with its maxim of ‘liberté, égalité, 
fraternité’, was thus unsurprisingly one of enthusiasm: “In a very broad sense 
virtually every person of education, talent and enlightenment sympathised with the 
Revolution, at all events until the Jacobin dictatorship, and often for very much 
longer” (Hobsbawm 1996, p. 78). To many observers inside the German states it 
appeared as both the culmination of a more general movement towards an enlightened 
cultural and political landscape as well as a signal for the coming of an age without 
precedence:  
The growth of Enlightenment, the recent recovery of sympathy with the ideals of 
Greece, the cultural ferment following the Sturm und Drang were now capped by the 
epoch-making events in Paris. It is not surprising that in young minds the spark of 
hope be kindled that they might see, even bring about a transformation of Germany, a 
new edition of the Great Age of Athens (Taylor 2005, p. 52). 
While the Terror that followed did much to quell this enthusiasm in the German 
states, and to provoke reactionary tendencies amongst many, there can be no denying 
that the Napoleonic reforms implemented in the French-occupied German states of 
the early nineteenth century transformed the cultural landscape quite dramatically. 
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The reforms differed from state to state and in many cases were limited or incomplete. 
However, the sheer extent and rapidity of this drive towards modernisation was 
thoroughly unprecedented. In the Confederation of the Rhine:  
…[t]he French overthrew the existing secular and ecclesiastical princes, abolished the 
tithe, ended seigneurialism, eliminated guilds, overturned monopolies, nullified 
privileges, emancipated the Jews, introduced religious toleration, and secularised 
church lands. Changes in the legal system affected every aspect of life, from marriage 
and divorce to property rights. These and other changes transformed economy, 
society and political rule (Blackbourn 2003, p. 54).  
Thus the ideal of rebuilding society and the state upon a rational foundation was 
belatedly enacted in the German States. Hitherto novel ideas such as the rewarding of 
education and careers based on talent rather than birth became the norm. The most 
proficient reform movement of the time was arguably that which was undertaken in 
Prussia between 1807-19 under Stein and Hardenberg, and it is interesting to note that 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right appeared in 1820. The extent, however, to which this 
work constitutes evidence of Hegel being an apologist for the Prussian state remains a 
contentious point. Charles Taylor makes note of the important consideration that 
Hegel did in fact integrate a large amount of precepts from the French revolution in 
the Philosophy of Right that were not adopted in the Prussian reforms (Taylor 2005, p. 
73), and this fact, taken in consideration with the strict censorship laws in place at the 
time, certainly clouds the issue. What can be argued, regardless of any accusations of 
bias or indirect coercion, is that after 1815 Prussia, as well as Austria, emerged as 
exemplary models for the modernisation of states in the region of what was then the 
Holy Roman Empire; and while it seems to be an unqualified exaggeration to regard 
this as an event of ‘world historical’ significance, it can be argued at least 
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retrospectively “…that the Stein-Hardenberg era left its impress not just on Prussia 
but ultimately on nineteenth-century Germany as a whole” (Blackbourn 2003, p. 62). 
 
Regardless of where the precise locus of change was occurring, there can be no doubt 
that the dominant philosophy of the turn of the nineteenth century was in many 
respects reflective of the political upheavals of the time:  
German classical philosophy was…a thoroughly bourgeois phenomenon. All its 
leading figures (Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Schelling) hailed the French Revolution and 
indeed remained loyal to it for a considerable time – Hegel championed Napoleon as 
late as the battle of Jena (1806).19 The Enlightenment was the framework of Kant’s 
typically eighteenth-century thought, and the starting-point of Hegel’s. The 
philosophy of both was profoundly impregnated with the idea of progress: Kant’s 
first great achievement was to suggest a hypothesis of the origin and development of 
the solar system, while Hegel’s entire philosophy is one of evolution (or, in social 
terms, historicity) and necessary progress (Hobsbawm 1996, p. 250).   
It would perhaps be surprising, however, if this widely held conviction of the 
necessity of progress was explicable solely as a response to the political events of the 
time, though when considered in conjunction with the contemporaneous 
advancements in science and technology this belief must have appeared to be almost 
ineluctable. Although the effects of the industrial revolution on continental Europe 
were much delayed, its thorough-going transformation of British society was in many 
circles viewed as a herald for the new epoch of revolutionary progress:  																																																								
19 This general expectation that philosophy would soon find its culmination in a suitable political order 
was noted by Nietzsche much later still in 1889; the changing cultural and political landscape of his 
time (and particularly the rise of German nationalism) led him to react against the idea: “Culture and 
the state… are antagonists: the ‘cultural state’ is merely a modern idea. The one lives off the other, the 
one thrives at the expense of the other. All great cultural epochs are epochs of political decline… 
Goethe’s heart opened up at the phenomenon of Napoleon – it closed up to the ‘Wars of Liberation’… 
In the history of European culture the rise of the ‘Reich’ signifies one thing above all: a displacement 
of the centre of gravity. The fact is known everywhere: in the main thing – and that is still culture – the 
Germans no longer come into consideration” (TI, “What the Germans Lack,” 4).  
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…some time in the 1780s, and for the first time in human history, the shackles were 
taken off the productive power of human societies, which henceforth became capable 
of the constant, rapid and up to present limitless multiplication of men, goods and 
services… To ask when…[the Industrial Revolution] was ‘complete’ is senseless, for 
its essence was that henceforth revolutionary change became the norm (Hobsbawm 
1996, pp. 28-29). 
While it is true that the infinite potentialities for the advancement of humanity, to 
which Feuerbach refers, is an assertion made in explicit connection to his critique of 
theology, its compatibility with the sentiments of those awed by the progress of 
technological advancement is striking. Feuerbach’s humanism, avowed materialism 
and faith in the limitless nature of scientific progress can only have been reinforced in 
such an atmosphere. 
 
The reality of the alienating effects of large-scale industrial production, though 
speculated upon much earlier, became truly apparent in the 1830s and 40s. The steady 
rise of displaced and increasingly destitute masses of poor people unable to withstand 
the sudden transition to the new economy inevitably lead to widespread social unrest. 
Marx & Engels wrote The German Ideology in 1846 and published The Communist 
Manifesto in 1848; the latter work in particular could be viewed as the culmination of 
commonly held sentiments of a vast number of “…the generation after 1815…[who 
witnessed a period in which] never in European history and rarely anywhere else, has 
revolutionism been so endemic, so general, so likely to spread by spontaneous 
contagion as well as by deliberate propaganda” (Hobsbawm 1996, p. 109). The 
revolutionary uprisings of 1848 were not, however, reactions against the general 
consensus of necessary progress, but merely against the direction this progress was 
taking. The rationalist conception of the inherent value in the mastery of natural 
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forces remained the dominant ideological position; while some less influential 
positions, such as those held by many Romantics, were in certain respects reactions 
against this. 
 
The above may be of some help in explaining the rationale behind this general motif 
of transformation informing Marx’s theory of ideology. There remains the important 
task of identifying which aspects of this motif exercise an undue or insubstantial 
influence on the theory, and whether the removal of such aspects can be achieved 
whilst maintaining coherence. 
 
4.2 The Primacy of Reason and the Organic State 
 
Rosen, in his On Voluntary Servitude, convincingly demonstrates that Marx’s theory 
of ideology ultimately rests upon two untenable background beliefs: rationalism and 
providentialism. He argues that the theory of ideology should be read as an attempted 
response to a confounding yet legitimate question: “Why do the many accept the rule 
of the few, even when it seems to be plainly against their interests to do so” (Rosen 
1996, p. 1)? The answer given by Marx is that the majority of individuals in unequal 
societies, though living in a state of objective exploitation, are essentially unaware of 
their predicament; their genuine interests are effectively masked from them because 
they perceive the world around them through the prism of ideological false 
consciousness. The shortcomings of this response have been made clear: if false 
consciousness is to be properly understood, there must necessarily be a corresponding 
form of ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ consciousness, a standpoint from which one is able to 
diagnose it, and with regards to defining this standpoint Marx is decidedly vague; the 
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other flaw relates to the nature of the agent or agents responsible for the manifestation 
of ideological false consciousness, and I have argued that the conception of an 
‘economic base’ lacks the sufficient autonomy to play this role. Rosen’s work is 
pioneering in that he questions the very foundation presupposed by these problems. 
Whence does Marx derive the supreme valuation in the emergence of fully 
autonomous and rational individuals? Is this valuation neutral in an ideological sense? 
What is the rationale behind the implicit premise “…that societies are systems, in the 
sense that they maintain themselves (or change, as the case may be) in ways that 
cannot be understood simply from a common-sense individualistic 
perspective…(Rosen 1996, p. 7)? Does this organic conception entail unsubstantiated 
teleological assumptions? Finally, if the suppositions above are without foundation, 
what remains of the theory of ideology? 
 
Insofar as rationalism values an unmediated and authentic perspective on reality it can 
be agreed that the theory of ideology shares a common conception of the good:  
…the dominant conceptions of human nature to be found in…[Marxism] are 
rationalist through and through. According to Marxism, society based upon the 
production of commodities is both exploitative and impersonal: it makes human 
beings the ‘playthings of alien forces’ (Rosen 1996, p. 21). 
Rosen traces the rationalist disposition back to Plato on the one hand and St 
Augustine on the other; both writers and the traditions originating from them 
espoused the primacy of reason over desire, though of course differed in their 
optimism with regards to the possibility of attaining a purely rational disposition. The 
role of false consciousness in Marx certainly has parallels with the role played by the 
Fall in Augustine, severing humanity from its access to God’s goodness - God here 
being synonymous with truth. The supposition that this state of mystification is 
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transient is common to the rationalists; whether in this life or the next, sin will be 
overcome, the debasement of humanity to its ‘animal functions’ is not permanent: 
“According to Plato, not only is the good knowable, but knowledge, not pleasure, is 
the highest good” (Rosen 1996, p. 57). What is important to note regarding this 
rationalist conception is that reason is not only distinct from and superior to desire, 
but also in constant tension with it; the proliferation of the ‘passions’ directly 
undermines the development of reason, and so it follows that the passions ought to be 
curtailed in order to attain the higher good. The passions are an ‘alien force’, in much 
the same way as for Marx the society based upon commodity-production is an ‘alien 
force’, they must be removed in order to attain the ideal state in which individuals are 
able to exercise complete and autonomous discretionary power. The disparagement of 
desire in favour of reason has indeed been criticised by many, particularly those 
writing from an existential or romantic perspective, but what is of greater significance 
is whether the two attitudes can genuinely be bifurcated. 
 
Rosen argues that Nietzsche’s conception of ‘socraticism’ in The Birth of Tragedy 
poses a troubling problem for the rationalism endemic to the philosophical tradition 
inherited by Marx. Nietzsche claims that rationalism springs from a need to impose 
order and intelligibility on an altogether indifferent world, that it is at bottom a coping 
mechanism, and if this is accepted it becomes increasingly difficult to talk viably of 
rationalist conceptions such as ‘disinterestedness’ and ‘objectivity’. Nietzsche’s 
critique is elaborated in The Gay Science, in which he argues that the conviction that 
science necessarily works within a framework devoid of bias or presuppositions is far 
from self-evident, that in fact it seems more plausible to say the valuation that reason 
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is pre-eminent is itself reflective of a desire of sorts. From where, he asks, does this 
‘desire for certainty’ arise? :  
To make it possible for…[science] to begin, must there not be some prior conviction – 
even one that is so commanding and unconditional that it sacrifices all other 
convictions to itself? We see that science also rests on a faith; there simply is no 
science ‘without presuppositions’. The question whether truth is needed must not 
only have been affirmed in advance, but affirmed to such a degree that the principle, 
the faith, the conviction finds expression: ‘Nothing is needed more than truth, and in 
relation to it everything else has only second-rate value’ (GS 344). 
This line of argument has a much broader application than the critique of the 
purported merits of scientific disciplines; generally applied, it can be inferred that the 
real problem lies in the attempt to somehow delineate a notion of the ‘subject’ over 
and above particular drives and desires, that any such attempt can ultimately be 
deconstructed and shown to involve the very things it seeks to eliminate. With regards 
to Marx, it appears that the ideal of the ‘autonomous subject’ is in need of some 
clarification. Insofar as Marx’s critique focuses on the curtailment and alienation from 
the potentialities needed for the development of subjecthood, his work remains 
relatively unscathed by the anti-rationalist critique, as Marx ensures that his 
conception of genuine subjecthood will be a result of authentic praxis and 
development, a cumulative process rather than a static ideal. On the other hand, the 
notion of ‘authentic praxis and development’ as a prerequisite foundation for self-
actualisation does entail a similarly abstruse approach to that undertaken in the 
rationalist tendency to conceive of reason in the abstract. In both cases, the possibility 
of these foundational states is simply presupposed. 
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The rationalist undercurrents of Marx’s thought are most clearly exemplified in the 
passages in which ideology is linked with false consciousness, as an inverted 
perception of the ‘real world’. The following is a good example, and one that also 
contains elements of the ‘providentialism’ examined below:  
This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the 
world, because they are an inverted world… It is the fantastic realization of the 
human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality… The 
abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their 
real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to 
call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is 
therefore in embryo the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo… 
It is therefore the task of history, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to 
establish the truth of this world (Marx 1992, p. 244). 
The concept of false consciousness is too malleable and indeterminate; on the one 
hand it can be read as a quite natural response to a false, i.e. alienated, world, and on 
the other hand it can be seen as that which manifests and sustains such a world, 
overall it seems to cloud the issue of agency rather than explicate it. The aesthetic 
approach to ideology discussed in the next chapter will do much to alleviate these 
difficulties; following the work of Althusser, ideology can be better understood as an 
affective rather than a cognitive phenomenon. As Eagleton argues, an ideological 
position can be either true or false, whether it accurately represents an empirical 
reality is quite irrelevant to the claim that it is ideological; rather, what matters is the 
sentiment or intent of the speaker, the way in which a particular position functions to 
reinforce one’s sense of identity and, on a societal level, the role it plays in the 
formation of ‘lived relations’ with others. It will be argued that this approach is far 
less susceptible to the problems associated with the rationalist tradition.  
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Closely connected with the rationalist presuppositions of Marx’s theory of ideology is 
the influence of a providential outlook. Rosen argues that in the eighteenth century 
there emerged  
…[b]oth the belief that societies are entities that preserve themselves by shaping the 
individuals and institutions of which they are composed and the belief that history is a 
process in which ‘nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of 
human action, but not the execution of any human design’ (Rosen 1996, p. 101). 
This organic conception is clearly evident in Marx’s base and superstructure model of 
ideology, and implicit in much of his work. The belief is formulated by Rosen in the 
manner of ‘unintended consequences’: the actions of individuals within a society 
serve a role over and above what can be intended or predicted by the actors 
themselves, but the wider significance of these actions can be understood when 
comprehended through a superior perspective. Rosen’s work demonstrates that the 
two contemporary explanations for what gives this perspective – “that actions have a 
wider significance as part of a progressive process of historical development 
[and]…that action should be interpreted from the perspective of society, treated as a 
self-maintaining entity” (Rosen 1996, pp. 101-102) – emerged through a complex 
development of the notion that “…the actions of individuals should be seen 
providentially, as the realization of the Divine Will” (Rosen 1996, p. 101). Many of 
the incommensurable aspects of Marx’s theory examined thus far, particularly the 
problematic relation between the individual and collective social labour, can in part be 
read as a result of his adoption of the belief that society can be treated as a self-
maintaining entity within a wider context of progressive historical development. Marx 
does not take into consideration the historically specific nature of this belief, its 
connection to a tradition with questionable foundations. Objective spirit in Hegel, 
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species being in Feuerbach and collective social labour in Marx are all symptoms of 
the teleology inherent in this providential conception of historical development. It will 
be shown that, in the aesthetic approach to the theory of ideology, the emphasis on the 
construction of the figure of the ‘Other’ as a method of binding individuals into a 
whole does away with the problematic dichotomies that result from the providential 
tradition. 
 
The influence of rationalism and providentialism on Marx’s theory, and the existence 
of alternative explanations to the problems addressed by the theory of ideology, leads 
Rosen to conclude along the same lines as Barth: “Thus the theory of ideology – a 
theory that was presented as an objective attempt to understand the nature of beliefs 
held for non-rational reasons – can be seen as a part of the phenomenon that it 
purports to explain” (Rosen 1996, p. 272). Despite this, Rosen rightly maintains that 
the problems the theory attempts to explain are themselves important and worthy of 
consideration. I argue that the traditional theory of ideology is quite right in its 
critique of the nature of certain ideological conceptions to do with authenticity and 
universality, in highlighting the duplicitous manner in which such conceptions can 
actually function to sustain material conditions of alienation. It only becomes 
entangled in the phenomenon it seeks to explain when it goes on to assume that such 
misrepresentation implies the substantive, or concrete, existence of such notions, or at 
least their potential actualisation in an unadulterated form. The benefit of isolating the 
ideological presuppositions informing the theory of ideology is that it becomes clear 
that such entanglement does not have to follow from the core principles of the theory 
itself. It is primarily in the adoption of the rationalist ideal of autonomous subjects 
exercising complete discretionary power that the problematic distinction between 
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‘non-ideological’ and ‘ideological’ subjects emerges from the theory; in a like 
manner, it is in the adoption of the organicism of the providential tradition that the 
relation between the individual and the ‘collective subject’ embodied in ideology 
becomes problematic, particularly in the subsequent difficulty of describing how 
ideology can be said to ‘determine’ individuals. In the following chapter it will be 
argued that with an aesthetic approach, such as that undertaken by Eagleton and 
Žižek, it is possible to develop a conception of ideology that is free of these 
presuppositions. Notions like authenticity, universality and reconciliation will still be 
shown to be intimately connected with ideology; however, they will be shown to be 
intrinsic to the phenomenon itself, and not things to be contrasted with it. 
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5 The Aesthetic Turn 
 
5.1 Between Subjectivity and Objectivity 
 
I have shown that, without serious amendments, the problematic relation between 
subject and object is further obscured by the theory of ideology developed by Marx. 
Ideology has been variously defined as a mechanism responsible for the organisation 
of a set of social relations arising from the more or less autonomous development of 
the productive forces, which are primary; it has also been defined as the deciding 
factor through which a particular class is able to suppress or to rebel against other 
classes with conflicting interests, and to ultimately ascend to and maintain a 
hegemonic position. Most importantly, ideology has generally been conceived in a 
pejorative sense, with the assumption that those under its sway fundamentally 
misperceive the determining factors behind their actions and/or beliefs. It has been 
argued that the combination of these elements cannot be integrated into a single 
coherent theory, that doing so invariably results in the unaccountability of the precise 
nature of the individual subject’s relation to the ‘whole’ (whether that be ‘class’, 
‘society’, ‘economic base’ or whatever objective formation deemed pertinent to the 
theory). These limitations and others have been summarised as follows:  
 ‘Ideology’ is variously argued to be too vague and/or all-inclusive as a social-
theoretical notion; to have been superseded in later modern societies (in whatever 
relevance it had); and/or to depend on an implausible notion of socio-political Truth 
or objective ‘outside’, against which ideologies’ imputed ‘falsity’ could be measured 
(Sharpe 2006, p. 95). 
In the article from which the above excerpt is taken, Sharpe convincingly 
demonstrates that the reformulated approach to the theory of ideology undertaken by 
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Eagleton and Žižek, with their respective emphases on ‘the beautiful’ and ‘the 
sublime’, opens the possibility for an aesthetic understanding of ideology in which 
much of the problematic aspects of Marx’s theory could potentially be overcome. 
 
Perhaps the most significant problem of ideology encountered so far has been in 
formulating the way in which the perspectives of individuals could be manipulated in 
certain fundamental respects by external forces without severely undermining the 
generally accepted principle of autonomy regarding the subject – if ‘ideology’ is the 
external cause of a set of actions/beliefs, then the extent to which one is ideologically 
determined is the extent to which one is effectively an automaton. However, 
conceptualising ideology in a like manner as one would conceive an aesthetic object 
could potentially dissolve this problematic subject-object dichotomy; for, as with the 
field of aesthetics, the meaningful content of the (ideological) object cannot be 
grasped without the intentional intervention of the subject, though this of course in no 
way diminishes the necessity of the object – here the subject-object relationship is 
reciprocal with regards to the concurrence of meaning. It will be argued that situating 
ideology in the interstices between subjectivity and objectivity does much to account 
for the manner in which ideology can be said to ‘determine’ individuals. As Sharpe 
notes, the genesis of the aesthetic turn in Eagleton and Žižek can be found in the work 
of Louis Althusser – so the first task is to investigate how Althusser’s notion of the 
‘interpellation of the subject’ opened up new avenues for the possible ways in which 
ideology can be said to function. 
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5.2 The Interpellation of the Subject in Althusser 
“In order to grasp what follows, it is essential to realize that both he who is writing 
these lines and the reader who reads them are themselves subjects, and therefore 
ideological subjects (a tautological proposition), i.e. that the author and the reader of 
these lines both live ‘spontaneously’ or ‘naturally’ in ideology in the sense in which I 
have said that ‘man is an ideological animal by nature’” (Althusser 2001, p. 116). 
 
The above passage must be read carefully as it includes both the potential for 
developments in the theory of ideology as well as the potential for serious limitations. 
First, the positive aspects: it has been argued that Marx inherited a humanist 
conception of authenticity from Feuerbach, a notion exemplified in the idea of 
‘collective social labour’. For Althusser, there is no longer a need to explain the way 
in which an individual identifies/communicates with this collective subject, in the 
sense that there is no dichotomy here between ‘authentic subject’ on the one hand and 
‘ideological identification’ on the other: there is no ‘subject’ prior to ‘ideological 
identification’, the two instances emerge simultaneously and cannot be differentiated. 
This reduction of the status of the subject to the ideological appears to do away with 
the problematic presupposition of ‘objective knowledge’ as a test and measure for 
instances of ‘ideological mystification’ – presuming that knowledge must be preceded 
by a subject, it would seem to follow that the influence of ideology must be in a 
certain sense ubiquitous.20 This leads to what can only appear on a first reading to be 
																																																								
20 This is not the conclusion arrived at by Althusser himself who, like Marx, maintains a conception of 
scientific knowledge as distinct from ideology in general: “Marx founds a new science, i.e. he 
elaborates a system of new scientific concepts where previously there prevailed only the manipulation 
of ideological notions. Marx founds the science of history where there were previously only 
philosophies of history…before Marx, two continents only had been opened up to scientific knowledge 
by sustained epistemological breaks: the continent of Mathematics with the Greeks (by Thales or those 
designated by that mythical name) and the continent of Physics (by Galileo and his successors)” 
(Althusser 2001, pp. 21-22). 
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a serious limitation in the Althusserian theory of ideology, as Sharpe has pointed out, 
this line of reasoning is indeed vulnerable to accusations of being too ‘all-inclusive as 
a social-theoretical notion’ to be of any use. The propositions that ‘man is an 
ideological animal by nature’, that one is ‘always-already’ a subject, appear to be 
simply non-falsifiable and so unhelpful in breaking away from the limitations 
encountered in the theory of ideology thus far. Nonetheless, I wish to argue that 
Althusser’s strict anti-humanism can and should be tempered with an aesthetic 
conception of a decentred, yet active, subject; that with slight revisions Althusser’s 
theories of interpellation and ideological State apparatuses do represent an important 
advance in the theory of ideology. 
 
Althusser begins his treatment on ideology with an important modification to the 
Marxist theory of the State. He notes that the standard formulation has been first to 
claim that the State can be defined as the repressive State apparatus; ‘State power’ 
must be distinguished from the State apparatus (the mechanism through which the 
former is exercised), as State power can change hands and represent different interests 
without modifying the State apparatus; ‘class struggle’ is primarily concerned with 
the seizure of State power, by a class or alliance of classes, in order to implement 
their class objectives through the consequent control of the State apparatus; finally, it 
is the imperative of the proletariat to seize State power, in order to first replace the 
existing State apparatus with a proletarian State apparatus, with the eventual goal of 
the radical dissolution of the State, i.e. every State apparatus and State power as such. 
Althusser accepts the distinction between State power and State apparatus but argues 
that a further distinction is needed within the State apparatus itself. He maintains that 
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the repressive State apparatus (RSA) can, preliminarily,21 be identified as the unity of 
institutions including the Government, Administration, Army, Police, Courts and 
Prisons – institutions which function primarily by ‘violence’, “…at least ultimately 
(since repression, e.g. administrative repression, may take nonphysical forms)” 
(Althusser 2001, p. 96). However, Althusser argues that the exercise of State power 
would not be possible in a purely repressive form of State apparatus, that any 
effective RSA must be supplemented with what he terms ‘Ideological State 
Apparatuses’ (ISAs). 
 
Unlike the composition of the RSA, the institutions representing the ISAs appear 
relatively autonomous and distinct from one another. Althusser presents the following 
as a preliminary empirical list:  
• the religious ISA (the system of the different Churches), 
• the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private ‘Schools’), 
• the family ISA, 
• the legal ISA, 
• the political ISA (the political system, including the different Parties), 
• the trade union ISA, 
• the communications ISA (press, radio and television, etc.), 
• the cultural ISA (Literature, the Arts, sports, etc.) (Althusser 2001, p. 96). 
Althusser of course accepts the obvious rebuke that the RSA and ISAs cannot be 
neatly demarcated, noting that some, such as the family ISA, serve other functions 
and others, such as the legal ISA and arguably the political ISA, also belong to the 
RSA. Despite this he maintains that there are important differences between the RSA 																																																								
21 It is important to note that Althusser did not present his theses on ideology in completed form: “I 
should like to venture a first and very schematic outline of such a theory [of ideology]. The theses I am 
about to put forward are certainly not off the cuff, but they cannot be sustained and tested, i.e. 
confirmed or rejected, except by much thorough study and analysis” (Althusser 2001, p. 107). 
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and the ISAs, over and above the fact that there is one RSA and a plurality of ISAs. 
Firstly, there is a distinction between public and private domains; the RSA belongs to 
the public domain whereas most of what comprises the ISAs can be considered to 
belong to the private domain. Anticipating the objection that what belongs to the 
private domain cannot also belong to the ‘State’ apparatus, Althusser argues that 
“…[i]t is unimportant whether the institutions in which they are realized are ‘public’ 
or ‘private’. What matters is how they function. Private institutions can perfectly well 
‘function’ as Ideological State Apparatuses. A reasonably thorough analysis of any 
one of the ISAs proves it” (Althusser 2001, p. 97). The general argument here is that 
insofar as the ISAs all work to produce, or rather reproduce, subjects with attitudes, 
habits and customs commensurable to the interests of the State, they can be said to 
belong to the State apparatus. The primary difference, then, between the RSA and the 
ISAs is that the former functions predominantly by violence and the latter functions 
predominantly by ideology. It is important to note that Althusser maintains that there 
is no such thing as a ‘purely’ repressive apparatus or a ‘purely’ ideological apparatus, 
each utilises the predominant aspect of the other as a secondary or supportive 
function:  
For example, the Army and the Police also function by ideology both to ensure their 
own cohesion and reproduction, and in the ‘values’ they propound externally…[the 
ISAs] also function secondarily by repression, even if ultimately, but only ultimately, 
this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic… Thus Schools and Churches 
use suitable methods of punishment, expulsion, selection, etc., to ‘discipline’ not only 
their shepherds, but also their flocks. The same is true of the Family… The same is 
true of the cultural IS Apparatus (censorship, among other things), etc. (Althusser 
2001, p. 98). 
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Given the necessary interplay between the RSA and ISAs, as well as Althusser’s 
dictum that no class can maintain or reproduce the use of State power without 
effective control of the ISAs, we can make the observation that the more subtle, the 
less obvious, are the instances of repression functioning in the ISAs, the more 
hegemonic and secure are the interests of the class or classes in control of State 
power. Thus the importance of the ideological field is clear:  
…the Ideological State Apparatuses may be not only the stake, but also the site of 
class struggle, and often of bitter forms of class struggle. [Because]…[t]he class (or 
class alliance) in power cannot lay down the law in the ISAs as easily as it can in the 
(repressive) State apparatus (Althusser 2001, p. 99).  
For while the appropriation of State power through the seizure of the RSA may be 
quick and decisive, it can only be short-lived without the subsequent reproduction of 
the relations of production which underlie it; and such reproductions cannot be 
achieved without what Althusser terms the ideological interpellation of individuals as 
subjects.    
 
The primary function of ideology, manifest in the ideological State apparatuses, is 
thus the reproduction of the relations of production. The question remains as to the 
means by which this is accomplished; precisely what is the nature of the relation 
between individuals and ideology? Althusser proposes two theses by way of 
explanation: “Thesis I: Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals 
to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser 2001, p. 109) and “Thesis II: 
Ideology has a material existence” (Althusser 2001, p. 112). Thesis I represents a 
slight divergence from the approach that Marx adopted from Feuerbach. The German 
Ideology proposed that ideology represented a mystified, or alienated, conception of 
authentic conditions of existence; the cause of this conception lies in the fact that the 
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actual conditions of existence are themselves alienating, thus in order for this to be 
sustained ‘authentic’ conditions of existence must be projected in ideology – either as 
a potentiality inherent in the actual conditions of existence, or more commonly, as 
with religious ideologies, as a state to be attained in a transcendent existence. The 
obvious flaw in this conception is the space left open regarding how one comes to 
formulate and identify with a mystified representation of authentic conditions that are 
necessarily absent from one’s actual conditions. Who or what is causally responsible 
for such a projection? Althusser’s thesis is beneficial in that it disposes of this 
problem of causation:  
[I]t is not their real conditions of existence, their real world, that ‘men’ ‘represent to 
themselves’ in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those conditions of 
existence which is represented to them there…it is necessary to advance the thesis 
that it is the imaginary nature of this relation which underlies all the distortion that 
we can observe (if we do not live in its truth) in all ideology …What is represented in 
ideology is therefore not the system of the real relations which govern the existence 
of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in 
which they live (Althusser 2001, p. 111).   
Although this thesis has advantages over those propounded in The German Ideology, 
it could arguably be accused of relying on circular reasoning: ideology represents an 
imaginary relation to one’s real conditions of existence. Why? Because one’s real 
conditions of existence are regulated through an identification with the ideological 
State apparatuses. Althusser’s approach becomes more meaningful against the 
backdrop of thesis II, so this criticism can be put aside for the moment. For now it is 
important to note the radical transformation of the status of alienation entailed here. 
For Marx, the ideological subject is necessarily an alienated subject – ideological 
conceptions are born of the estrangement entailed in alienated labour and class 
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stratification, essentially as an explanation or justification for this alienation. Here the 
opposite holds true: the ideological subject does not feel alienated from his or her 
actual conditions of existence – on the contrary the more one ‘feels at home’, the 
more one identifies oneself as belonging to the ISAs, i.e. the less alienated, the more 
successful ideological interpellation is. The two approaches agree on the same general 
tendency of ideology to create a sense of self-identification with the external, though 
while Marx holds this to be an illusory effect, Althusser argues it to be very real, for 
he insists that ideology has a material existence.    
 
The materiality of ideology follows from Althusser’s insistence that ideology is 
always realised in and through an apparatus. It seems non-controversial to claim that 
one’s ideas, particularly one’s ‘ideological’ ideas, if this distinction can be made, 
always imply a corresponding action – indeed Althusser claims that it is an essential 
aspect of ‘the ideological representation of ideology’ that one  
…must ‘act according to his ideas’…Indeed, if he does not do what he ought to do as 
a function of what he believes, it is because he does something else, which, still as a 
function of the same idealist scheme, implies that he has other ideas in his head as 
well as those he proclaims, and that he acts according to these other ideas, as a man 
who is either ‘inconsistent’…or cynical, or perverse…the ‘ideas’ of a human subject 
exist in his actions, or ought to exist in his actions… (Althusser 2001, pp. 113-114). 
This ‘ideological’ expectation that one ought to act according to one’s ideas is 
sustained by the fact that these ideas have correlative rituals and practices embodied 
in the ISAs. These rituals and practices are of course exceedingly numerous and 
diverse, ranging from obvious examples such as the material practices of worship and 
ethical commitments implied by a belief in God, to more subtle instances such as the 
proper rituals and practices associated with notions of civility and good manners. 
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Althusser follows Pascal here, these ideas, certainly supportive of and indispensible to 
the ISAs, are themselves, in the last determination, a product of the ISAs; they have 
no autonomous or ‘ideal’ existence of their own: “ideology…[exists] in a material 
ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices governed by a material ritual, 
which practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness 
according to his belief” (Althusser 2001, p. 115). The problem of circularity reappears 
here: the ISAs cannot function without subjects willingly adopting and identifying 
with the ideas that underlie them; but the possibility of adopting and identifying with 
ideas is itself dependent on their corresponding existence within a material ISA. Thus 
a person is simultaneously a free subject and a subjected being. To make sense of this 
counter-intuitive notion Althusser introduces the concept of ‘ideological 
interpellation’. 
 
The mechanism of ideological interpellation is equated with instances of being 
‘hailed’. Althusser gives the example of an individual being hailed on the street – 
‘hey, you there!’ – the consequent recognition from the hailed individual that this call 
was addressed to him or her, the spontaneity or obviousness of this recognition is, 
Althusser maintains, an ideological effect, ‘the elementary ideological effect’:  
[W]hat thus seems to take place outside ideology (to be precise, in the street), in 
reality takes place in ideology. What really takes place in ideology seems therefore to 
take place outside it. That is why those who are in ideology believe themselves by 
definition outside ideology: one of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation 
of the ideological character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says, ‘I am 
ideological.’… (Althusser 2001, p. 118). 
The way in which ideology functioning in the ISAs hails or interpellates individuals is 
reliant upon the recognition of themselves as ‘subjects’, ideology always addresses 
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itself to subjects and, because we ‘always-already’ are subjects, this hailing is almost 
always successful. To demonstrate that this is not so much a temporal process, but 
rather in a sense an omnipresent reality, Althusser refers to the Freudian analysis of 
the expectation of a birth:  
Everyone knows how much and in what way an unborn child is expected. Which 
amounts to saying, very prosaically, if we agree to drop the ‘sentiments’, i.e. the 
forms of family ideology (paternal/maternal/ conjugal/fraternal) in which the unborn 
child is expected: it is certain in advance that it will bear its Father’s Name, and will 
therefore have an identity and be irreplaceable. Before its birth, the child is therefore 
always-already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by the specific familial 
ideological configuration in which it is ‘expected’ once it has been conceived 
(Althusser 2001, p. 119). 
Althusser’s claim is that, to varying degrees, all the ISAs contain this feature through 
which certain expectations are in a sense imposed upon individuals as subjects, that 
this imposition succeeds because individuals recognise themselves as the intended 
‘subject’ of these expectations; thus in a retroactive movement one recognises oneself 
as being ‘always-already’ a subject. 
 
However, if ideological interpellation is conceived as a blanket process encompassing 
all aspects of human nature, it then appears to be not only non-verifiable but also 
intuitively implausible. Althusser’s reference to humanity being an ‘ideological 
animal by nature’ does seem to point in this direction and invites the following 
criticism from E.P. Thompson:  
…behind Althusser’s grotesque notion of ideological ‘interpellation’ or ‘hailing’ we 
find even more chic notions of men and women (except, of course, select 
intellectuals) not thinking or acting, but being thought and being performed. All these 
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exalted thinkers, ‘bourgeois’ or ‘Marxist’, proceed from the same ‘latent 
anthropology’, the same ulterior assumption about ‘Man’ – that all men and women 
(except themselves) are bloody silly (Thompson 1995, pp. 199-200). 
The attempt to disassociate ambiguous notions such as ‘human nature’, ‘authenticity’ 
and ‘essence’ from the theory of ideology is an understandable and, I would argue, a 
necessary endeavour; Marx’s failure to account for such notions when implying that 
ideology can be equated with ‘false consciousness’ is a fundamental deadlock in the 
theory. Thompson is correct to argue, though, that sweeping these notions under the 
umbrella of ideology does nothing to remove the ambiguity – we simply move from 
ideology in juxtaposition to an unspecified authentic ‘other’ to a concept of ideology 
itself that exhibits aspects of this unspecified ‘otherness’ (i.e. ‘class struggle’ as the 
determining factor in the last instance). I would argue, however, that Althusser’s 
theory has the potential of dissociating itself from these ambiguous notions without 
having to negate or subsume them – that human nature, authenticity and essence may 
or may not exist, and that this problem has nothing to do with the existence of 
ideology. I think that Althusser’s reference to ‘bad subjects’ could point towards this: 
…the subjects ‘work’, they ‘work by themselves’ in the vast majority of cases, with 
the exception of the ‘bad subjects’ who on occasion provoke the intervention of one 
of the detachments of the (repressive) State apparatus. But the vast majority of (good) 
subjects work alright ‘all by themselves’, i.e. by ideology (whose concrete forms are 
realized in the Ideological State Apparatuses) (Althusser 2001, p. 123).     
The need for this occasional intervention from the RSA can only mean that 
ideological interpellation does not have a uniform effect upon everyone, that the 
extent to which one is interpellated will vary in degree and, possibly, that it may fail 
entirely. This variability surely implies that there is a surplus dimension to 
personhood over and above the ‘ideological interpellation of individuals as subjects’; 
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further, I would argue that the supposition of a surplus – and it need only remain a 
supposition, simply the assumption that ideological interpellation is ‘not-all’ – is 
necessary for any meaningful discussion on ideology.  
 
One other limitation in Althusser’s theory pertains to the fact that it remains, albeit in 
a refined form, a version of the base/superstructure model of ideology with concurrent 
problems regarding the viability of having different ‘levels’ of determination. In an 
attempt to avoid this problematic Althusser makes the claim that the superstructure is 
not simply an effect of the economic base but rather has a material existence of its 
own, that in the last instance it has only a material existence, and thus is relatively 
autonomous and in turn capable of a level of effectivity with regards to the base. It is 
unclear, though, whether this signifies a genuine advancement over the original 
base/superstructure model, as the fundamentally passive nature of the individual 
remains the same in both instances. It seems, then, that the way out of this problem is 
to renege on the exclusive materiality of ideology, and this is the direction taken by 
Žižek:  
When Althusser claims that ideology interpellates individuals into subjects, 
‘individuals’ stand here for the living beings on which a dispositif of ISAs works, 
imposing on them a network of micro-practices, while the ‘subject’ is not a category 
of living being, of substance, but the result of these living beings being caught in an 
ISA dispositif (or in a symbolic order). Where Althusser falls short is in his 
disappointing and misplaced insistence on the ‘materiality’ of the ISA: the primordial 
form of dispositif, the ‘big Other’ of the symbolic institution, is precisely immaterial, 
a virtual order… (Žižek 2013, pp. 984-985) 
This is not to deny Althusser’s insistence on the fundamental importance of ideology 
manifesting in material rituals and practices. However, in arguing that a central aspect 
		
135	
of it is immaterial or virtual, Žižek is able account for the active engagement of 
individuals in the field of ideology. He further argues that the effectiveness of the 
material ISAs is to a certain extent reliant upon this immateriality: whereas Althusser 
must always posit the pre-existence of the material arm of the State apparatuses in 
order to sustain the ideological – Žižek refers here to Althusser’s imputation of the 
existence of the armed forces or gold reserves (amongst other examples) functioning 
as a necessary ‘background’ guarantee of State power – Žižek maintains that the 
actual or material existence of such guarantees are of secondary importance; it is 
enough that one believes in their existence in order to establish the desired ideological 
effect; what follows from this belief in the imagined potency of the symbolic order (or 
superstructure) are the reproduction of material rituals and practices commensurable 
to it; if the instances of State power, existing in the individual mind as a potentiality, 
are actually displayed, this can have the paradoxical effect of weakening them:  
[T]he ‘little piece of the real’ (the armed force, gold reserves) that can remain in the 
background since it can perform its function even without being used, indeed can 
fulfil that function even if it does not exist at all…not only does it not need to exist in 
reality, if it did appear and directly intervene in reality, then it would risk losing its 
power…[it] is thus a spectral entity…a father who is perceived as ‘omnipotent’ can 
only sustain this position if his power remains forever a ‘potential’, a threat which is 
never actualized. The full use of force, painful as it might be, makes it part of reality 
and as such by definition limited” (Žižek 2014, p. 54). 
The reference to gold reserves indicates that this situation is not limited to instances 
of direct repression; the transition from the material to the virtual in the emergence of 
digital economies does nothing to lessen the effectiveness of the monetary system – 
on the contrary it works to endow a currency with a sort of limitless omnipresence 
and thereby strengthens its relation to the material practices of individuals. This leads 
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Žižek to argue for a more expansive conception of materialism than that which is 
deployed by Althusser:  
[N]ot only the ‘priority of being over consciousness’, in the traditional Marxist sense 
that ideas are grounded in the material social and productive process, and not only the 
material (ideological) apparatuses that sustain ideology, but also the immanent 
materiality of the ideal order itself (Žižek 2014, pp. 55-56). 
This notion of ‘the immanent materiality of the ideal order itself’ is essential for the 
possibility of an active component of the ideological subject; a component which 
allows for the possibility of one’s imaginary/symbolic identifications to be confirmed, 
reformulated or even denied – for the ‘power’ of ideology here resides within the 
individual subject, to the precise extent that one’s ideal order is confirmed by or 
conforms to one’s material rituals and practices. This leads back to the idea that there 
are differences in the degree to which individuals are interpellated as subjects and, 
what follows, that some may be more susceptible to ideology than others. In order to 
develop this argument further the work of Eagleton needs to be addressed, for his 
analysis of the nature or process of ideological identification is highly relevant. 
 
5.3 Eagleton via Kant: Ideology and Aesthetic Judgments   
 
For Eagleton the mechanism of ideological interpellation can be conceived along the 
same lines as the formative process of aesthetic judgments developed by Kant. This is 
not to say that ideology is necessarily aesthetic, or that all aesthetics is ideological – 
rather the feeling of pleasure associated with the contemplation of ‘the beautiful’, and 
the assumed grounds for this feeling, is said to be illustrative of the way in which 
successful ideological interpellation functions; that it accounts for the assumed 
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‘obviousness’ or ‘disinterestedness’ of ideological judgments, and for the way in 
which ideology is able to manifest a sense of homogeneity amongst people with 
otherwise disparate interests. In addition, by equating ideological interpellation with 
judgments of taste, Eagleton can account for the active component of the ideological 
subject – for though Kant holds that judgment is an inherent cognitive faculty, it is not 
one that develops in a uniform manner:  
It may be a matter of uncertainty whether a person who thinks he is laying down a 
judgment of taste is, in fact, judging in conformity with that idea; but that this idea is 
what is contemplated in his judgment, and that, consequently, it is meant to be a 
judgment of taste, is proclaimed by his use of the expression ‘beauty’ (Kant 2007, p. 
47).  
For Kant a sense of taste needs to be cultivated in order for the possibility of purely 
aesthetic judgments to be made – so as to divorce them from the influence of that 
which may be simply ‘agreeable’, or gratifying to the senses, and that which may be 
simply ‘good’, of objective practical worth. Similarly the ISAs may be said to 
cultivate a sense of subjecthood in individuals, and if the analogy holds this would 
entail a level of self-referential discourse for the identification of drives and/or desires 
in tension with the ideological ‘ideal’ – the strength of a particular ideology is then 
measured by its effects, the extent to which individuals willingly suppress or disavow 
those tendencies identified as falling outside the sphere of ideological interpellation.  
 
Eagleton regards the aesthetic in Kant as an archetypal example of the possibility of a 
‘non-alienated’ object; the evocation of notions of beauty or the sublime from the 
contemplation of certain phenomena is one that is grounded in intuition, establishing 
an immediate sense of relatedness between perceiver and perceived. The spontaneous 
consensus amongst different individuals who judge this or that object to be an 
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instance of beauty or the sublime is thus the grounds for the possibility of a form of 
‘intersubjectivity’ which may be otherwise lacking:  
…establishing ourselves as a community of feeling subjects linked by a quick sense 
of our shared capacities… For the alarming truth is that in a social order marked by 
class division and market competition, it may finally be here, and only here, that 
human beings belong together in some intimate Gemeinschaft. At the level of 
theoretical discourse, we know one another only as objects; at the level of morality, 
we know and respect each other as autonomous subjects, but can have no concept of 
what this means… In the sphere of aesthetic culture, however, we can experience our 
shared humanity with all the immediacy of our response to a fine painting or 
magnificent symphony. Paradoxically, it is in the apparently most private, frail and 
intangible aspects of our lives that we blend most harmoniously with one another 
(Eagleton 1990, pp. 75-76). 
This common sense is grounded in the perception of the aesthetic object. Eagleton 
notes, however, that it is no way representative of the object itself – the ‘beautiful’ 
describes a subjective state, a ‘universal subjectivity’ to the extent that this judgment 
forms a consensus – it is rather indifferent to the objective nature of the object itself. 
It is in this sense that Eagleton argues that aesthetics and ideology share a common 
logic.  
 
The significance of aesthetic judgments pertains to their ability to establish common 
values independent of any objective or concrete actualities; and this is a function 
which ideology must be able to fulfil in order to establish a sense of social solidarity, 
a function which becomes increasingly important in proportion to the extent to which 
a society tends towards the atomisation of its subjects. Eagleton argues that Kant’s 
dismissal of the possibility of deriving values from facts, of the transition from ‘is’ to 
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‘ought’, is grounded in the recognition that the practices underlying modern societies 
are inimical to the formation of societal identification, thus the unification of subject 
and State must be established on a higher, conceptual level: “Values do not flow from 
facts, in the sense that ideologies are intended not simply to reflect existing social 
behaviour, but to mystify and legitimate it” (Eagleton 1990, p. 82). However, as 
noted, it is implausible for this conceptual identification to be constructed and 
maintained if what is represented by it are conditions and values that are 
fundamentally absent from one’s actual conditions of living. Thus Eagleton argues 
that the Kantian moral law is, from an ideological perspective, quite ineffective in its 
exhortation that reason alone is sufficient for such valuations:  
It is a fiction, this moral law, a hypothesis which we must construct in order to act as 
rational creatures at all, yet an entity of which the world yields no trace of evidence. 
The Kantian moral law is a fetish; and as such it is a poor basis for human solidarity, 
which is precisely its ideological paucity (Eagleton 1990, p. 83).	
If, on the other hand, an ideological configuration is able to engage individuals on an 
aesthetic level, then this dislocation can be overcome. 
 
The aesthetic establishes a sense of purposiveness for the external in which natural 
objects appear uniquely suited or even designed for our imaginative faculties; this 
apparent synthesis between two otherwise alienated positions is what needs to occur 
for the possibility of successful ideological interpellation:  
That things are conveniently fashioned for our purposes must remain a hypothesis; 
but it is the kind of heuristic fiction which permits us a sense of purposiveness, 
centredness and significance, and thus one which is of the very essence of the 
ideological (Eagleton 1990, p. 85). 
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Eagleton argues that this ‘heuristic fiction’ of centredness and significance is 
precisely the end result of the process of ‘hailing’ functioning in the ISAs, another 
example of the aesthetic nature of ideology. The primary function of the ISAs is the 
reproduction of the relations of production underlying a given society,  
…but it cannot succeed…unless those individuals are permitted the illusion that the 
world ‘hails’ them, shows some regard for their faculties, addresses itself to them as 
one subject to another, and it is this fiction which ideology for Althusser exists to 
foster (Eagleton 1990, p. 88). 
Thus the centring of the subject aroused by aesthetic judgments of the beautiful can 
be seen as being equivalent to the centredness entailed in the recognition of oneself as 
the subject hailed in the process of ideological interpellation; they both create a sense 
of ‘being-at-home’ in the world, a self-identification in complete contrast to any 
instances of objective alienation. However, as Eagleton notes, such unencumbered 
harmony, if taken to the extreme, would likely lead to a self-satisfied and inactive 
populace at odds with political expedience. In the same way as the ISAs are 
supplemented with the RSA, Kant’s analytic of the beautiful is supplemented with an 
analytic of the sublime, apprehension of which appears to, “…contravene the ends of 
our power of judgment, to be ill-adapted to our faculty of presentation, and to do 
violence, as it were, to the imagination, and yet it is judged all the more sublime on 
that account” (Kant 2007, p. 76). Eagleton detects an analogous dialectic of centring 
and de-centring subjects in the interplay between the ISAs and the RSA, effecting an 
often precarious balancing act in which freedom and self-identification are reconciled 
with submission and conformity.   
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Aesthetic judgments for Kant are supposed to be simultaneously subjective and 
universal. Eagleton notes that this entails a level of duplicity in their grammatical 
form:  
To claim that you are sublime is not for me to identify some property in you but to 
report on some feeling in myself. Judgments of taste appear to be descriptions of the 
world but are in fact concealed emotive utterances, performatives masquerading as 
constatives (Eagleton 1990, p. 93).  
The difficulty, as Eagleton sees it, is that the concealment of the 
emotional/performative aspects of such judgments is accomplished on an almost 
unconscious level; he argues that it is not possible to simply remove ideological 
influence by translating statements of the form ‘x is sublime’ into ‘I like x’ – the very 
nature of the subjectivity conceived to be operative in aesthetic judgments is one of 
pure disinterestedness, removed of all personal opinion, belief and inclination – a 
subjective feeling of such self-evidence so as to preclude disputation. A primary 
function of aesthetic judgments, Eagleton maintains, is their effect of re-
conceptualising one’s lived relation to the world as being a characterisation of the 
world itself, and in this sense they are strictly homologous to the ‘hailing’ entailed in 
ideological interpellation. Thus Eagleton argues that ideology should not be assessed 
with regards to the truth or falsity of a given proposition, rather one should seek to 
determine what sort of social configurations are promoted or denigrated by the 
discourse, what relation should be drawn between its implicit premises and the 
distribution/reproduction of State power, and this relation is oftentimes a very subtle 
and attenuated one:  
Ideology does indeed importantly contain many false propositions, such as the claim 
that Asians are inferior to Europeans or that the Queen of England is highly 
intelligent; but the falsity of such claims is not what is peculiarly ideological about 
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them, since not all false propositions are ideological and not all ideological 
statements are false. What makes such false claims ideological is the motivation of 
their falsity: the fact that they encode emotive attitudes relevant to the reproduction of 
social power. The same is true of the many ideological utterances which happen to be 
true… [Ideology] is a matter of wishing, cursing, fearing, reverencing, desiring, 
denigrating and so on – performative discourse… (Eagleton 1990, p. 94). 
By defining ideology as a performative discourse Eagleton’s reformulation is 
compatible with the idea that there may be differences in the extent to which 
individuals are interpellated as subjects; the effect of ideology on the reproduction of 
the relations of production will be the same regardless of whether individuals are 
completely interpellated and identify aesthetically with the ideology functioning in 
the ISAs, or if such notions are simply espoused cynically in pursuance of one’s 
interests. The myriad of possible dispositions in between will presumably be 
determined by the extent to which the antagonisms internal to a social order are 
mystified/naturalised, or conversely, the extent to which they work to disrupt feelings 
of social harmony, and this in turn would differ from person to person depending on 
the level of subjective alienation experienced. Thus Althusser is quite correct to claim 
that the ideological field is both the ‘stake’ as well as the ‘site’ of class struggle.   
 
The aesthetic, then, is a powerful source of social harmony, an apparently pure and 
immediate foundation for solidarity based upon shared feelings of intersubjectivity 
aroused by the seemingly universal apprehension of instances of ‘the beautiful’ and 
‘the sublime’, a foundation for what Kant considers to be a ‘sensus communis’. 
Recognition of this common sense is thus a shield against alienation, an illustration of 
the way in which one can be said to recognise oneself as ‘always-already’ a subject in 
respect to ideological interpellation. Eagleton importantly adds that, insofar as the two 
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examples are analogous, the perceived universality of this subjective recognition has 
the effect of dissociating it from any and all of the subject’s opinions and beliefs 
acknowledged to be ‘subjective’ in a personal sense, and garnishes the position with 
the status of genuine neutrality. Thus ideology appears to the subject of interpellation 
as its very opposite, a position completely neutral with regards to personal interests 
and a genuine reconciliation between subject and object:  
…[The aesthetic] thus offers an ideological paradigm for both individual subject and 
social order – for the aesthetic representation is a society, in which each constituent 
component is the condition of the purposive existence of every other, and finds in that 
felicitous totality the ground of its own identity (Eagleton 1990, p. 99).  
Insofar as Kant’s analytic of the beautiful can be read as a paradigm for the 
ideological conception of the non-alienated and harmonious relation between subject 
and society, it would seem, then, to be ill-suited to account for the more insidious 
aspects of ideological discourse, the forms of ‘cursing’, ‘fearing’, ‘desiring’ and 
‘denigrating’ to which Eagleton refers to. Here Sharpe’s analysis is beneficial because 
he points out that by assuming the functioning of the ISAs can be equated with Kant’s 
analytic of the beautiful, and that of the RSA with Kant’s analytic of the sublime, 
these antithetical dispositions of ideological interpellation may be overlooked. But by 
emphasising the role of the sublime in ideological identification itself, not as a 
supplement or corrective to potential deviations from interpellation, Žižek’s approach 
may be able to account for this apparent discrepancy.  
 
Sharpe notes that for Žižek there is always an ‘indivisible remainder’ to ideological 
subjectification, an excess which is on the one hand unable to be incorporated into the 
ideology itself, but on the other hand necessary for it to effectively function: an 
‘ideological fantasy’ that,  
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…(1) (re-)narrates the (violent) historical emergence of the present socio-political 
order, and (2) provides a semantic framework situating this order viz-à-viz its 
synchronic ‘outside’ (other nations, political foes, and points of internal or 
‘symptomatic’ rupture within its consensual fabric (Sharpe 2006, p. 108). 
Ideological interpellation is never total because no ideology is entirely self-sufficient, 
for anything to be sanctioned by or included in an ideology there is always, at least 
implicitly, a reference to that which is to be excluded or prohibited. It is in virtue of 
this latter, ‘sublime’ otherness, that ideology possesses its importance, meaning and 
attraction – for if a sensus communis were truly universal there would be no need for 
ideology. The conception of the ‘Other’ thus plays an important role in ideological 
cohesion, and in an important sense the internal homogeneity of a group is defined by 
what is external to it, thus the ‘Other’ has the strange function of being that which is 
both incapable of being assimilated into the ideological edifice, as well as being a real 
and defined threat to the stability of the edifice. Therefore the inconsistent status of 
the ideological ‘Other’ is in fact key to the consistency of ideology:  
What is decisive about the ideological positing of a malign external enemy, Žižek 
argues, is how it functions within a political community to externalise the causes of 
any manifest dissonances that arise in this polity’s sensus communis. The political 
‘gain’ associated with this archetypal ideological device is then, as Žižek explains, 
how it allows representatives of the ideology to foreclose the possibility that any such 
‘symptomatic’ internal divisions are structurally immanent to the existing political 
regime. All such sources of internal crisis can rather be re-signified in advance as 
contingent to the regime… They are thus reinscribed as in principle removable 
without any fundamental structural change (Sharpe 2006, p. 115). 
It seems, then, that ideology needs to be investigated with respect to both its 
‘beautiful’ and ‘sublime’ aspects, in order to identify and distinguish between what 
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may be positive and what may be negative in a given ideological configuration. This 
tension between the beautiful and the sublime is also reflective of Althusser’s 
emphasis on ‘struggle’ as being ever present within the field of ideology. 
 
The most obvious instances of the malevolent potential of ideology can be seen in 
those groups in which the overt denigration of the ‘Other’ is in-itself a foundation for 
a sense of solidarity, in which the perceived attributes of an external group are 
themselves a positive referent through which the ideology unifies its subjects in a 
purely negative relation to its self-defined ‘outside’. The immeasurably long and 
ongoing history of ideologically based discrimination and repression attests to this. It 
may seem, then, that if ideology is to dispose of this dangerous potential it must 
disavow any and all negative conceptions of the ‘Other’, that harmony can be attained 
and sustained through a discourse of tolerance and the embracing of a multitude of 
differences. The idea of tolerance as a unifying principle is relatively recent; indeed it 
has even been argued that the implementation of the principle of tolerance is itself 
representative of a shift towards a form of ‘post-ideological’ discourse: 
Ideology was considered distinct from a pluralist, free, tolerant and rational society 
where ‘politics’ takes place. Writers as diverse as Ralph Dahrendorf, J L Talmon, 
Bernard Crick, Hannah Arendt and Karl Popper, in their different ways, all spoke of 
‘totalising ideologies’ and closed societies (fascism and communism), as distinct 
from tolerant civil politics and open societies. Ideology, in this reading, becomes an 
intolerant and limited perspective in comparison to forms of non-ideological, open 
and tolerant politics. In this total context it was therefore argued that ideology had 
ended in advanced, industrialised democratic societies (Saksena 2009, p. 67). 
However, as Wendy Brown has argued, this notion of the ‘end of ideology’ is a little 
premature, as things are a little more complicated. The problem has nothing to do 
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with tolerance per se, but rather with the call for tolerance as being the initial and 
foundational moment for political discourse, for as Brown notes:  
Almost all objects of tolerance are marked as deviant, marginal, or undesirable by 
virtue of being tolerated, and the action of tolerance inevitably affords some access to 
superiority, even as settings or dynamics of mutual tolerance may complicate 
renderings of superordination and superiority as matters of relatively fixed status 
(Brown 2008, p. 14). 
In addition to any implicit renderings of superordination and superiority, there is also 
the essential problem that if tolerance and acceptance of differences is to be 
universalised as the ideological/political foundation of a society, then these 
differences themselves cannot have any role in the public sphere in regards to the 
functioning of the State. The analysis of Hegel and Marx has shown that the 
distinction between the public and private spheres is much more tenuous than is often 
appreciated and, by way of advancement, Brown’s analysis demonstrates that the 
incorporation of a plurality of differences into an ideological configuration can only 
be achieved if these differences are essentially ‘de-politicised’. Given the ambiguous 
relation between the public and private spheres, this de-politicisation inevitably leads 
to conflict between groups for whom certain issues are a matter of public rights, and 
for others must be relegated to the sphere of private differences. The way in which the 
discourse of tolerance attempts to resolve this fractured harmony is decidedly similar 
to the ideological mechanisms from which it was supposed to be a departure:  
Depoliticization involves construing inequality, subordination, marginalization, and 
social conflict, which all require political analysis and political solutions, as personal 
and individual, on the one hand, or as natural, religious, or cultural on the 
other…Tolerance as it is commonly used today tends to cast instances of inequality 
or social injury as matters of individual or group prejudice. And it tends to cast group 
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conflict as rooted in ontologically natural hostility toward essentialized religious, 
ethnic, or cultural difference (Brown 2008, p. 15).      
In claiming that apparently ‘post-ideological’ discourses such as the discourse of 
tolerance do in fact share common features with ideology in its overt forms, it is 
certainly not my intention to equate the two in an ethical sense; the actual or concrete 
experiences of individuals interpellated as subjects will of course vary from ideology 
to ideology, and it is conceivable that the value of particular ideologies could be 
assessed in regards to their negative and/or positive effects. Brown’s analysis is 
important in that she successfully highlights a concealed level of cultural bias 
operating in an ostensibly neutral liberal-democratic discourse; and is as such a 
perfect example of successful ideology. In order to undertake a thorough examination, 
ideology needs to be identified and analysed in all its forms, particularly when it is 
most surreptitious. Here the work of Žižek is significant as he is able to establish 
certain tools essential for the diagnosis and critique of ideology in a nominally post-
ideological landscape.			
5.4 The Critique of Ideology in Žižek 
“…beyond the fiction of reality, there is the reality of the fiction” (Žižek	2013,	p.	4).		For	Žižek the discipline of psychoanalysis is essential for understanding the dialectic 
of the beautiful and the sublime inherent in ideology: ideological interpellation has 
the structure of fantasy, a construct that both arises from and covers up the inherent 
inconsistencies/antagonisms of the symbolic order; the ideological fantasy, the 
‘beautiful’, is sustained through an act of transference, whereby there is a disavowal 
of the sources of these inconsistencies/antagonisms and a displacement locating them 
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in the conception of a ‘sublime’ Other. Žižek completes the aesthetic turn in the 
theory of ideology, explicating how ideology effectively de-centres the subject while 
simultaneously demonstrating the subject’s active engagement in this process. 
 
Žižek begins his treatment on ideology by contesting what appears to follow from the 
cynical distance individuals commonly maintain from the State apparatuses. This 
cynical attitude, often considered to have been exacerbated by the events of 1968 and 
arguably made more pronounced following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
the thawing of the Cold War, gives rise to a situation in which the ideological 
pronouncements of the hegemonic powers are no longer taken seriously, no one really 
‘believes’ in them. This situation appears to contradict a central assumption of 
traditional ideology critique, namely that ideology enables the reproduction of the 
relations of production by mystifying or naturalising the forces underlying them; here 
the majority of people are no longer convinced of the authenticity of grand ideological 
causes, of the legitimacy of ideological universals such as ‘Freedom’, ‘Justice’ and 
‘Equality’, and tacitly assume varying degrees of self-interest and structural 
exploitation to be the natural underpinning of the superstructure; and yet despite the 
prevalence of this cynical disposition towards ideology, the reproduction of the 
relations of production continues unabashedly and un-perturbed. What appears to 
follow, then, is that the Marxist tradition has greatly over-estimated the significance 
ideology has for the functioning of the State. It is here, though, where Žižek 
disagrees, and makes use of Sloterdijk’s distinction between kynicism and cynicism to 
develop an interesting counter-argument. Sloterdijk associates kynicism with the long 
and often fruitfully subversive tradition established by Diogenes, namely the use of 
satire, irony and sarcasm to playfully undermine the professed solemnity of the ideals 
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espoused by the ruling classes, to create a shift in public opinion from naïve 
acceptance to outright rejection by highlighting the inconsistent and often hypocritical 
function these ideals have in society. Modern cynicism, though related, lacks entirely 
this subversive aspect. Sloterdijk defines it somewhat paradoxically as follows:  
Cynicism is enlightened false consciousness. It is that modernized, unhappy 
consciousness, on which enlightenment has labored both successfully and in vain. It 
has learned its lessons in enlightenment, but it has not, and probably was not able to, 
put them into practice. Well-off and miserable at the same time, this consciousness no 
longer feels affected by any critique of ideology; its falseness is already reflexively 
buffered (Sloterdijk 2010, p. 5). 
Ideology critique is no longer effective as it appears that there is no longer anything to 
‘unmask’, indeed the underlying intentions behind the very process of unmasking are 
themselves vulnerable to a cynical suspicion. The pervasiveness of this cynical 
attitude is reflected in the ease with which it can be incorporated into the dominant 
cultural discourse. As Žižek puts it:  
Cynicism is the answer of the ruling culture to this kynical subversion: it recognizes, 
it takes into account, the particular interest behind the ideological universality, the 
distance between the ideological mask and the reality, but it still finds reasons to 
retain the mask. This cynicism is not a direct position of immorality, it is more like 
morality itself put in the service of immorality – the model of cynical wisdom is to 
conceive probity, integrity, as a supreme form of dishonesty, and morals as a supreme 
form of profligacy, the truth as the most effective form of a lie. This cynicism is 
therefore a kind of perverted ‘negation of the negation’ of the official ideology… 
(Žižek 2008, p. 26).  
This cynical ‘openness’ has in no way undermined the material effects of the 
ideological superstructure, and this leads Žižek to propose a contemporary 
reformulation of an old Marxist standard, no longer – ‘sie wissen das nicht, aber sie 
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tun es’ – the situation is rather that people are well aware of how things are, and yet 
continue to act as if they did not know. Žižek, however, argues that this does not 
signal a move towards a form of ‘post-ideology’; rather, what is needed is a revision 
of the traditional methods of ideology critique. Following Althusser he maintains that 
the ‘illusions’ of ideology do not pertain to knowledge but to the illusions which 
structure our social activity, our effective relation to reality as such. The ‘distance’ 
evoked by cynicism is not a new phenomenon; as argued, ideological interpellation 
can never be total, thus an effective ideological formation must be flexible enough so 
as to allow its subjects to situate themselves both inside and outside of the edifice; 
cynicism, then, can be read as an extremely effective mechanism for achieving this.   
 
Žižek’s analysis of cynicism allows for a more sophisticated conception of the 
relation between belief and ideology. Belief, in this regard, is not to be conceived 
psychologically, it is not simply or essentially a ‘mental state’. Again following 
Althusser, Žižek insists that beliefs are always materialised in social activity; thus 
even if particular beliefs are disavowed, so long as they are embodied or ‘played out’, 
the disavowal has no practical efficacy. Žižek’s argument actually has stronger 
implications; it would appear that our social activity is structured by beliefs and 
practices that do not have a necessary or consistent correspondence with our 
subjective convictions:  
…belief supports the fantasy which regulates social reality…What we call ‘social 
reality’ is in the last resort an ethical construction; it is supported by a certain as if 
(we act as if we believe in the almightiness of bureaucracy, as if the President 
incarnates the Will of the People, as if the Party expresses the objective interest of the 
working class…). As soon as the belief…is lost, the very texture of the social field 
disintegrates (Žižek 2008, pp. 33-34). 
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Thus this unacknowledged ‘as if’ actually functions in a far more predominant 
manner than ‘belief’, traditionally conceived, could, and what is typically overlooked, 
perhaps necessarily, is this tenuous foundation – the ‘fantastic’, ‘fictitious’ or 
‘illusory’ nature of the beliefs and practices, without which our concrete social 
activity as a whole cannot function. Ideology is therefore situated on the side of 
praxis, the ideological illusion being the way in which we relate to this praxis:  
The illusion is therefore double: it consists in overlooking the illusion which is 
structuring our real, effective relationship to reality. And this overlooked, 
unconscious illusion is what may be called the ideological fantasy…Cynical distance 
is just one way – one of many ways – to blind ourselves to the structuring power of 
ideological fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an 
ironical distance, we are still doing them (Žižek 2008, p. 30).   
On the surface cynicism may be read as a realist refutation of the naïve organicism 
implied by the aesthetic interpellation of the subject, however, this reading overlooks 
their common logic: both positions enable the avoidance of a direct confrontation 
with the structural fantasy we unconsciously participate in, a fantasy which exerts a 
far greater influence on our social activity than any intimately held ‘beliefs’, feelings 
or opinions.  
 
If it is unnecessary for the rules and regulations which govern our social activity to be 
grounded in any positively defined, agreed upon, principles, Žižek argues that it must 
follow that obedience to the Law is grounded, tautologically, in the enunciation of the 
Law itself. The effectiveness of the Law would be variable and limited if it were to be 
followed only insofar as it concurred with our subjective conceptions of justice, 
indeed it would entail a shift of authority from the external to the internal and the 
dissolution of the Law itself: “It follows, from this constitutively senseless character 
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of the Law, that we must obey it not because it is just, good or even beneficial, but 
simply because it is the law…” (Žižek 2008, p. 35).  Žižek argues that genuine 
obedience must therefore be ‘external’, maintained at a distance; total identification 
with the Law would not be sustainable, invariably leading to disillusionment and 
dissatisfaction the more one encounters inconsistent material representations of one’s 
subjective ideals. In order to explain the way in which the subject of ideological 
interpellation adopts the groundless injunctions of the Law, without becoming mired 
in self-contradiction, Žižek refers to the analogous function operative of the superego: 
This is the fundamental feature of the psychoanalytic concept of the superego: an 
injunction which is experienced as traumatic, ‘senseless’ – that is, which cannot be 
integrated into the symbolic universe of the subject. But for the Law to function 
‘normally’, this traumatic fact that ‘custom is the whole of equity for the sole reason 
that it is accepted’ – the dependence of the Law on its process of enunciation…must 
be repressed into the unconscious, through the ideological, imaginary experience of 
the ‘meaning’ of the Law, of its foundation in Justice, Truth (or, in a modern way, 
functionality) (Žižek 2008, pp. 35-36). 
How is this ‘repression into the unconscious’ achieved? It becomes clear that 
ideology does not function in spite of the distance assumed by its subjects, but rather 
because of it. For the hypothetical figure of complete ideological interpellation, the 
trauma of confronting the senseless, superegoic foundation of the ideological edifice 
leads directly to the disintegration of his or her subjective identity, and so indirectly, 
to the weakening of the ideological edifice’s structural efficacy. For those who 
maintain a critical distance, however, this confrontation can be perpetually deferred. 
Thus ideology, to be sustainable, requires the tacit approval of certain sentiments and 
practices which may fall outside the ‘official’ dogma, avenues and outlets through 
which a sense of subjectivity can be developed in contradistinction to any 
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inconsistencies that may be encountered through an identification with the 
superstructure. Precisely what is tacitly deemed to be acceptable and what remains 
prohibited is, of course, variable, and so is an interesting point of reference when 
comparing different ideological formations. As a way of illustrating the necessity of 
this subjective ‘distance’ Žižek refers to Stanley Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket and the 
experiences of its two central characters: Private ‘Gomer Pyle’ Lawrence, initially 
unable to comply with the superegoic demands of military basic training and 
consequently the victim of severe hazing, attempts to redefine himself through an 
over-identification with the ‘ideal’ military subject; this leads to his complete mental 
breakdown, murder of the drill sergeant and suicide. Private Davis, on the other hand, 
undergoes his military basic training and deployment to Vietnam with an ironic 
distance, fulfilling the actions required without assuming a direct subjective 
identification with them. The film ends with Davis shooting a wounded Vietcong 
sniper girl:  
…[Davis] is the one in whom the interpellation by the military big Other has fully 
succeeded; he is the fully constituted military subject. The lesson is therefore clear: 
an ideological identification exerts a true hold on us precisely when we maintain an 
awareness that we are not fully identical to it, that there is a rich human person 
beneath it: ‘not all is ideology, beneath the ideological mask, I am also a human 
person’ is the very form of ideology, of its ‘practical efficiency’…[it is] not that there 
is no ideology without a trans-ideological ‘authentic’ kernel but rather, that it is only 
the reference to such a trans-ideological kernel which makes an ideology ‘workable’ 
(Žižek 1997, p. 21).  
Žižek detects the same ironic distance on display with the characters of the TV show 
MASH, characters who outwardly mock and detach themselves from the official pro-
war rhetoric, and yet perform their tasks with the utmost efficiency, contributing to 
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the continuation of the military apparatus. It could be argued that this case is much 
more ambiguous, given the characters’ overarching ethical obligations defined in the 
Hippocratic oath. In any case, it serves as a good example of the contradictions that 
can arise from the position of being both inside and outside of an ideological edifice; 
where carrying out one’s duty to do no harm and cure indiscriminately can indirectly 
help to sustain the conditions one seeks to prevent. 
 
It would, of course, be insufficient for ideological interpellation to function solely on 
the tacit proviso that it does not encroach too much onto the individual’s sense of 
subjective identity; the active engagement of the subject requires more. Here Žižek 
introduces a factor typically ignored by traditional ideology critique, the role of 
enjoyment in ideological interpellation. Žižek identifies the superego as having a 
twofold relation to ideology, on the one hand it is representative of the 
characteristically ‘senseless’ injunctions of the Law, yet on the other hand it is 
defined as that which intervenes in order to mask or sustain this ‘senselessness’. 
According to Žižek, the connection between superego and ideology is manifest in the 
frequent supplement of an ‘obscene’, ‘nightly’ or ‘libidinal’ Law underscoring the 
officially proclaimed ‘public’ Law. This is a set of transgressions explicitly prohibited 
yet covertly encouraged, ideological enjoyment as a buffer against the inherent 
fallibility of ideological meaning:  
…[The] splitting of the law into the written public Law and its underside, the 
‘unwritten’, obscene secret code…[comes from] the incomplete, ‘non-all’ character 
of the public Law: explicit, public rules do not suffice, so they have to be 
supplemented by a clandestine ‘unwritten’ code aimed at those who, although they 
violate no public rules, maintain a kind of inner distance and do not truly identify 
with the ‘spirit of community’ (Žižek 2005, pp. 54-55).   
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This lack of identification with the ‘spirit of community’ is a much more potent cause 
for social ostracisation than a lack of identification with the public Law, and thus the 
unwritten precepts governing the enjoyable ‘underside’ of the Law can be seen as the 
real glue which determines social cohesion. To return to Full Metal Jacket, Private 
Davis’ apparent dissociation from the public Law governing the military apparatus is 
explicable if we assume his unconscious identification with its ‘superego underside’, 
the enjoyment factor underlying it – it is this factor which Private ‘Gomer Pyle’ 
Lawrence is never able to identify with, and the attempt at total assimilation with the 
public Law supported by it is not enough to compensate for this. 
 
It is, however, a result of the peculiarly amorphous nature of ideological enjoyment 
that, in order to be sustained, it needs to refer back to ideological meaning; ‘ideology 
for ideology’s sake’ would be a difficult organisational principle to implement. And 
yet ideological meaning is itself inchoate and in need of a foundation, so at first it 
appears that ideological interpellation requires an incessant to-and-fro between its two 
complimentary aspects; however, this is not necessarily the case. A recurrent notion 
in Žižek’s work is the idea that one of the most effective forms of belief is the 
supposition that, regardless of my personal position, there exists ‘someone supposed 
to believe’ – the ‘meaning’ of ideological meaning is sustained through reference to 
this projected figure. As an elementary example Žižek refers to the tradition 
surrounding the figure of Father Christmas: the parent stages the ritual of belief for 
the benefit of the child, the one ‘supposed to believe’; more interesting is the case in 
which the child no longer believes, yet maintains the outward position of innocent 
belief for the benefit of the parent, the one ‘supposed to believe in his or her belief’ – 
here the entire ritual of belief is sustained through reciprocal projections on to the 
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‘other’. Žižek maintains that, to varying degrees, ideological meaning always relies 
upon such configurations, and it is obvious that cynical distance does not preclude 
this. Yet why is it the case that such intricate social relations are needed for ideology 
to function, or rather why is it necessary for its underside, ideological enjoyment, to 
be repressed? Here some clarification is needed. The English word enjoyment does 
not sufficiently encapsulate what Žižek has in mind – Žižek often uses the French 
term jouissance, particularly emphasising its role in Lacanian theory: “…for Lacan 
the term…[jouissance] entails an essential excess, a lack of balanced satisfaction, 
derived from the pleasurable dissatisfaction of never reaching the object of one’s 
desire” (Sheehan 2012, p. 33). One can now see the difficulty in identifying with the 
underside of ideology: it conjures up the impression of a blind drive towards an 
unattainable goal, the enjoyment of a hamster wheel rather than pleasurable 
satisfaction. Ideological meaning, approached directly or from a distance, masks the 
conditions which sustain it – there is no ideological meaning without ideological 
enjoyment, and yet there can be no enjoyment without the ‘illusion’ of meaning – 
direct proximity to either pole can potentially destroy the whole ideological edifice. 
This leads to what Žižek terms the ‘fundamental ideological paradox’:  
What is really at stake in ideology is its form, the fact that we continue to walk as 
straight as we can in one direction…the ideological subjects, ‘travellers lost in a 
forest’, must conceal from themselves the fact that ‘it was possibly chance alone that 
first determined them in their choice’; they must believe that their decision is well 
founded, that it will lead to their Goal. As soon as they perceive that the real goal is 
the consistency of the ideological attitude itself, the effect is self-defeating… Why 
must this inversion of the relation of aim and means remain hidden, why is its 
revelation self-defeating? Because it would reveal the enjoyment which is at work in 
ideology, in the ideological renunciation itself. In other words, it would reveal that 
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ideology serves only its own purpose, that it does not serve anything – which is 
precisely the Lacanian definition of jouissance (Žižek 2008, p. 92).  
 
It has been argued that ideological enjoyment is a relatively stable feature across 
various and differing ideological formations, it follows that the specific identity of a 
given ideology is to be located on the side of meaning. To this end Žižek introduces 
another psychoanalytic notion relevant to the critique of ideology, the Lacanian point 
de capiton. It is argued that each ideological formation consists of a set of relatively 
autonomous ‘free floating signifiers’; in order to unify them ideological meaning 
requires the intervention of the point de capiton, a ‘nodal point’ which retroactively 
gives meaning to the whole by situating the set of signifiers as a series of 
equivalences, a series totalised in virtue of their reference to itself:  
If we ‘quilt’ the floating signifiers through ‘Communism’, for example, ‘class 
struggle’ confers a precise and fixed signification to all other elements: to democracy 
(so-called ‘real democracy’ as opposed to ‘bourgeois formal democracy’ as a legal 
form of exploitation); to feminism (the exploitation of women as resulting from the 
class-conditioned division of labour); to ecologism (the destruction of natural 
resources as a logical consequence of profit-orientated capitalist production); to the 
peace movement (the principal danger to peace is adventuristic imperialism), and so 
on (Žižek 2008, p. 96).   
The existence of a nodal point is essential for explicating the apparently inconsistent 
fact that radically opposed ideologies can and at times do employ the same language 
to justify the implementation of vastly divergent means; it also helps to explain the 
particularly arduous nature of the task of settling ideological disputes, for Žižek’s 
point is that in reality these signifiers do not have any inherent positive content that 
could remain the same in all circumstances, they can only remain ‘fixed’ within the 
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wider framework established through the nodal point. The same ambiguity holds for 
the nodal point itself, it has no more inherent meaning than the signifiers it unifies, its 
primacy pertains purely to its functional role within the set: “…[It is] the word to 
which ‘things’ themselves refer to recognize themselves in their unity” (Žižek 2008, 
p. 105). Thus Žižek can demonstrate how there is no contradiction in contemporary 
debates between social democrats and neo-conservatives in which both sides 
distinguish themselves as being on the side of ‘Freedom’, the word simply has a 
different meaning depending on the ideological constellation it refers to. Given the 
‘trans-ideological’ nature of the free-floating signifiers it is immediately apparent that 
the nodal point needs to be distinguished in order to ascertain the precise meaning or 
identity of a given ideology: “The first task of the analysis is therefore to isolate, in a 
given ideological field, the particular struggle which at the same time determines the 
horizon of its totality…” (Žižek 2008, p. 97). Emphasising the role of the nodal point 
in ideology critique also helps to distinguish ideology proper from political rhetoric as 
a means to populist ends, as the lack of a coherent set of equivalences would be 
indicative of a fundamentally hollow ideology.  
 
To return now to the dialectic of the beautiful and the sublime; the ideological 
conception of the beautiful can be associated with fantasy insofar as it is 
representative of an organic social body in which all its parts complement one another 
to form a unified whole; this conception represents a constitutional impossibility as it 
does not permit of any antagonisms within the social field and yet antagonisms 
palpably exist. Thus in order to sustain the fantasy antagonisms need to be displaced, 
there can be no ideological conception of the beautiful without the supplement of the 
sublime. Žižek defines the ‘sublime object of ideology’ as being a spectral entity as it 
		
159	
is devoid of any positive ontological consistency – it is a projection, the embodiment 
of various internal antagonisms condensed in a single source, a source that must be 
‘foreign’ to the social body if the fantasy of the beautiful is to be sustained. Given that 
the sublime object is the displaced embodiment of disparate antagonisms, its 
constitutive make-up is invariably contradictory – for Žižek the supreme example is 
to be found in the attributes of the anti-Semitic figure of the Jew:  
The anti-Semitic figure of the Jew takes from the great capitalists their wealth and 
social control, from the hedonists sexual debauchery, from commercialized popular 
culture and the yellow press their vulgarity, from the lower classes their filth and bad 
smell, from intellectuals their corrupted sophistry, and from Jews their name (Žižek 
2009, p. 318).  
To reiterate Sharpe’s observation, the function of the sublime is to re-interpret what 
are in reality the inherent limits or deadlocks of a society as being instances of outside 
corruption and so capable of being removed without any structural change. The 
sublime represents an unfulfillable desire, the non-existence of the ‘beautiful’ society 
is not an impediment to the idea’s affectivity so long as its existence in the 
imagination can be sustained with the assumption that the ‘Other’ is responsible for 
preventing its fruition, or is in possession of it itself, or indeed both. In this sense the 
attributes of the sublime object directly coincide with the unconscious desires of the 
ideological subject. This conception is in accordance with one of the key tenets of the 
early Frankfurt School’s analysis of Nazi-era anti-Semitism:  
In the image of the Jew which the racial nationalists hold up before the world they 
express their own essence. Their craving is for exclusive ownership, appropriation, 
unlimited power, and at any price. The Jew, burdened with his tormentors’ guilt, 
mocked as their lord, they nail to the cross, endlessly repeating a sacrifice in whose 
power they are unable to believe (Horkheimer & Adorno 1987, pp. 137-138). 
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Given the cataclysmically inhumane consequences that have followed from an 
ideologically skewered conception of the sublime, its importance for ideology critique 
is self-evident – for Žižek the formula is as follows: “to detect, in a given ideological 
edifice, the element which represents within it its own impossibility” (Žižek 2008, p. 
143). 
 
From the investigation above it can be seen that key aspects of Althusser’s theses on 
ideology could be workable given the important qualification regarding the exclusive 
materiality of ideology: it is true that ideology must at some point manifest itself in 
material rituals and practices, the absence of this would make it indistinguishable 
from subjective opinion and renew the epistemic difficulties regarding a standard of 
truth; to this, however, there needs to be added the latent capacities of the subject, the 
‘immanent materiality of the ideal’ to use Žižek’s phrase, in the process of ideological 
interpellation and re/formulation. To deny this potentiality leads to a problem of 
circularity when attempting to define the causal determinants of the ideological 
subject; in addition, such an approach would have to assume what is an intuitively 
implausible uniformity of dispositions amongst such subjects. Incorporating aspects of 
aesthetic and psychoanalytic theory into the notion of ideology helps to avoid the 
extremes of both the idealist and materialist approaches. It is clear then that a 
combination of the work of Althusser, Eagleton and Žižek is of great benefit for 
renewed attempts at the identification, classification and subsequent critique of 
ideology. 
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6 Ideology in Practice 
 
6.1 The Problem of Determination 
 
The previous chapter argued the case for what may at first appear to be an implausible 
notion: the possibility of a subject who is at once ideological and autonomous. 
Advances made in the theory of ideology by virtue of an appeal to aesthetics and 
psychoanalysis are clear – the troubling dichotomy between false consciousness and 
its elusive opposite is no longer relevant. Although the aesthetic turn represents a 
sophisticated representation of the nature of ideological consciousness, and of the 
effect of ideology on the processes of individual subjectification and identity 
formation, it also poses some problems as to the way in which ideology functions on a 
wider societal level. Despite Althusser’s breakthroughs, his insistence that ideology 
serves the primary function of the reproduction of the relations of production cannot 
but appear to contradict another of his central theses, the ‘relative autonomy’ of the 
ideological superstructure. This contradiction speaks to the wider problematic of 
determination within the Marxist tradition, in which individuals and classes are 
simultaneously determined by the economic base as well as being actively engaged in 
class struggle – the base’s reproduction or transformation. These apparent instances of 
economic reductionism are not only problematic with regards to autonomy; in 
addition it can be argued that such an approach fails to explain the role of ideology in 
all of its forms: “It leaves no room for non-class ideologies such as racism and 
sexism; and even in class terms it is drastically reductive. The political, religious and 
other ideologies of a society are not exhausted by their functions within economic 
life” (Eagleton 2007, p. 148). Of course, it should not be assumed that discarding the 
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base/superstructure model equates to denying a role for ideology in the reproduction 
of the relations of production; Eagleton’s point is rather that, given there are instances 
of ideology irreducible to the economic (and vice versa) it follows that the two are 
‘relatively autonomous’ (in a much more drastic sense than that proposed by 
Althusser). The practical efficacy of ideology, its broader function, must then be 
sought elsewhere. 
 
The ramifications of the problem of determination stemming from an Althusserian 
theory of ideology are succinctly stated as follows:  
…[E]ither we have basically economistic forms of analysis in which politics is 
reduced to class interests or we have to analyse power relations and political forces 
without prejudice. A possible implication of the latter is that such analyses may 
extend beyond the limits of a Marxist problematic (Smart 1985, p. 29). 
The reduction of politics and ideology to the expression of class interests determined 
by the economy is simply incompatible with the conception of ideology developed 
thus far; however, the need to extend analysis beyond the limits of a Marxist 
problematic need not be considered a limitation. The issue of economic determination 
and human agency does not necessarily relate to a theory of ideology as such. As 
Smart notes elsewhere, it can be argued that the problem of determination is rather a 
result of a tendency within the Marxist tradition to conceive of almost all phenomena 
as being relatable to the general schema of political economy:  
…[I]n so far as Marxist analysis has developed, broadly speaking, within the 
conceptual framework of political economy, then determination has been 
conceptualised as in the final instance ‘economic’. In consequence, Marxist analyses 
have tended to conceptualise phenomena in terms of either a direct or an indirect 
relationship of economic determination (Smart 1985, p. 22). 
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If it is accepted that this tendency exists it follows that a break from the confines of a 
purely Marxist framework can only serve to advance the legitimacy of a theory of 
ideology. 
 
In an article concerning the uncertainty of the future relevance of ideology McCarthy 
argues that it is primarily the reformulations provided by Althusser and Foucault that 
signify the concept’s enduring importance:  
…[E]ach offered to social theory a vision that burst the confines of ideology’s 
location. Ideology was no longer housed in the bourgeoisie’s collective being or in its 
structures of wealth and labor. Ideology was dispersed throughout a ‘social order.’ 
…Today’s ideologies originate neither in a solid economic base nor in the region of 
class politics, but in a new environment of symbolic and hegemonic forms (McCarthy 
1994, p. 416). 
While I maintain some reservations about the extent to which Althusser’s work has 
broken with the traditional conception of ideology’s location, at least in terms of its 
practical function as a means of class struggle, it will be argued in this chapter that the 
work of Foucault allows for a comprehensive and internally consistent analysis of 
social structures that are compatible with the notion of ideology outlined in chapter 5. 
Key to this reconciliation will be the shift in Foucault from a juridical to a relational 
conception of power – the former, it will be argued, has often served as an ideological 
distortion contained within the theory of ideology itself, resulting in the contradiction 
posed by the problem of determination. 
 
It may of course be objected that the attempt to synthesise aspects of Foucault’s work 
with an aesthetic/psychoanalytic approach to ideology such as Žižek’s is problematic. 
Unlike Foucault, Žižek does remain faithful to a Universalist conception of Truth, that 
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of the Lacanian ‘Real’ which discloses itself in the various inconsistencies, 
breakdowns and symptoms of symbolic orders: “Psychoanalysis, …[for Žižek], is 
concerned with truth, not meaning, and the truth is often that there is no meaning, that 
structures of meaning are themselves fantasies” (Harpham 2003, p. 465);  
“Even if the object of desire is an illusory lure, there is a real in this illusion: the 
object of desire in its positive nature is vain, but not the place it occupies, the place of 
the Real, which is why there is more truth in unconditional fidelity to one’s desire 
than in a resigned insight into the vanity of one’s striving” (Žižek 2011, p. 72). 
It must be acknowledged that in this regard the two thinkers are representative of 
divergent philosophical traditions, as Foucault eschews any notion of absolute truth. It 
is important to note, however, that Žižek’s Truth is a negative one, the contention that 
the category of subject is constitutive of a lack, of an inherent disjointedness that 
emerges upon our entry into the symbolic orders of language and culture, a disparity 
that engenders incessant recourse to the frameworks of ideological fantasy. I would 
argue, then, that it is a Truth that is not so at odds with the major contention of 
Foucault, namely that the assumption that it is possible to delineate a positive 
conception of the subject as something stable and objective is an illusion, that any 
such effort can actually be read as an expression of finite and historically contingent 
relations of power. Foucault’s main target is the construction of the subject as 
epitomised in the humanist tradition, and this construction is similarly dismissed in 
the approach taken by Žižek. With this in mind, I will argue that Foucault’s 
ambivalence towards universal conceptions of truth or subjectivity does not preclude 
the fact that, in certain key respects, his work is both compatible with and supportive 
of the aesthetic/psychoanalytic approach, and that it is capable of enriching the 
approach with significant insights into the material effects of ideology. 
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6.2 The Symbiosis of Power and Knowledge 
“It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for 
knowledge not to engender power” (Foucault 1980, p. 52). 
 
In an interview with Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino Foucault identifies 
what he believes to be three fundamental flaws with the theory of ideology. Given 
that the current objective is to demonstrate the compatibility of Foucault’s overall 
project with a refined theory of ideology, it is first necessary to address these 
objections, which are as follows:  
The notion of ideology appears to me to be difficult to make use of, for three reasons. 
The first is that, like it or not, it always stands in virtual opposition to something else 
which is supposed to count as truth…The second drawback is that the concept of 
ideology refers, I think necessarily, to something of the order of a subject. Thirdly, 
ideology stands in a secondary position relative to something which functions as its 
infrastructure, as its material, economic determinate, etc. For these three reasons, I 
think that this is a notion that cannot be used without circumspection (Foucault 1980, 
p. 118). 
As previously argued, it should not be assumed that non-ideological and ideological 
perspectives stand in a relation to each other of truth and falsity; empirically, an 
ideological perspective can be true or false. ‘Reification’ better encapsulates the status 
of ideology, insofar as it often conceals certain emotional or performative judgments 
within an apparently neutral framework, obscuring the relation of such judgments to 
the reproduction of social power. As Eagleton has argued, ideology involves 
‘reconceptualising one’s lived relations to the world as being a characterisation of the 
world itself’. ‘Reification’ also encapsulates the advances made by Žižek, the notion 
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that ideology ‘both arises from and covers up the inherent 
inconsistencies/antagonisms of the social-symbolic order’, and that it involves a 
repressed form of enjoyment entailed in the power of its form over its content. 
Defined in this way, I would argue that there is no need to posit some sort of standard 
of truth in order to make sense of ideology. Foucault’s second objection, regarding the 
reference to ‘something of the order of a subject’, appears more difficult to refute; 
however, if the problem of the necessary positing of a subject relates to the theory of 
ideology as defined by Marx, as implying a necessary correlative in the ambiguous 
form of ‘human nature’, ‘authenticity’ or ‘essence’ then, as argued, this may be 
overcome. This conception of a pure subject in opposition to ideological distortion 
appears to be what Foucault has in mind in the following passage from Discipline and 
Punish, of which he is understandably dismissive:  
…[L]et there be no misunderstanding: it is not that a real man, the object of 
knowledge, philosophical reflection or technical intervention, has been substituted for 
the soul, the illusion of the theologians. The man described for us, whom we are 
invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound 
than himself (Foucault 1991, p. 30).  
A precise conceptualisation of what constitutes a subject is indeed difficult to define; 
however, I maintain that this problem is only peculiar to a theory of ideology if it is 
assumed that ideological interpellation is ‘total’, and complete ideological 
interpellation is impossible to reconcile with the notion of ideology outlined in 
chapter 5. For instance, phenomena such as ideological enjoyment and cynical 
distance require that subjects are able to situate themselves both inside and outside of 
an ideological edifice. I would argue that the troubling matter of what constitutes, in 
Žižek’s terms – this ‘non-ideological kernel’ of the subject – is in fact a problem 
applicable to most Western philosophical traditions associated with a form of 
		
167	
foundationalism and not distinct to a theory of ideology. Foucault’s third objection, 
though, is impossible to dismiss and ironically enough I wish to argue that the way 
ahead lies in an accommodation of the work of Foucault himself. 
 
Foucault’s work demonstrates that the problem of determination for a theory of 
ideology actually arises from the general theory of power at work in most Marxist 
analyses. He argues that this Marxist conception of power shares a fundamental 
commonality with the juridical conception of power developed by the eighteenth 
century liberal philosophes. This latter conception envisaged power as essentially 
having the status of a commodity; power was seen as a ‘right’ that everyone possesses 
and thus is something that can be transferred or alienated, in part or in full. The 
legitimisation of a set of power relations is thus established within a legal framework 
such as a contract: “Power is that concrete power which every individual holds, and 
whose partial or total cession enables political power or sovereignty to be established” 
(Foucault 1980, p. 88). Although the legalistic terminology is largely absent from the 
Marxist conception, Foucault identifies an inherent homogeneity between it and the 
juridical model, insofar as the two view the functioning of power in an essentially 
economic sense. For the juridical theory the logic of power is explicable in the 
analogous process of exchange and circulation of commodities; and for the Marxist 
conception the concrete manifestations of power, and the primary role of politics and 
ideology, is likewise discoverable in the economy. It is this shared assumption that 
Foucault argues to be both underdeveloped and severely limiting; he argues that it is 
simply not the case that power is always subordinate to and dependent on the 
economy, nor is the commodity a suitable representative of power. In 
contradistinction Foucault asserts that “…power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor 
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recovered, but rather exercised, and that it only exists in action…[and also] that power 
is not primarily the maintenance and reproduction of economic relations, but is above 
all a relation of force” (Foucault 1980, p. 89). The question as to how power is 
exercised, and to what ends, is thus renewed. 
 
Foucault identifies two distinct yet complimentary non-economic hypotheses on the 
nature of power broadly accepted by many of his contemporaries at the time of his 
writing on the subject, and incidentally he acknowledges that a combination of the 
two represented his own approach in his earlier writings. The first hypothesis equates 
the function of power with that of repression, Foucault traces this idea back to Hegel 
via Reich and Freud: whether it be in regards to ‘nature’, ‘the instincts’, ‘a class’, 
‘individuals’ and so on, power is that force which controls and suppresses. The 
function of power is thus inherently negative and can be opposed to freedom, 
liberation and other like notions. The second hypothesis, the origin of which Foucault 
identifies with Nietzsche, conceives of power relations as being a ‘hostile engagement 
of forces’. Here power is viewed as something quite unstable and in flux, and is 
analogous to instances of ‘struggle’, ‘conflict’ and ‘war’. This conception of power 
corresponds with that of Nietzsche’s early period, and is exemplified in the struggle 
between the Dionysian and Apollonian elements in The Birth of Tragedy: 
…[A] metaphysical comfort tears us momentarily from the bustle of the changing 
figures. We are really for a brief moment primordial being itself, feeling its raging 
desire for existence and joy in existence; the struggle, the pain, the destruction of 
phenomena, now appear necessary to us, in view of the excess of countless forms of 
existence which force and push one another into life, in view of the exuberant fertility 
of the universal will (BT 17). 
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The combination of these hypotheses establishes a different binary opposition 
applicable to the analysis of power from that which was utilised under the juridical 
model. For the juridical theory power relations can be conceived of in terms of 
contract and oppression, i.e. power is exercised either legitimately or illegitimately, 
rightly or wrongly. The refined approaches displace this opposition with that of 
struggle and repression: power is conceived of as a hostile engagement of forces, 
temporarily resulting in instances of domination and subjugation which in turn result 
in the resumption of struggle. I would argue that this latter approach corresponds well 
with the theory of power implied by the theory of ideology examined thus far: the 
hostile engagement of forces manifests in class struggle and results in the 
establishment of an ideological superstructure, one of whose functions is the 
repression of those interests at odds with that of the dominant class or classes. The 
primary determinant of this play of forces, borrowing from the juridical model, is the 
economy. For Foucault this struggle/repression opposition, like the juridical model, is 
inadequate. 
 
The importance of Foucault’s critique of what he terms the ‘repressive hypothesis’ for 
a theory of ideology is most clearly evinced in the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality. In this work Foucault investigates the historical changes regarding the 
culturally dominant attitudes towards sex and sexuality in the West, with a focus on 
the apparently repressive conservatism typical of the Victorian era. This trend, the 
occurrence of which Foucault identifies as having first arisen during the seventeenth 
century, is often conceived of as an ideology of prohibition; sexuality is not openly 
discussed, bodies are concealed and certain mores of decorum are established in 
which matrimony is presented as the exclusive location of adult sexuality. Leaving 
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aside the question of whether this accurately reflects the state of affairs of the time, 
and Foucault’s work makes a strong case that it does not, it is interesting to attempt to 
apply the struggle/repression conception of power as a means for its analysis. The 
apparent ideology of sexual repression coincides with the economic necessity of a 
vast increase in available labour power. Therefore:  
If one writes the history of sexuality in terms of repression, relating this repression to 
the utilisation of labor capacity, one must suppose that sexual controls were the more 
intense and meticulous as they were directed at the poorer classes; one has to assume 
that they followed the path of greatest domination and the most systematic 
exploitation: the young adult male, possessing nothing more than his life force, had to 
be the primary target of a subjugation destined to shift the energy available for 
useless pleasure toward compulsory labor (Foucault 2008, p. 120). 
As Foucault notes, it is somewhat strange that an economic imperative for increased 
procreation among the working classes would manifest in an ideology of sexual 
repression, it could certainly be argued that an ideology of sexual liberation would be 
just as, if not more, suited to fulfil such a demand; the fact that a given economic 
situation can be resolved or made compatible with such opposing ideologies surely 
undermines the notion that the former should be conceived as their primary 
determinate. Leaving this aside, Foucault’s work further undermines the 
struggle/repression model by demonstrating that the historical records paint quite a 
different picture. It was simply not the case that the problem of sexuality was posed in 
regards to the working classes, the bourgeoisie did not establish mechanisms for the 
repression and control of proletariat sexuality in order to ensure their subjugation; 
these mechanisms of repression and control were rather established by and for the 
bourgeoisie itself. But as Foucault argues the terms ‘repression’ and ‘control’ are 
given overdue emphasis here, instances of repression and control were certainly 
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established, but they arose as the effects of a more general development of what 
Foucault terms the ‘deployment of sexuality’, the creation of a ‘science’ of sexuality 
whose positive effects cannot be reconciled with the repressive hypothesis. 
 
Foucault notes that the archetypal figures to which the deployment of sexuality were 
first addressed were actually representative of the socially and politically dominant 
classes, for instance the ‘idle’ or ‘hysterical’ woman and the ‘onanistic’ child; the 
concomitant disregard for the way of life and living standards of the working classes 
further demonstrates their initial exclusion from this development: “The primary 
concern was not repression of the sex of the classes to be exploited, but rather the 
body, vigor, longevity, progeniture, and descent of the classes that ‘ruled’” (Foucault 
2008, p. 123). What the emphasis on the repression of sexuality deemed to fall outside 
of the newly established ‘conservative’ discourse fails to grasp, is thus the gradual 
development of a new social identity. Whereas the old aristocracies could rely upon 
notions of ‘blood’ to solidify their place within the social hierarchy, the bourgeois 
class rising to dominance was in need of other mechanisms for coalescing its 
heterogeneous elements:  
Let us not picture the bourgeoisie symbolically castrating itself the better to refuse 
others the right to have a sex and make use of it as they please. This class must be 
seen rather as being occupied, from the mid-eighteenth century on, with creating its 
own sexuality and forming a specific body based on it, a ‘class’ body with its health, 
hygiene, descent, and race… (Foucault 2008, p. 124). 
This formulation is quite compatible with key tenets of the theory of ideology 
outlined in chapter 5, in particular the establishment of a sense of ‘being-at-home’ or 
rather a natural correlation between one’s subjective identity and one’s material 
practices. Moreover, the self-imposition of a social identity based partly on the 
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deployment of sexuality necessarily makes use of the function of an ‘Other’; for those 
who are excluded from the deployment of sexuality are by definition potential sources 
of deleterious health and hygiene, degeneracy and thus possibly dangerous to the 
stability of the ideological formation; so again, the excluded are both a danger to, yet 
in a sense necessary for, the establishment of a homogeneous ideological formation. 
 
The deployment of sexuality was eventually expanded and made to encompass the 
working classes as well. However, Foucault notes that this occurred after the 
discourse was already firmly established, and that it occurred for quite different 
reasons. Initially functioning primarily as a mechanism for identity formation, the 
political and economic utility of the deployment of sexuality was gradually made 
evident, a development which effected changes in both the discourse itself and the 
social formations to which it was applied. Foucault identifies three general 
movements, diffuse in time, that signify the gradual infiltration of a science of 
sexuality among the wider population: at the end of the eighteenth century Foucault 
notes a growing interest in the problems of birth control and the extent to which it was 
practiced; some time around the 1830’s Foucault argues that there was a recognition 
of the political and economic expedience to be gained from the proliferation of the 
‘conventional family’ as a standard norm, in order for greater control and regulation 
of the wider population, this recognition manifested in “…a great campaign for the 
‘moralization of the poorer classes’” (Foucault 2008, p. 122); and at the end of the 
nineteenth century Foucault highlights an upsurge of interest in the problems of 
sexual perversions and the apparent threat they pose to the stability of society in 
general, manifested in their meticulous absorption within the juridical and medical 
apparatuses. Thus here is an example of an ideology arising independently of 
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immediate economic determinations, an ideology which at times had an effect upon 
economic relations, and at other times was effected by economic relations; 
importantly, it was prone to adaptation, remaining relatively stable and yet capable of 
effecting quite different ‘lived experiences’ amongst the various social formations 
onto which it was deployed. This conception is not compatible with the 
struggle/repression model of ideology, but it is quite consistent with another argument 
developed in the previous chapter, the notion that ideological interpellation is never 
total, and thus the extent to which one is interpellated will vary from subject to 
subject:  
Some think they can denounce two symmetrical hypocrisies at the same time: the 
primary hypocrisy of the bourgeoisie which denies its own sexuality, and the 
secondary hypocrisy of the proletariat which in turn rejects its sexuality by accepting 
the dominant ideology. This is to misunderstand the process whereby on the contrary 
the bourgeoisie endowed itself, in an arrogant political affirmation, with a garrulous 
sexuality which the proletariat long refused to accept, since it was foisted on them for 
the purpose of subjugation… one has to admit that this deployment does not operate 
in symmetrical fashion with respect to the social classes, and consequently, that it 
does not produce the same effects in them [emphasis added]  (Foucault 2008, p. 127). 
Foucault’s critique of the repressive hypothesis does not entail a reversal of the 
standard base/superstructure model, nor does it imply a structural reciprocity between 
base and superstructure à la Althusser; his critique actually goes much deeper in that 
it attempts to completely dissolve these binary oppositions. Thus in order to locate the 
practical role of ideology it is first necessary to understand what Foucault means by a 
‘relational’ conception of power. 
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Foucault argues that the role of power in a social body needs to be understood within 
the context of a dynamic network comprised of a multiplicity of force relations. In a 
quite literal sense it can be said to function everywhere; and this already amounts to a 
strong divergence from the Marxist tradition, in which it is often assumed that power 
can be seized, and thus the omnipresence of power is limited to its effects. For 
Foucault power is omnipresent,  
…not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible 
unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or 
rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because 
it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere (Foucault 2008, 93). 
The positing of diffuse and manifold power determinations does not, however, do 
away with the problems of power; domination and subjugation consistently retain 
central prominence in Foucault’s analysis and, against the objections discussed below, 
this remains pertinent in an ethical sense. Power defined as the composition of a 
multiplicity of force relations does necessitate a revaluation of the approaches to 
ideology in practice examined thus far – specific levels, binary oppositions and strict 
hierarchies are too rigid tools for such an analysis. In light of this Foucault proposes 
five ‘methodological precautions’ that must be considered in order to grasp the 
dynamism of power. 
 
In the first place there is a need for a reorientation regarding what is considered to be 
the proper object of analysis; Foucault argues that it is a mistake to attempt to 
delineate a central locus of power, to begin by locating power in its most obvious, 
legitimised forms – central governments, entrenched institutions, much of what has 
been argued to comprise an ideological superstructure. In order to establish a general 
mode of power Foucault maintains that it is much more productive to approach from 
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the opposite direction, instances in which power is operative “…at its extremities, in 
its ultimate destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its 
more regional and local forms and institutions” (Foucault 1980, p. 96). This follows 
naturally from a multiplicity of force relations, for a hegemonic formation to develop 
it would have to begin with the colonisation of reactive forces in the most localised 
spheres. In the second place Foucault argues that there is a need to dissociate oneself 
from the idea that power is operative primarily at the level of ‘conscious intention or 
decision’. This is particularly relevant to the theory of ideology in Marx, implicit in 
which is the presumption that the ‘secrets’ of power can be discerned through the 
unmasking of ideological pronouncements. For Foucault the intentional character of 
power is indistinguishable from its immediate practical effects, however this is not to 
say it is irrational:  
…there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. But this 
does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of an individual subject… 
the rationality of power is characterised by tactics that are often quite explicit at the 
restricted level where they are inscribed (the local cynicism of power), tactics which, 
becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating one another, but 
finding their base of support and their condition elsewhere, end by forming 
comprehensive systems: the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it 
is often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said 
to have formulated them… (Foucault 2008, p. 95). 
The third precaution is to avoid conceiving of power as a possession, the idea that 
there are individuals or classes with consolidated power and therefore individuals or 
classes who are powerless. For Foucault power is always in a process of circulation; 
he uses the metaphor of a chain, in which individuals are always in a situation in 
which they are simultaneously exercising a form of power as well as being acted upon 
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by a form of power, “…individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of 
application” (Foucault 1980, p. 98). The fourth precaution warns against a hasty 
conclusion that may be drawn from the previous three. It has been said that the 
analysis of power, with regards to its original or determinate locations, is to be found 
in its most diffuse and localised regions; that power is in a strong sense non-
intentional; and that power is simultaneously exercised by and exercised upon each 
individual within a vast network of force relations. From this it should not be 
concluded that power is evenly distributed amongst a social body, as Foucault notes, 
there is no “…democratic or anarchic distribution of power through bodies” (Foucault 
1980, p. 99). Relationships of domination and subordination and hierarchical 
formations are not incompatible with a relational conception of power; rather what 
should be concluded from such a conception is that a hegemonic power cannot 
function autonomously, in order to function it must necessarily enter into or engender 
relations of recognition, acquiescence or resistance, all of which being forms of power 
as well – an insight well illustrated by Hegel’s Master/Slave dialectic. Foucault’s 
overall point is that there is a need to discard the deductive conception of power in 
which power is seen to emanate from a centralised source, with its effectiveness being 
measured by the extent to which it reaches the peripheries of a social body. On the 
contrary, Foucault advocates an ascending analysis of power, a focus on the ways in 
which the most localised tactics and strategies of power are absorbed, utilised, 
transformed and displaced by ever more general power formations, up to the national 
and international hegemonic formations. The final precaution contains Foucault’s 
most direct refutation of the expediency of a theory of ideology for social analyses. 
The aforementioned mechanisms through which power can be said to develop are 
possible, and this can be gleaned from the terminology of ‘tactics’ and ‘strategies’, 
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because power is always exercised within an apparatus of knowledge, or discourse. 
Foucault argues that much of the confusion around the function of power is the result 
of the application of inappropriate discourses intended for its explication. The 
‘sovereign’ conception of power implicit in the juridical theory may have been 
appropriate for the structures of feudal societies, but Foucault argues that its retention 
in the conceptual analysis of contemporary societies results in an inability to properly 
understand the dominant form of power applicable to the modern age, what he terms 
disciplinary power. Disciplinary power and its relation to discourse is described as 
follows:  
It is the production of effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of 
knowledge – methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures for 
investigation and research, apparatuses of control. All this means that power, when it 
is exercised through these subtle mechanisms, cannot but evolve, organise and put 
into circulation a knowledge, or rather apparatuses of knowledge, which are not 
ideological constructs (Foucault 1980, p. 102). 
Foucault goes on to say that these apparatuses of knowledge are both ‘much more and 
much less’ than ideology. While it will be argued that Foucault is right to distinguish 
between discourse and ideology, and emphasise the structural pre-eminence of the 
former, I still maintain that it would be wrong to therefore dismiss the relevance of 
ideological discourses and their relation to discourse in general. However, before 
developing this argument there is a need to address the criticism that Foucault’s work 
introduces a peculiar kind of relativism that, if true, could completely dissolve the 
questions to which a theory of ideology, and arguably areas of Foucault’s work itself, 
attempts to answer. 
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Taylor has noted that an important aspect of Foucault’s work on the pervasive nature 
of power has been in identifying its most surreptitious and insidious forms; for 
instance the height of modern disciplinary power is conceived in those instances in 
which power no longer appears to take the outward form of ‘power per se’, when it is 
concealed behind notions of scientific discourse and advancement. In this respect, 
Taylor argues that Foucault’s work is representative of the familiar tradition of 
‘unmasking’, and is therefore imbued with certain normative valuations:  
You would think that implicit in all this was the notion of two goods that need 
rescuing and that the analyses help to rescue: freedom and truth – two goods that 
would be linked deeply granted the fact that the negation of one (domination) makes 
essential use of the negation of the other (disguise). We would be back on familiar 
terrain with an old Enlightenment-inspired combination (Taylor 1984, p. 152). 
On the other hand Foucault’s work does not allow for such a critique, insofar as each 
and any ‘truth’ inveighed against the dominant discourses of power/knowledge must 
itself be limited to its correspondence with a particular set of power relations, there is 
no ‘outside’:  
There is no truth that can be espoused, defended, or rescued against systems of 
power. On the contrary, each such system defines its own variant of truth. And there 
is no escape from power into freedom, for such systems of power are coextensive 
with human society (Taylor 1984, pp. 152-153).  
This leads Taylor to question whether Foucault represents a genuinely original 
perspective on the problem of power, or has advanced a confused and perhaps 
contradictory method of analysis. What is the value of a critique of power, or even a 
more general analysis of the discourses of power and knowledge, that is necessarily 
biased, essentially an expression of one particular and contingent knowledge 
apparatus? Is such a critique redundant? The applicability of these questions to a 
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theory of ideology is palpable. A similar objection to Foucault has been advanced by 
Habermas. Habermas notes that, given that the structures required for the very 
possibility of truth claims are themselves neither true nor false in any meaningful 
sense, Foucault’s analysis is limited to a value-free assessment of the ‘wills’ that find 
expression in such claims and their intricate connections to the networks of power. He 
goes on to note, however, that Foucault’s genealogical method does appear to contain 
an implied normative standard, insofar as there is a persistent impetus towards the 
unearthing of ‘subjugated’ or ‘disqualified’ knowledges, the discourses relevant to 
those who are confronted most directly by the technologies of power, discourses 
deemed to be naïve or unscientific and thus excluded by the dominant discourses. 
This notion of disqualified knowledge is discernible in Foucault’s Discourse on 
Language (1972, pp. 216-220), where he argues that a discourse always entails certain 
rules of exclusion which govern who has the most right to say something of a 
particular subject, “…not just anyone…may speak of just anything” (1972, p. 216); in 
addition to these prohibitions, Foucault notes another form of exclusion in the 
establishment of oppositions between what is considered to be reasonable or folly, 
this being exemplified in the classification of the insane; finally, Foucault argues that 
the simple distinction between truth and falsity itself functions as a system of 
exclusion, insofar as what is to be counted as knowledge (and the means by which 
this knowledge can be attained) is historically variable and contingent on the 
dominant discourse of the time, as evidence of this he points towards the fluctuation 
in the objects of knowledge that serve to sharply distinguish the ‘will to truth’ of the 
ancient Greek poets from the empiricists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
(1972, pp. 218-219). That this emphasis on the exclusivity of discourse constitutes a 
		
180	
normative standard is an assumption that is also shared by some who are sympathetic 
to Foucault:  
We contend his work aims at clearing a space in which the formerly voiceless might 
begin to articulate their desires – to counter the domination of prevailing authoritative 
discourses… when those usually spoken for and about by others begin to speak for 
themselves, they produce a “counter-discourse”…[and] have begun to resist the 
power seeking to oppress them (Moussa & Scapp 1996, pp. 88-89).   
The subjects comprising the bulk of Foucault’s work do seem to confirm this. 
However, the privileging of disqualified knowledges is in need of justification, to 
what end is this counter-power illuminated? This problem, Habermas argues, is 
resolved in the Marxist tradition only because it adheres to a philosophy of history 
grounded in the development of class consciousness and the productive forces; he 
refers to the early Lukács for whom “…Marxist theory owed its freedom from 
ideological bias to the privileged possibilities of knowledge from a perspective of 
experience that had arisen with the position of the wage-laborer in the process of 
production” (Habermas 1990, pp. 280-281). This justification is not available to 
Foucault as he abstains from any systematic or teleological reading of history. The 
issue is further complicated as, given Foucault’s conception of power/knowledge, any 
instance of disqualified knowledge or counter-power is by definition manifested 
within the self-contained totality of discourses established by the hegemonic forces, 
of which it is a reaction; therefore Habermas argues that the ‘victory’ of these 
subjugated knowledges would equate to their immediate transformation into 
discourses of domination, thus engendering new forms of counter-power. If the only 
constant is the ever-shifting applications of power, Habermas wonders by what right 
we privilege one form of discourse over another. This leads him to question whether 
Foucault’s genealogical method is superfluous:  
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…[I]f it is just a matter of mobilizing counterpower, of strategic battles and wily 
confrontations, why should we muster any resistance at all against this all-pervasive 
power circulating in the bloodstream of the body of modern society, instead of just 
adapting ourselves to it? …It makes sense that a value-free analysis of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the opponent is of use to one who wants to take up the fight – but 
why fight at all (Habermas 1990, pp. 283-284)? 
 
These criticisms appear quite damaging, particularly as it has been suggested that 
ideology, in a similarly qualified sense as Foucault’s notion of power, is operative 
everywhere; so the same objection can be made, what is the value of a critique of 
ideology that is itself necessarily ideological? However, the potency of these 
criticisms is greatly reduced if consideration is made of just what it would take to 
satisfy the requirements of Taylor and Habermas. It was precisely the attempt to 
establish a non-ideological standard from which to evaluate ideology that led to the 
incoherence of both ideas; the idea that a position of neutrality is possible, required 
even, in order for a justified preference of one discourse over another is similarly 
untenable. Unfortunately this line of reasoning does not resolve the issues raised, but 
merely demonstrates their applicability to both approaches. A stronger defence of 
Foucault has been made by Rouse, who notes that objections such as those raised by 
Taylor and Habermas above, actually make use of and rely upon crucial disjunctions 
which simplify and misrepresent Foucault’s conception of power:  
Either a critique of power in the name of legitimacy, or an acceptance that power 
makes right; either the validation of one’s claims from a standpoint of 
science/epistemic sovereignty, or an acceptance that all claims to truth are of 
equivalent standing. Yet these disjunctions themselves presuppose a standpoint of 
epistemic sovereignty, and to invoke them may beg the question. Even the positions 
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that in the end are attributed to Foucault (epistemological relativism and/or a 
reduction of truth to domination and legitimacy to forced acceptance) are positions 
that claim sovereignty by standing outside epistemic and political conflicts to 
adjudicate the claims competing parties can legitimately make upon us (Rouse 1994, 
p. 105). 
The conclusion, then, that it follows from Foucault that all truth claims are of equal 
standing, appears to rest on two false presuppositions: that power is inherently 
negative and that the discourses through which power is exercised are relatively static. 
However, Foucault argues that the discourses of power/knowledge are in a constant 
state of transformation, and thus the introduction or rather elevation of disqualified 
knowledges has the potential to re-orientate the boundaries and referents of a 
discursive field, thereby altering the way in which power is exercised. A discursive 
shift of this sort has been noted by Hacking in his analysis of Foucault’s notion of 
savoir or ‘depth knowledge’:  
Savoir is not knowledge in the sense of a bunch of solid propositions. This ‘depth’ 
knowledge is more like a postulated set of rules that determine what kinds of 
sentences are going to count as true or false in some domain. The kinds of things to 
be said about the brain in 1780 are not the kinds of things to be said a quarter-century 
later. That is not because we have different beliefs about brains, but because ‘brain’ 
denotes a new kind of object in the later discourse, and occurs in different sorts of 
sentences (Hacking 1986, pp. 30-31). 
Similarly, Hacking notes the Liberationists’ claim that the elevation of the discourse 
of the ‘doctors of deviancy’ entailed a reformulation of the category ‘homosexual’, 
where what once referred specifically to certain acts is now applied to certain people 
(Hacking 1986, p. 36). In such cases, then, the elevation or disqualification of 
knowledge is not simply the outcome of conflicting perspectives on a pre-given object 
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of knowledge, but rather a fundamental change in that object itself; and this implies 
that Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge is more open-ended than his critics allow. 
It may still be claimed that this results in a form of relativism, insofar as it is unclear 
how we can justify the privileging of one discourse over another; however, I would 
argue that such a reading could only follow if power is conceived as essentially being 
a relation of domination and subjugation. If one maintains a Nietzschean conception 
of power, a strong influence on Foucault, then a broad spectrum of power applications 
is conceivably possible, ranging from the domination of others through to forms of 
‘self-overcoming’ and all manner of applications between. For Nietzsche the differing 
manifestations of power are quite clearly compatible with a coherent system of 
valuation: to the extent that power tends towards or is expressive of an over-fullness 
of life, it is valuable; where it is conducive to the impoverishment of life, it is not: 
“Regarding all aesthetic values I now avail myself of this main distinction: I ask in 
every instance, ‘is it hunger or superabundance that has here become creative?’” (GS 
370). Power that is manifested in a relation of domination and subjugation would 
have to figure at the bottom of this scale of values: “Certainly the state in which we 
hurt others is rarely as agreeable, in an unadulterated way, as that in which we benefit 
others; it is a sign that we are still lacking power, or it shows a sense of frustration in 
the face of this poverty…” (GS 13); at the top, power as a form of creative life-
affirmation, exemplified in aesthetic expression:  
And how could I bear to be human if the human being were not also a composer-poet 
and riddle-guesser and the redeemer of coincidence! To redeem that which has passed 
away and to re-create all ‘It was’ into a ‘Thus I willed it!’ – that alone should I call 
redemption (Z II: 20). 
This reading would have a definite parallel with the above noted weakness of an 
ideological formation that is overtly reliant upon the repressive State apparatuses, 
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relative to one that aims towards a sense of aesthetic intersubjectivity.22 Thus I would 
argue that a case could be made for the ethical pertinence of Foucault’s project, 
insofar as it works towards the integration of more amenable forms of power. 
Similarly with ideology: the ubiquitous presence of ideology as such does not equate 
to an equivalent validity for all of its multiform manifestations. A case can still be 
made for the valuation of different ideological formations, perhaps with a mind 
towards the resistances they generate and the effects they have upon those excluded 
by the discourse.  
 
Ideological discourses should thus be conceived as a supplement to the networks of 
discourse in general, though they differ from them in an important respect: Whereas 
the dynamic discourses of power/knowledge tend towards constant adaptation and 
readjustment, with the absorption or rejection of different power strategies, ideology 
tends towards relative stabilisation. It is in the breakdown of the vast networks of 
hegemonic power, and thus in the re-engagement of hostile forces at the local levels, 
the ultimate support for such a formation, that ideology is able to gain momentum. It 
is not surprising that economic crises have been conceived as the primary determinate 
of ideology, as they arguably represent one of the most visible instances of a 
breakdown of hegemonic power in the resurgence of localised struggles. The re-
engagement of hostile forces precipitates a new need for stabilisation, an ostensible 
equilibrium formerly provided by the stabilisation through adaptation of the 
hegemonic discourses – and ideology can be seen as a less sophisticated, yet arguably 
more potent, form of such stabilisation. Ideology is more potent insofar as it speaks to 
the psychological and aesthetic disposition of the individual subject, as the grounds 																																																								
22 Of course, it must be remembered that this distinction becomes increasingly problematic to the 
extent and manner in which this sense of intersubjectivity is itself reliant upon the use of the 
ideological figure of the ‘Other’. 
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for societal identification; however, this potency in cohesion is only possible insofar 
as an ideological discourse eschews from any radical transformation dictated by the 
dynamic and ever-shifting relations of power. What can be derived from this relative 
lack of adaptability is an inherent frailty in the long-term effectiveness of an 
ideological discourse, and thus the need to displace this frailty in the projection of an 
‘Other’ in order for it to be sustainable. The incorporation of Foucault’s work 
certainly dethrones ideology of its predominant role in the functioning of social 
structures in general, however, I would argue that it is clearly compatible with the 
outline of ideology sketched in chapter 5. As to the primary determinate of ideology, 
although it is unequivocally connected to the material manifestations of the discourses 
of power/knowledge, I would suggest a return to the notion that it is essentially a 
psychological response. 
 
6.3 Three Cases: Early Christianity, the European Far Right and the New 
Age Movement  
 
In order to test the strength of the outline proposed above it will be useful to apply it 
to some historical examples. It seems that a good place to start would be the case of 
the early Christians for two reasons: on the one hand it could certainly be argued that 
the development of the traditional theory of ideology outlined in chapters 1-3 can be 
read as being a reaction against the perceived influence of Christian theology on the 
intellectual landscape of the time, this is most explicit in the works of Feuerbach and 
Marx. On the other hand I have argued that this critique is itself imbued with certain 
theological conceits, in particular a teleological conception of development and 
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reconciliation. It will be interesting, then, to see if the refined approach to ideology is 
better equipped to assess this phenomenon. 
 
Situated on the frontiers of the Roman Empire, the history of first-century Palestine 
attests to a disruption of hegemonic power in the re-engagement of hostile forces at 
the local levels. In describing a period that begins with the breakdown of the 
Hasmonean Dynasty through civil war (67 – 37 B.C.E), proceeds under Roman 
occupation, first indirectly under Herod (37 – 4 B.C.E) and later directly, and ends 
with the outbreak of the first Jewish-Roman war (66 – 73 C.E), Josephus writes of a 
region in perpetual civil unrest, afflicted by numerous factional disputes and recurrent 
popular uprisings. The short-lived ministry of Jesus of Nazareth (28-30 – 30-33 C.E) 
would appear, then, to have arisen in a time and place that was highly favourable to 
the influence of ideological formations, if of course the refined theory of ideology is 
correct on this point – and there is much in Josephus that suggests it is. The messianic 
message behind Jesus’ movement appears to have been a popular and commonly 
recurring one: Josephus writes of Hezekiah, a ‘bandit chief’, ‘over-running’ a district 
adjacent to Syria who was caught and executed along with many followers by Herod 
(Josephus 1972, p. 48); Simon of Peraea, a slave who “…considered that his good 
looks and great stature entitled him to set a crown on his own head” (Josephus 1972, 
p. 119); a shepherd named Athrongaeus, “[a] third claimant to the throne…whose 
hopes were based on his physical strength and contempt of death, and on the support 
of four brothers like himself” (Josephus 1972, p. 119). The consolidation of Roman 
authority in the region was met with strong resistance under the leadership of Judas 
the Galilean, “…[who] tried to stir the natives to revolt, saying that they would be 
cowards if they submitted to paying taxes to the Romans, and after serving God alone 
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accepted human masters. This man was a rabbi with a sect of his own, and was quite 
unlike the others” (Josephus 1972, p. 125). Later Josephus writes of a rise in ‘cheats 
and deceivers claiming inspiration’, who he charges with attempting to bring about 
revolutionary change by leading their followers “…out into the wild country on the 
pretence that there God would show them signs of approaching freedom” (Josephus 
1972, p. 139). The most dangerous of these instigators, according to Josephus’ 
disapproving survey, is referred to as the ‘Egyptian false prophet’: “Arriving in the 
country this man, a fraud who posed as a seer, collected about 30,000 dupes, led them 
round by the wild country to the Mount of Olives, and from there was ready to force 
an entry into Jerusalem…” (Josephus 1972, p. 139). After the outbreak of the first 
Jewish-Roman war Josephus refers to Menahem, son of the aforementioned Judas the 
Galilean (Josephus 1972, p. 157), and Simon, son of Gioras (Josephus 1972, p. 264) 
as being the leaders of two separate Jewish resistance movements with a messianic 
ideology. One can of course add to this list John the Baptist, of whom Jesus appears 
to have been a disciple. Although for some the categorisation of Jesus’ ministry in the 
above tradition may appear to be a superficial exercise, it should be noted that for 
Jesus’ contemporaries the terms ‘Messiah’ and ‘Son of God’ did not have the same 
connotations as they would for later Christians:  
Jesus’ claim to be the Messiah was not in anyway blasphemous in the eyes of the 
Pharisees or, indeed, of any other Jews, for the title ‘Messiah’ carried no connotation 
of deity or divinity. The word ‘Messiah’ simply means ‘anointed one’, and it is a title 
of kingship; every Jewish king of the Davidic dynasty had this title. To claim to be 
the Messiah meant simply to claim the throne of Israel, and while this was a reckless 
and foolhardy thing to do when the Romans had abolished the Jewish monarchy, it 
did not constitute any offence in Jewish law (Maccoby 1998, p. 37).   
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Maccoby notes that there were some differences between the advocates of the 
messianic ideology with regards to their interpretation of its prophetic meaning, in 
particular there was a divergence between those who saw the Messiah as the 
harbinger of the restoration of national independence and liberation from Rome, and 
those who saw this liberation as a precursor to a more general and far-reaching era of 
peace and liberation. The role of pacifism in this movement was also somewhat 
contentious and is historically ambiguous, though a common thread of divinely 
ordained liberation seems to be a fair assessment. The most pressing issue for this 
study that arises from the above overview, then, is an explanation of how and why the 
Christian movement was able to separate itself from the other messianic movements 
and develop into the dominant religion it would become. 
 
In order to understand the rise of Christianity it is almost impossible to overestimate 
the influence of the Epistles of Paul. The canonisation of the New Testament occurred 
relatively late in the history of the early Church, at the Council of Hippo Regius in 
398 C.E, and the sequence that was decided upon works to cloud the historical 
development of the Church’s teachings. The standard arrangement begins with the 
Gospel of Matthew and is followed by the Gospels of Mark, Luke and John, with the 
Epistles of Paul appearing as a sort of footnote. The actual order in which these texts 
were composed is as follows: The Epistles of Paul (48 – 56 C.E), the Gospel of Mark 
(70 – 71 C.E), the Gospels of Matthew and Luke (90 – 100 C.E) and the Gospel of 
John (100 – 120 C.E). The most important thing to keep in mind is that the nature of 
the doctrine espoused by the immediate successors of Jesus’ ministry, James and the 
apostles, cannot be known with any certainty, as the congregation was thoroughly 
dispersed along with the Roman destruction of Jerusalem in 70 C.E. So the only link 
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between the original Christian church in Jerusalem and the Christianity of the New 
Testament is to be found in the letters of Paul; a tentative link given that Paul never 
met Jesus, if we discount his vision on the road to Damascus, and is often openly 
hostile to the Jerusalem church in his letters. Aslan writes:  
After the Temple was destroyed, the holy city burned to the ground, and the remnants 
of the Jerusalem assembly dispersed, Paul underwent a stunning rehabilitation in the 
Christian community. With the possible exception of the Q document (which is, after 
all, a hypothetical text), the only writings about Jesus that existed in 70 C.E. were the 
letters of Paul (Aslan 2013, p. 214). 
The Q document refers to a hypothetical collection of Jesus’ sayings, an inference 
drawn as an explanation for the common material found in the Gospels of Mathew 
and Luke (90 – 100 C.E) but absent in the Gospel of Mark (70 – 71 C.E). In any case, 
if one wants to identify the roots of Christian ideology and the ways in which it 
differentiated itself from other messianic movements of the time, the Epistles of Paul 
would be the most illuminating documents to assess for “…the theories of Paul were 
already before the writers of the Gospels and coloured their interpretations of Jesus’ 
activities. Paul is, in a sense, present from the very first word of the New Testament” 
(Maccoby 1986, p. 4). 
 
What is immediately apparent in Paul is the exulted status of Jesus of Nazareth, unlike 
other Messiahs Jesus is not ordained by God nor a messenger from God but the literal 
Son of God, God incarnate: “For what the law was powerless to do in that it was 
weakened by the sinful nature, God did by sending his own Son in the likeness of 
sinful man to be a sin offering” (Romans 8: 3). This reinterpretation of the nature of 
Jesus/God would set the movement apart from other messianic movements; it was not 
only controversial among non-Christians but was a matter of fierce debate amongst 
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the early Christians themselves, and it was only much later at the Council of Nicaea 
(325 C.E) that this doctrine was accepted as orthodoxy. As Aslan notes:  
It was not unusual to be called Son of God in ancient Judaism. God calls David his 
Son: ‘today I have begotten you’ (Psalms 2:7). He even calls Israel his ‘first-born 
son’ (Exodus 4:22). But in every case, Son of God is meant as a title, not a 
description. Paul’s view of Jesus as the literal son of God is without precedence in 
second Temple Judaism (Aslan 2013, p. 266). 
This transcendental conception of Jesus is highly important as it lays the foundation 
for Paul’s comprehensive use of the ideological Other; coinciding with Jesus’ divine 
status is a reinterpretation of the ‘kingdom of God’ as being a celestial and no longer 
a terrestrial idea; and so unlike the case would be with other messianic ideologies, the 
crucifixion of Jesus, the dispersion of his ministry and the failure of promised 
liberation cannot negate the central tenets of Christianity, salvation is now a matter 
that can be perpetually deferred: “I declare to you, brothers, that flesh and blood 
cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable” 
(1 Corinthians 15: 50), “I consider that our present sufferings are not worth 
comparing with the glory that will be revealed in us” (Romans 8: 18), “Now we know 
that if the earthly tent we live in is destroyed, we have a building from God, an eternal 
house in heaven, not built by human hands” (2 Corinthians 5: 1). This displacement of 
the ideological object coincided with a similar operation in which events that were 
counterposed to the ideology’s vision and a hindrance to its progression were 
reinscribed into the religion itself. Edward Gibbon noted a peculiar enthusiasm for the 
notion of demons amongst the early Christians, a tenet which enabled for competing 
religious practices to be conceived not as an alternative but rather as an effect of 
Christian practices, or lack thereof:  
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Those rebellious spirits who had been degraded from the rank of angels and cast 
down into the infernal pit were still permitted to roam upon earth, to torment the 
bodies and to seduce the minds of sinful men. The demons soon discovered and 
abused the natural propensity of the human heart towards devotion, and, artfully 
withdrawing the adoration of mankind from their Creator, they usurped the place and 
honors of the Supreme Deity (Gibbon 2003, p. 247). 
 
The Christianity of Paul adheres to the schema of a refined theory of ideology in 
another sense, with regards to a stabilisation of forces. Though Foucault’s work 
demonstrates that such an organisation is not in an actual fact possible, I would argue 
that its existence as semblance or at least projected as a possibility is essential to what 
differentiates ideology from discourse in general. Paul is at pains to present 
Christianity as a uniquely universal doctrine, loosening it from its foundation in 
Mosaic Law and its connection to Jerusalem; the primary aim of Paul’s preaching is 
the conversion and/or assimilation of the various adherents of the polytheistic 
religions scattered throughout the Roman empire and beyond:  
But when God, who set me apart from birth and called me by his grace, was pleased 
to reveal his Son in me so that I might preach him among the Gentiles, I did not 
consult man, nor did I go up to Jerusalem to see those who were apostles before I 
was, but I went immediately into Arabia and later returned to Damascus (Galatians 1: 
15-17)    
The move towards a semblance of stabilisation is best evinced in Paul’s complete 
disavowal of the spirit of rebelliousness from which the messianic movements 
originated. Paul not only presents his doctrine as being perfectly compatible with 
Roman domination, he also argues that any and all forms of government are equally 
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acceptable from the point of view of Christianity – temporal conformity in exchange 
for eternal liberation in the next life:  
Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority 
except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been 
established by God. Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is rebelling 
against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on 
themselves (Romans 13: 1-2). 
This purported reconciliation through abnegation, combined with a uniquely suitable 
socio-historical landscape, helped to propel the advancement of Christian ideology. 
As Gibbon notes, the vast network of public highways, constructed for the 
transportation of the Roman legions to and from all the major cities in the empire, 
allowed for the probably unprecedented speed at which such an ideology was able to 
extend itself in a geographical sense: “It has been observed, with truth as well as 
propriety, that the conquests of Rome prepared and facilitated those of Christianity” 
(Gibbon 2003, p. 270). As to the transition from ideology to discourse – and whether 
this is ever possible in a complete sense is difficult to say, though in this case the 
existence of doctrinal and denominational disputes and refinement suggests that it is 
not an impossibility – though it would be impossible to locate with any precise degree 
of accuracy, the conversion of the Emperor Constantine (306 – 337 C.E.) and later the 
adoption of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman empire point towards a 
move in that direction. 
 
Shifting the focus to our contemporary situation, the global financial crisis of 2008 
was a particularly significant event that signalled critical fault lines in the edifice of 
hegemonic power. Although the crisis was complex with consequences varying in 
severity from region to region, I will focus attention on the case of Europe, with an 
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emphasis on the rise in popularity of the extreme nationalist parties and their 
tendencies towards populism, xenophobia and racism – a phenomenon that gained 
momentum following the crisis, and would later be exacerbated by the European 
refugee crisis in 2015. 
 
Broadly speaking the crisis can be seen as a predictable consequence, though not in its 
scale and intensity, of ever-expanding global neoliberal financial and economic 
policies. The catalysts of this particular crisis, and here I rely heavily on the 
informative survey of recent literature on the subject undertaken by Sue Mew (2013), 
included the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers investment bank and the liquidity 
crisis incurred by AIG, events which precipitated the conversion of privately 
generated debt into sovereign debt in order to maintain the functioning of this 
international industry. The crisis was exacerbated further by the wide-spread practices 
of speculative mortgage lending by US financial organizations and the trading of 
derivative securities by international banks, practices which brought about a ‘bubble’ 
leading to crises and recessions around the world. Of most pertinence to this study, 
maintaining the schema outlined above, is the way in which this breakdown in the 
effectiveness of the structure of global finance was made manifest in the sphere of 
localised conflicts. Mew notes that:   
…the global crisis in all its localized manifestations embraces a deepening social 
crisis that is wrought by loss of homes, falling incomes, unemployment, cuts to 
welfare provision, rising taxation, and increased food and energy costs. For many, 
these are the very basic needs for social reproduction… (Mew 2013, p. 99). 
Her work highlights the growth of a sense of disenfranchisement in Europe following 
the crisis, a sentiment bolstered by the perception that governmental adherence to the 
dictates of international neoliberal policies represents a fundamental loss in national 
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sovereignty. The ideological conception of reconciliation and being ‘at home’ is thus 
critically undermined; and with it the figure of the ‘Other’ is no longer fixed, and the 
matter of who or what is to be projected into this role becomes open to contestation:  
Real political power, it seems, lies elsewhere and is not to be confused with the 
decision-making of the political or ruling elite. Indeed, the choices and actions of 
political elites these days are circumscribed by a combination of international and 
supranational institutions, financialization, and techno-managerial bureaucracies 
(Mew 2013, p. 103). 
This disillusionment is also apparent in the strong reactions against the widespread 
implementation of austerity measures as a response to the crisis – reactions that are 
not limited to a critique of financial and economic policy, but speak to a growing 
sense that such measures are representative of a broader process of the gradual 
dismantling of the foundations necessary for social democracy. Mew argues that this 
sentiment can be read as an effect of a general ‘crisis of care’ in Europe, and one of 
the more common material effects of this crisis in local spheres has been a growing 
disengagement with the hegemonic forms of political practice:  
This state of affairs has been exacerbated by a corresponding crisis of social 
democracy, namely low voter turnout at elections, political apathy, and evaporating 
trust in governments or traditional politics to address the questions that matter most to 
people (Mew 2013, p. 103). 
The situation, then, is highly conducive to the growth in influence of ideological 
formations – and arguably the ideologies of most concern, as Mew notes, are the ones 
that embody a resurgence of the most insidious forms of nationalism. 
 
It so happened that the period following the crisis saw just such resurgence, with 
significant electoral gains made by extreme right-wing political parties across the 
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continent; some of the more prominent included: the National Front (France), Jobbik 
(Hungary), the Freedom Party of Austria (Austria), the Finns Party (Finland), the 
Party for Freedom (Netherlands), the Danish People’s Party (Denmark) and Golden 
Dawn (Greece). These parties, and others similar, differ a good deal in the overtness 
of their more unsavoury and prejudicial platforms, as well as the extent to which they 
can be considered to advocate for an incitement towards intolerance and violence. 
What unites them all, however, is their familiar use of the negatively construed image 
of the ideological Other, a displacement that can be discerned in the steadfast 
assumption that the root causes of Europe’s problems lie in the adoption or rather 
‘corruption’ of influences from ‘outside’ – this is manifest in the importance they 
ascribe to their strong anti-immigration message and their peculiar fear of the 
‘Islamisation’ of Europe. On the surface this can be read as a paradigmatic case of the 
Žižekian notion that an ideology both arises from and works to partially conceal the 
inconsistencies and antagonisms that are inherent to a social-symbolic order, in this 
case the crisis is conceived to have resulted from the degeneracy of a more or less 
sound system rather than being something that was structurally imminent to that 
system; and while this may be true there are a number of other, more subtle, points 
that can be gleaned from this phenomenon as well. 
 
In the first place the importance of a reengagement in localised conflicts for the 
development of ideological discourse can be confirmed in this case, insofar as the 
target audience is in the main those who perceive themselves to be some of the most 
downtrodden and marginalised from what is considered to be mainstream society. 
Srećko Horvat notes that there is a strong tendency among the extreme right to 
present themselves as being the expression of the working class. He cites the case of 
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the ‘Workers Party’ in the Czech Republic, who have organised pogroms against 
Roma people, and that of Golden Dawn, who advance the notion that immigrants 
‘stealing the jobs’ of ordinary Greeks are mostly to blame for the crisis. Stressing the 
point that one should not conflate two examples from vastly different socio-historical 
periods, Horvat nevertheless demonstrates that there is an undeniable resemblance 
between this discourse and that of the bourgeoning Nazi movement in Weimar 
Germany: 
Here is a typical illustration of this rhetoric: “They have taken all sovereign rights 
from us. We are just good enough for international capital to allow us to fill its 
money sacks with interest payments … Three million people lack work and 
sustenance. The officials, it is true, work to conceal the misery. They speak of 
measures and silver linings. Things are getting steadily better for them, and steadily 
worse for us. The illusion of freedom, peace and prosperity that we were promised 
when we wanted to take our fate into our own hands is vanishing. Only the complete 
collapse of our people can follow from these irresponsible policies.” Isn’t this a 
perfect description of Europe’s current deadlock? Would you expect such a discourse 
from SYRIZA or from the Golden Dawn? The answer might be surprising: the author 
is no-one else than Joseph Goebbels, and it’s part of his text ‘Wir fordern’ (‘We 
demand’) published in the fourth issue of Der Angriff, dated 25 July 1927 (Horvat 
2015, pp. 79-80). 
Horvat is not arguing that there is fundamental commonality between the opposite 
ends of the political spectrum, insofar as they both appear to make use of the notion of 
‘workers’ rights’ to advance their cause; rather the point to be made is how effectively 
the financial crisis, and I would argue any crisis of hegemony, can be exploited with 
the use of ideological discourse. Indeed the appropriation of a ‘workers’ rights’ 
discourse by the extreme right can be seen as a particularly insidious application of 
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ideology – for in practice the appropriation is a mere pretence, Horvat notes how the 
predominant propaganda actually works to displace the causes of the crisis by inciting 
conflict between different working classes – “the German against the Greek, the 
Austrian and the Greek against the immigrants, and so on” (Horvat 2015, pp. 83-84). 
Thus this ideological strategy can be seen as an attempt at the reestablishment of a 
hegemonic formation through cynical obfuscation, an example of ideological 
discourse functioning as a supplement to discourse in general. 
 
This phenomenon gives credence to the idea that ideological discourse is a 
supplement to discourse in general in another way. It can be seen in the way in which 
the extreme rhetoric of this movement can actually function to strengthen or 
naturalise those aspects of hegemonic power of which it is reacting against. In the 
context of the EU crisis, the far-right’s anti-immigration agitation is an excellent 
example of this:  
During public appearances, Golden Dawn and the like loudly express that which is 
repressed in the European Union’s vocabulary, these new extreme movements create 
a political climate where, for example, the exceptionally tough anti-immigration 
legislation of the EU begins to look ‘moderate’ in comparison. As a consequence, this 
shifting context enables extreme movements to radicalise further (Horvat 2015, pp. 
170-172). 
In this case an ideological discourse arises expressing a perceived weakness in a 
hegemonic practice, retroactively strengthening said practice and thereby 
marginalising itself. It could be inferred that a highly contentious policy such as this is 
always in need of some such ideological supplement in order to present itself as 
palatable. Interestingly, we can witness a near reversal of this process in the case of a 
hegemonic discourse adopting the language and practice of ideology, as in the highly 
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reified notion of a ‘war on terror’, a war that must inevitably dispose of the principles 
it purports to be defending if it were to be any way practicable:  
Many liberal warriors are so eager to fight anti-democratic fundamentalism that they 
end up dispensing with freedom and democracy if only they may fight terror. If the 
‘terrorists’ are ready to wreck this world for love of another, our warriors against 
terror are ready to wreck democracy out of hatred for the Muslim other. Some of 
them love human dignity so much that they are ready to legalise torture to defend it 
(Žižek 2015, pp. 123-124). 
The contradictory and self-defeating nature of this ideology in practice highlights the 
fact that although ideology may be the most potent form of discourse, it is also a 
discourse severely lacking in the requisite potential for adaptable transformation, and 
thus is in constant need of the tactics of obfuscation and conceptual displacement in 
order to sustain itself; Žižek is right to claim that, for ideology, the power of its form 
far outweighs the power of its content. 
 
The examples of early Christianity and contemporary European far-right politics are 
of course very distinct phenomena, they do however adhere to the traditional Marxist 
assumption that ideology is, at least ostensibly, primarily a discourse of the socially 
and economically marginalised. In order to demonstrate the pervasive nature of 
ideology, and to break away from the notion that ideology is always an instance of 
class struggle, another example is needed. The ‘New Age’ movement, which 
developed in the 1970’s and 80’s, is an excellent example of the fact that ideology is 
not bounded by economic determinations. It has been observed that this movement 
was almost exclusively manifested amongst segments of the ‘baby boom’ generation 
(those born between 1946 and 1964); statistically speaking, it was a generation that 
was highly educated and socially and economically privileged: “According to 
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Strickland and Ambrose, the baby boomers were the ‘healthiest, best-fed, best-
clothed, best-housed generation’ to come along in the United States” (Brown 1992, p. 
91). This disconnect from the traditionally conceived location of ideological 
formations is reinforced by Paul Heelas, who notes that one reason for the 
international appeal of the New Age movement is “…no doubt…that the New Age is 
strongly associated with the middle to upper-middle professional classes, the category 
of the population which is most uniform across cultures” (Heelas 1996, p. 121). Of 
course, the absence of a grounding in economic conflicts does not invalidate the 
aforementioned importance of the (re)emergence of localised conflicts for the growth 
of ideological formations. In many respects the New Age can be seen as a 
continuation of, or rather a transition from, the counterculture movement of the 
1960’s – or at the very least, many New Agers would identify themselves as being 
former ‘hippies’; and it will be shown that many of the issues which served to foment 
social conflict in the counterculture were appropriated by the New Age movement, 
albeit in a transfigured form. 
 
Before proceeding it is important to note some difficulties with the categorisation of 
this broad movement under the title of ‘New Age’. In the first place, the movement is 
known for its eclecticism, for the adoption of numerous and diverse traditional beliefs 
and practices, and for its decentralised structure and rejection of all forms of 
‘dogmatism’; thus there is no standard or definitive criteria one can point to when 
talking of ‘New Age spirituality’. Nevertheless the term is still useful; it has been 
argued that its indeterminate nature does not preclude the fact that there is a ‘family 
resemblance’ observable between the various manifestations of the ‘New Age’, and 
so “…[it is] still possible to develop a list of ‘New Age’ traits, as long as one bears in 
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mind that any given manifestation of this subculture is unlikely to be categorized by 
all of them” (Lewis 1992, p. 6). The second issue relates to the negative connotations 
associated with the term itself. As Lewis and Melton note, the attention of the 
mainstream media was drawn to the New Age movement in the late 1980’s by events 
such as the airing of Shirley MacLaine’s Out on a Limb and the Harmonic 
Convergence of 1987. The general reaction that developed was one of disparagement, 
and it is fair to say that the ‘New Age’ is commonly perceived to be trivial, “… ‘woo-
woo’ and ‘airy-fairy’…” (Lewis 1992, p. 3). This negative perception often extends to 
those for whom the label is usually applied to, and it is often the case that individuals 
referred to as being ‘New Age’ would actually reject this label themselves. So the 
retention of the term in the academic literature on the subject is indeed problematic. 
As Lewis notes, however, there is no other term available that sufficiently 
encapsulates all aspects of the movement; and also, the decline in self-identifying 
with the category ‘New Age’ in no way represents a decline or abandonment of the 
beliefs and practices to which this term formerly represented:  
Partially because of this negative press, even book publishers are abandoning the new 
age category for a series of ‘more accurate labels like self-help, new science, 
metaphysics, Eastern religions, philosophy, natural living,’ and so forth (meaning that 
the term has been dropped without abandoning any of the topics that were formerly 
marketed under the new age label) (Lewis 1992, p. 1). 
So for the lack of an alternative I will retain use of the term New Age, keeping in 
mind that its usage is a point of contestation. 
 
The New Age movement has many influences; however, in a broad sense it has been 
characterised as a tradition with a strong revivalist and millenarian outlook with a 
specific emphasis on ‘Self-spirituality’ and ‘transformation’. It has absorbed aspects 
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from various traditions, those of particular influence being New Thought, Theosophy 
and Spiritualism, as well as certain beliefs drawn from Eastern and Native American 
religious traditions. Any exhaustive list of historical progenitors is, however, quite 
difficult to ascertain. This is not only due to the movement’s eclecticism but also from 
the absence of any stringent conformity to the various beliefs and practices from 
which it drew its inspiration: “…[The New Age Movement] arose, not so much as a 
new religion, but as a new revivalist religious impulse directed toward the 
esoteric/metaphysical/Eastern groups and to the mystical strain in all religions” 
(Melton 1992, p. 18). Incidentally, it has been suggested that this informal and 
incomplete appropriation from various traditions, often assumed to be a sign of the 
triviality of the New Age movement, may not be a matter of carelessness; that it could 
rather be integral to the formation’s use of the mechanism of the ideological Other. 
Regarding the influence of Hinduism on the New Age, Diem and Lewis note that 
what on the surface appear to be simple misinterpretations of the tradition, actually 
serve the tactical purpose of establishing an idealized image of the East to be counter-
posed with the perceived deficiencies of the West, so that the latter can be judged 
from the framework of this ideal. The authors add that this same operation can be 
observed in many Enlightenment thinkers usage of the image of ancient Greece and 
Rome:  
In a manner parallel to the way in which the early New Age movement of the 1970s 
would later use the East, the Enlightenment thinkers used the West’s own historical 
past – particularly the Greek and Roman period – as a background against which to 
criticize their own society. In their hands, the classical period became both a highly 
idealized reflection of their own aspirations and the very antithesis of everything they 
detested in eighteenth-century Europe (Diem & Lewis 1992, p. 51). 
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This, then, appears to be a reversal of the way in which the ideological figure of the 
Other is deployed in contemporary far-right politics: whereas the latter case uses the 
figure of the Other in an attempt to displace and thereby suppress the effects of 
internal antagonisms and inconsistencies, here the ideological Other itself stands for 
and thereby displaces the idea of social harmony and stability, and this may be 
presumed to imply a heightening of the effects of internal antagonisms and 
inconsistencies; it may be assumed from such a reading that ideological discourse 
should be neatly demarcated along the lines of its ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’ 
usage. However, at least in this case, things are a little more complicated. 
 
Perhaps one of the most commonly accepted ideas amongst the New Age movement 
is the notion of monism; there is a general aversion towards dualistic thinking, 
particularly the distinction between mind and matter. For the New Age proponents 
‘consciousness’ is a primary and universal force, and it is possible for individuals to 
directly tap into this force provided they utilise the correct methods and practices. 
There is no one pathway towards this convergence, and the various methods and 
practices adopted by the New Age reflect not only its eclecticism but a belief that all 
spiritual pursuits, past and present, share this same fundamental goal; so this notion of 
‘raising consciousness’ may be manifested in practices as diverse as meditation, 
‘channelling’, natural diets, near-death experiences and out-of-the-body travel, 
contact with ‘UFOs’, forms of healing and alternative medicine, the use of crystals, 
past life regression, astrology; and so on (though again, no one New Age group would 
adhere to all New Age practices). Another important trait of New Age thinking is a 
rejection of the idea that spiritual transformation can be attained from an external 
source; rather any such transformation can only be a matter of ‘inner experience’:  
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To experience the ‘Self’ itself is to experience ‘God’, the ‘Goddess’, the ‘Source’, 
‘Christ Consciousness’, the ‘inner child’, the ‘way of the heart’, or, most simply and, 
I think, most frequently, ‘inner spirituality’. And experiences of the ‘Higher Self’, to 
use another favoured term, stand in stark contrast to those afforded by the ego 
(Heelas 1996, p. 19). 
The alleged proliferation of the ‘ego’ or ‘lower self’ in modern mainstream society 
and culture is attributed to various forms of ‘social engineering’ associated with the 
‘established order’: “The mores of the established order – its materialism, 
competitiveness, together with the importance it attaches to playing roles – are held to 
disrupt what it is to be authentically human” (Heelas 1996, p. 18). The importance of 
an idealized image of the East is clear here, it works to demonstrate that the anxieties 
and insecurities one experiences are not natural states, as there are or at least were 
tangible societies devoid of these problems, societies constituted by individuals with 
‘higher’ and more ‘divine’ levels of consciousness; so self-transformation is 
conceived as a clear and demonstrable possibility. Many proponents of New Age 
spirituality claim to have undergone just such a transformation; and from this it is said 
to follow that, given the steady rise of people awakening to their authentic nature, 
society as a whole will inevitably be transformed to reflect this state – hence the term 
‘New Age’. 
 
It can be seen, then, that the New Age movement is to a certain extent a critique of 
modernity, that it inherits from the counterculture of the ‘60s its disdain for 
mainstream society and culture; however, the two movements differ widely in their 
relation to the hegemonic discourse. Whereas the counterculture confronted 
hegemonic power as a discourse of resistance and disengagement, manifested in its 
protest and commune movements, the New Age movement can be seen to engender a 
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semblance of stabilisation and much more closely fits the mould of ideology 
functioning as a supplement to discourse in general. The comparative violence and 
non-violence (in a broad sense), characteristic of the climate of the two movements, 
indicates that the counterculture is representative of a breakdown in hegemonic power 
(it has been noted that the open and excessive use of the repressive State apparatuses 
signifies a weak hold on State power and a lack of ideological cohesion), with the 
New Age pointing towards an end to this ideological struggle (evinced by its 
reintegration of hegemonic practices and emphasis on non-violence); I would argue 
that this is key to its relative longevity when compared with the counterculture. The 
fundamental break from the counterculture is in the movement’s turn towards the 
individual, the pre-eminence afforded to ‘Self’ transformation. What follows from 
this is that changes to the structures of societal organisation are of secondary 
importance, the change that is necessary must come from ‘within’ and not from 
‘without’, and so regardless of what station one occupies, it is still possible to 
conform to the New Age movement. This adaptability ensures that New Age 
principles can be applied rather indiscriminately to any and all aspects of one’s life: 	
…[W]e see a blending of different areas of life – business, personal, and spiritual – 
which would have been more compartmentalized in traditional religions (even in 
more traditional occult-metaphysical organizations). This tendency to blur the 
barriers between different areas of life (a tendency New Agers would view positively 
as ‘holistic’) is characteristic of New Age spirituality… (Lewis 1992, p. 4). 
This tendency towards integration, Lewis goes on to note, is reflected in the 
organisation of New Age congregations, which usually dispense with the traditional 
‘ceremony’ in favour of a refined approach to standardised ‘workshops, lectures, and 
classes’ (Lewis 1992, p. 8). 
 
		
205	
In terms of ideology critique, it does not follow that the New Age movement should 
be dismissed as ineffectual. Its historical development actually presents as a case of 
an ideology, initially functioning as a reaction against a dominant discourse, whose 
reabsorption into said discourse has the effect of strengthening it; it is an ideal 
example of the necessity of an ideological supplement to maintain an otherwise 
volatile hegemonic formation. The expediency of the New Age movement as an 
ideological supplement can be seen in a point made by Rupert who, writing in the 
early 1990’s, notes that:  
Over the past decade GM, Lockheed, Scott Paper, and a host of other major 
corporations have paid for their personnel to attend seminars which, many critics 
argue, rely upon unconventional religious beliefs to maximise participants’ 
productivity. The trend is undoubtedly significant; it has been estimated that 
American corporations collectively spend about $4 billion per year on New Age 
seminars (Rupert 1992, p. 128). 
This enthusiastic reabsorption extended as far as the U.S. Army: “The slogan ‘Be All 
You Can Be’ is a direct result of a commission established to explore the possibility 
of creating a ‘New Age Army’” (Rupert 1992, p. 127). The unlikely pairing of New 
Age spirituality with a military apparatus demonstrates just how wide the gap can be 
between the content and the form of an ideological discourse. In this regard Marx may 
be quite correct in his suspicion, expressed in The German Ideology, that those who 
consider themselves to be engaged in “…‘pure’ theory, theology, philosophy, 
morality, etc.” (1976, p. 50), may, in certain circumstances, inadvertently function as 
prototypical ‘ideologists’, the unwitting apologists for hegemonic discourse. 
 
I maintain that the commonalities established between the three ideological 
formations examined above, chosen with specific regard for their diversity, 
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demonstrate both the pervasive nature of ideology as well as the possibility of 
analysing and critiquing ideology in all of its manifold manifestations. Ideology is 
everywhere but not everywhere the same; the material circumstances engendered by it 
can differ greatly, and so the establishment of tools capable of the valuation and 
critique of ideology are not only possible but, I would argue, necessary. It is to this 
end that a refined theory of ideology is of such importance. 
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Conclusion 
 
I began by situating the problem of ideology within the broader context of the 
metaphysical problem of the relation between mind and matter; this was necessary 
insofar as ideology has commonly been conceived as being a false representation or 
mystification of the real world, and so it appeared to follow that its existence would 
have to entail the possibility of an undistorted, or authentic, consciousness to be 
contrasted with it. The philosophy of Hegel served as the starting point primarily 
because in its innovative conception of the processes of alienation and reconciliation 
it is able to move beyond this problematic and provide a plausible foundation for the 
theory of ideology. Hegel is also essential given that the early philosophy of Marx, 
from which the traditional theory of ideology was developed, can be read as a 
Hegelian critique of Hegel.  
 
Of most importance to the theory of ideology was the Hegelian conception of 
alienation, which can be conceived both positively and negatively. Alienation as 
estrangement (Entfremdung) was defined as a state or process whereby one’s 
consciousness is separated from one or more of the necessary aspects required for 
authentic self-understanding; it is thus the foundation for what in Marx becomes 
ideological consciousness. Alienation as externalisation (Entäusserung) was defined 
as a process whereby consciousness externalises itself in object form, and in doing so 
is able to develop a greater understanding of itself; in Hegel this is represented by the 
activity of disciplined work, the shaping of material objects in conformity with one’s 
own rational plan. For Marx this latter form of alienation is not possible given the 
conditions of alienated labour, conditions that he argues are sustained by the discourse 
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of ideology; thus for Marx the problem of ideology is inextricably linked to material 
practices. 
 
Hegel argued that for the development of self-consciousness four fundamental 
requirements, all of which being interdependent, are necessary: the experience of 
freedom or autonomy, the mutual recognition of this status from subject to subject, 
the disciplined work described above and a fear of death which is perhaps best 
understood as a proper understanding of our status as a finite manifestation of the 
universal. Importantly, Hegel maintained that these conditions cannot be met in 
isolation, rather they can only be achieved as the outcome of the establishment of a 
free and rational society, from which it can be inferred that prior to this stage all 
perspectives could be considered partial at best, and so in the broadest sense 
ideological. This is an assumption shared by Marx in his conception of ideology, 
which explains his insistence that ideology is primarily a matter related to societal 
organisation. Insofar as ideology remains connected to the question of the extent to 
which our knowledge is socially conditioned, it is an enduring assumption. 
 
The work of Feuerbach is of critical importance not just as a bridge between the 
thought of Hegel and Marx, but as a significant progenitor to the once popular notion 
that ideology should be read as a form of false consciousness. Elaborating on Hegel’s 
notion of a divided subject, exemplified by the figure of the ‘unhappy consciousness’ 
in the Phenomenology, Feuerbach outlines a state in which one forms an over-
identification with the inessential (changeable, finite) aspects of being with a 
concurrent dissociation from being’s essential (unchangeable, infinite) aspects. For 
Feuerbach this is a problem because he argues that what we perceive to be our 
		
209	
inessential aspects are themselves always and only finite manifestations of the 
universal, essential, categories of Reason, Will and Heart. Thus the division between 
the two has the effect of dissociating oneself from one’s ‘essential self’. The problem 
with religion, as Feuerbach sees it, is that it involves a transformation of this 
conceptual distinction into an ontological division with the deification of human 
ideals, or ideal traits; so it represents a potent form of alienation as estrangement. I 
argued that a distorted ontological shift of this nature would have to occur if the 
definition of ideology as false consciousness was to be viable, however ultimately it 
was found to be untenable. 
 
Marx’s notion of ideology incorporates and expands upon Feuerbach’s reading of 
religion as anthropomorphic self-alienation. It is in Marx that the traditional 
conception of ideology is firmly established, however, it is also the case that Marx 
introduces a level of ambiguity to the concept insofar as he alternates between an 
epistemological and a political understanding of the term, with the two leading to 
seemingly incompatible consequences. Marx accepts the preeminent role played by 
self-alienation in the works of Hegel and Feuerbach; however, he diverges from them 
by denying that this state is a necessary or intrinsic stage in the development of self-
consciousness per se. Marx argues that Hegel and Feuerbach arrive at their 
conclusions by the use of an ‘upside-down’ procedure whereby human essence is first 
established as something given, and society is then conceived of as being a reflection 
of this essence; imperfect societies are then interpreted as a reflection of imperfect or 
under-developed essence. For Marx, the human essence is no more and no less than 
the ensemble of social relationships in a given society; it follows that if a society is 
conducive to the production of self-alienated subjects, then it is the organisation of 
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that society which is underdeveloped and thus prone to radical transformation. The 
religious feeling described by Feuerbach is thus not a universal stage in the 
development of self-understanding, but a reaction to specific social conditions. For 
Marx it becomes an exemplary model of ideology functioning to mask concrete 
conditions of alienation. 
 
I argued that, although there is no clear rupture or ‘epistemological break’ 
demarcating Marx’s early and later treatment on the subject, there is a definite tension 
between two quite disparate notions of ideology adhering throughout his work. The 
first approach is a conception of ideology that is essentially epistemological, the 
‘illusion’ model of ideology. Here Marx correlates the division of labour with an 
emergence of the idea that theoretical ideas are fundamentally autonomous, they are 
thoroughly dissociated from their conditions of possibility. This leads to a commonly 
held assumption that such ideas are universal, an ideological conception for Marx as 
he maintains that such ideas are ultimately the mystified expression of, in this case 
exploitative, economic conditions. I argued that this formulation creates an immediate 
problem with regards to the purpose or value of unmasking ideology; it seems to 
follow from the epistemological approach that one is left with the choice of living 
with the naïve illusion of self-determined universal ideas, or the acceptance that our 
thoughts are simply representations of a material life-process beyond our direct 
control. Neither option offers hope of affective change, and the exercise of ideology 
critique would appear to be a superfluous endeavour. The determinism implicit in 
such an approach also appears to contradict the ‘purposive’ or ‘intentional’ nature of 
human consciousness stressed by Marx. The other approach, a political or functional 
conception of ideology, appears to restore a sense of agency to the subject; however, 
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it is not without its own problems. Here ideology is conceived in the manner of a 
conscious or intentional political tool, it is not dissociated from and ineffectual 
towards material activity, but rather the latter’s guiding force – a collection of ideas 
systematically designed to maintain the status quo of exploitative relations of 
production. The immediate difficulty here is that it is unclear how the process evolves 
whereby some individuals are ideological and others practice ideology, it would seem 
to entail an implausible distinction between the consciousness of the ‘ruling class’ and 
the ‘ruled’ – a notion that is hinted at but underdeveloped. 
 
Both approaches imply a ‘misrepresentation’ of the ‘actual’ state of affairs. They 
differ in that the epistemic approach views material activity as determining 
consciousness, and the political approach views consciousness as determining 
material activity. In a sense, then, the inconsistency could simply stem from the 
difficulty in developing a theory of ideology from a conceptual foundation of the 
inter-dependence of thought and action. I have argued that this is not necessarily 
contradictory, that depending on its socio-historical circumstances a society could be 
in thrall to one or the other forms of ideology; the epistemic model would then 
represent a state in which ideological influence is especially strong, meaning the 
tensions within the material base are effectively masked; and in a less stable, 
conflictive environment, the political model would be operative, presumably with the 
intent of affecting its stronger variant. This reading may help to resolve the apparent 
incompatibility of the two approaches, but it leaves the problems internal to each 
untouched; and so it is clear that Marx’s work on ideology is in need of development. 
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The investigation inevitably leads back to the initial problem in that the forms of 
ideology established still seem to require some sort of standard of truth to be 
juxtaposed with them. Marx is not so convincing here, contrasting ideology with ‘that 
which can be determined with the precision of natural science’ and simply assuming 
that the scientific method is free of ideological influence. Without a solid epistemic 
foundation it can only follow that the theory of ideology is itself vulnerable to 
ideology critique, it turns back in on itself. The consequence of this is quite drastic: it 
appears to follow that the options left are to either assume that the theory of ideology 
is invalid or to assume that all thought is to a certain extent ideological. Arguing that 
there is still much of value in Marx’s theory, I tentatively opted for the latter. The 
objective then is to attempt to unpack the Marxian theory of ideology, using a similar 
method to that used by Marx in his critique of the ‘ideologists’, in order to ascertain 
whether a distinction can be made between the ideology behind the theory of 
ideology, and those aspects of the theory which could be retained. 
 
Despite being in some respects a critique of Hegel and Feuerbach, Marx’s notion of 
ideology retains and makes use of the conceptual framework adopted by his 
predecessors: I have argued that all three conceive of history as being a teleological 
process of transformation; a process whereby consciousness or human nature 
progresses from a state of alienation, through various forms of what could be called 
ideology, and develops towards a state of authenticity, as yet unreached. A conception 
of authenticity as being a state in which one is ‘at home’ in and not distinct from 
society at large is a shared assumption, however they differ in their views on how this 
will come about: for Hegel it will emerge as a consequence of an organic state, an 
organisation that arises naturally from a properly philosophic understanding of 
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absolute spirit; for Feuerbach authenticity becomes possible after the development of 
a more self-sufficient form of humanism, one free of religious mystification; and for 
Marx it is represented by the coming of a classless society free of exploitation. All 
three identify the history of human societies as a fundamentally progressive 
development. Within this schema, ideology is to be conceived as that force from 
which this necessary advancement is – temporarily – hindered, stifled or regressed. 
An ideological presupposition behind this theory of ideology, then, is the existence of 
some sort of collective subject embodied in the historical process; a subject who is 
conceived to be both rational and purposive, and yet one who moves beyond the 
immediate comprehension of the individual subjects of whom it is composed. This 
ideological presupposition is responsible for another seemingly insurmountable 
division analogous to that of ideology and a standard of truth: a division between the 
individual subject and the, arguably reified, conceptions of Geist, species being, and 
collective social labour.  
 
This teleological motif is not unique to Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx; it can rather be 
seen to reflect the culturally dominant idea of necessary progress proliferating at the 
time. It is no coincidence that the bulk of literature under review was composed 
between 1789 and 1848, a period defined as the ‘age of revolution’ by Eric 
Hobsbawm, and it is not surprising if the theoretical transformations described were 
perceived to be consistent with, or substantiated by, the material transformations 
taking place. Hegel was writing of the perfectibility of the state at the close of a 
period that witnessed the apparent potential for Enlightenment ideals to become actual 
with the example of the French revolution; as well as the subsequent and 
unprecedented drive towards the modernisation of states manifested in the far-
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reaching Napoleonic reforms implemented in the French-occupied areas of the Holy 
Roman Empire. Feuerbach’s arguments for the infinite potentialities for the 
advancement of humanity could, likewise, have only been reinforced by the 
unforeseeable limits of the scientific and technological advancements emanating from 
the industrial revolution in Britain. Needless to say the necessity of progress and the 
inherent value in the mastery of natural forces was a motif enthusiastically adopted by 
Marx in his theory of ideology. The assumption that this teleological tendency is 
empirically verifiable is then of critical importance, insofar as this belief potentially 
masks or disassociates itself from its theoretical foundations, foundations which may 
be dubious or unwarranted. This is the argument advanced by Rosen, that implicit in 
Marx’s theory of ideology are certain unsubstantiated claims derived from the 
traditions of rationalism and providentialism. 
 
Rosen’s argument is significant in that it questions not just the validity of the theory 
of ideology, but the very problems presupposed by it. For instance, he asks on what 
basis does Marx equate the end of ideology with the emergence of fully autonomous 
and rational individuals. The origin of this valuation is not questioned by Marx, and 
Rosen traces it back to Plato on the one hand, and St Augustine on the other; both of 
whom espoused the primacy of reason over desire, stressing that reason is distinct 
from, superior to and in constant tension with the passions, such that for the former to 
develop authentically, the latter must be curtailed. Desire as an ‘alien force’ separate 
from what is essentially human has clear parallels with the notion that a society based 
upon the production of commodities is an ‘alien force’. However, these distinctions 
between reason and desire, and autonomy and alienation, need to be rethought. As 
Nietzsche would argue, the valuation that reason is preeminent is itself reflective of a 
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desire, a desire for certainty; and the same could hold for the pre-eminence of 
autonomy, which could simply be reflective of an aversion to alienation. It follows 
that the objective of ideology critique needs to be refined, that the ideal of an 
‘autonomous subject’ to be opposed with an ‘ideological subject’ needs to be 
discarded; it is to this end that the turn towards an aesthetic/psychoanalytic 
understanding of ideology works to advance the theory. Rosen identifies aspects of 
providentialism in the theory in the assumption that societies can be conceived as 
organic systems that are able to maintain themselves in ways that cannot be directly 
understood from the perspective of the individual subject. This is exemplified in 
Marx’s notion of a more or less autonomous ‘economic base’ that is able to produce 
the most suitable ‘ideological superstructure’. Rosen is able demonstrate that this way 
of thinking descends from the idea that individual actions should be viewed as being 
the realisation of a Divine Will, and like its source, lacks a sufficient justification. It is 
in order to remove this influence, and other instances of economic reductionism, that I 
argue that the theory of ideology should rather be applied to Foucault’s conception of 
societies as being dynamic networks of power/knowledge, of which it is much more 
compatible. My response to the two ‘background beliefs’ highlighted by Rosen does 
have the implication that a slightly different approach should be taken to the analysis 
of ideological consciousness, or the way in which ideology is experienced by the 
individual subject, on the one hand, and the function of ideological discourse on a 
societal level, on the other; given that these phenomena are relatively distinct I do not 
believe this to be problematic. Refined in this manner, I have argued that the theory of 
ideology remains one of the best-equipped tools for the analysis of alienation, non-
rational belief and the unity of culture.  
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An aesthetic conception of ideology has the immediate benefit of radically altering 
the approach to which one can take towards three of the most problematic 
presuppositions contained in the traditional theory of ideology: the nature of the 
‘ideological subject’; the apparently necessary positing of a ‘collective subject’, 
mystified or falsely represented by ideology; and a ‘standard of truth’ from which 
ideology can be evaluated. The aesthetic approach makes use of the notion of 
‘hailing’ utilised by Althusser in his theory of ideological interpellation. There is no 
longer a clear distinction to be made between ‘ideological’ and ‘authentic’ 
consciousness, as ideology can be conceived to be operational everywhere and 
experienced, to a certain extent, by everyone. The problem of non-falsifiability 
implicit in a ubiquitous conception of ideology can be avoided with the important 
caveat that ideological interpellation is never total, as no ideology is self-sufficient. 
The measure of ideological interpellation is analogous to that of judgments of taste, it 
is the extent to which one perceives their subjective ‘lived experiences’ reflected in 
the (ideological) object, or rather the extent to which they recognise themselves as the 
intended subject of the (ideological) object. Ideology does not so much ‘determine’ 
individuals, then, but can rather be seen as a discourse that is utilised, whether 
consciously or unconsciously, in order to ameliorate the effects of a sense of 
alienation. The growth of an ideological formation is likewise explicable in an 
aesthetic sense, as the extent to which an ideological judgment forms a consensus is 
proportionate to the extent to which that judgment is able to conceal its 
emotional/performative foundation and function, and be presented as an ‘obvious’, 
‘disinterested’ and ‘universal’ observation. 
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This refined approach, inaugurated by Eagleton, has the advantage of explicating the 
nature of the ‘collective subject’ implied by ideology when combined with the work 
of Žižek. If the object of ideology is conceived along the same lines as that which 
works to fashion a ‘sensus communis’ in Kant, a sense of ‘intersubjectivity’, then the 
ontological status of this object is best identified with that of fantasy. The collective 
subject has been epitomised in the notion of an organic or harmonious society, a 
projection arising from, and to the extent to which individuals identify with it on an 
aesthetic level, covering up, inherent inconsistencies and antagonisms of the 
social/symbolic order. It is a projection then, the need for which would grow in 
proportion to the extent to which a society tends towards the atomisation of its 
subjects; on the other hand, however, this ideological fantasy can hardly be sustained 
in conjunction with concrete instances of antagonism, atomisation and alienation. 
This is why the ideological fantasy of the ‘beautiful’ society must always be 
supplemented with a ‘sublime’ Other, a figure on to whom the sources of the various 
inconsistencies and antagonisms are displaced. The sublime Other can thus be read as 
a manifestation of the unconscious desire of the subject; a figure who is able to 
sustain the affectivity of the ‘beautiful’ (ideological) object, despite its non-existence, 
in the imagination: for the Other is conceived to be that which prevents the fruition of 
the ideological object, or is conceived to embody or possess the object; or a mixture 
of both. Such a reading sheds a light on the reason why a ‘collective subject’, a notion 
intricately entangled with ideology, has been so hard to define: for, as Žižek 
demonstrates, it is a ‘subject’ completely devoid of any positive ontological 
consistency, a ‘spectral’ or ‘virtual’ entity comprised of the myriad antagonisms in a 
social body, thus an entity whose constitutive make-up is invariably contradictory. 
The amorphous and indeterminate nature of this collective subject does not, however, 
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lessen its practical efficacy – another important contribution to the theory of ideology 
made by Žižek is his insistence on an expansion of the traditional Marxist conception 
of materialism, so as to include the immanent materiality of the ideal order itself; the 
collective subject serves the functional role of maintaining a status quo, or ensuring 
the reproduction of the relations of production, by externalising the causes of 
antagonisms internal to a social structure, by re-signifying them as instances of 
corruption contingent to the structure itself. It is in this sense that ideological 
discourse can be distinguished from discourse in general in Foucault: whereas the 
latter evolves through constant adaptation, ideological discourse functions by 
assuming the semblance of stabilisation and constancy. 
 
A third advantage of the aesthetic/psychoanalytic approach is that it does away with 
the need for a standard of truth to make sense of ideology. There is a general shift 
from an epistemological to an affective understanding of the concept; as Eagleton 
notes, whether a proposition is empirically true or false is irrelevant to whether the 
proposition can be said to be ideological. The ‘unmasking’ relevant to ideology 
critique is not concerned with a transformation from ‘false’ to ‘authentic’ 
consciousness, rather one seeks to identify the emotional and performative aspects 
implicit in a given proposition, to determine what sort of social configurations are 
promoted or denigrated by a discourse that may well be presented ostensibly as being 
neutral. 
 
The final problem to be addressed is the need for a replacement of the 
base/superstructure model as an explanation for the functional role of ideology, as this 
model has been shown to be reductive and unable to account for ideology in all of its 
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forms. It is to this end that the work of Foucault is essential for the development of 
the concept. The conception of power implicit in the traditional theory of ideology 
contains the same binary opposition of struggle/repression that was deconstructed and 
discarded by Foucault; I have argued that the refined approach to ideology outlined 
above is much more compatible with and actually enhanced by the relational 
conception of power advocated by Foucault. The traditional theory of ideology saw 
the role of power in the hostile engagement of forces manifested in class struggle, the 
result of this struggle being the establishment of an ideological superstructure, one of 
whose functions being the repression of those interests at odds with that of the 
dominant class or classes; the primary determinate of this power as 
domination/subjugation is the economy, with the incommensurability of the economic 
base and the relations of production secured by the superstructure leading to the 
resumption of struggle. There are two significant flaws in this conception: firstly, it 
only encapsulates the negative aspects of power, the instances in which power is 
manifested as domination, subjugation and repression; this limited perspective leads 
necessarily to the goal of the gradual abolition of State power. However, Foucault 
notes that this ‘repressive hypothesis’ fails to account for power in all of its manifold 
and pervasive functions. Using the example of the ‘deployment of sexuality’ Foucault 
is able to demonstrate that dominant forms of power are not primarily concerned with 
repression, although repression and forms of control are certainly very real effects of 
power, but with creative forms of actualisation or even sublimation (in Hegelian 
terminology, with authentic or actual self-externalisation/objectification); in this case, 
the development of a new social identity. The other flaw pertains to the tendency in 
the traditional theory of ideology to treat of power as a possession, as something that 
needs to be seized. Foucault demonstrates that such a seizure is never possible, that 
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power needs to be understood within the proper context of a dynamic network 
comprised of a multiplicity of force relations, as something that quite literally 
functions everywhere in a constant process of circulation. In this context, it is wrong 
to conceive of individuals as being simply acted on or determined by forms of power, 
they are rather always in a situation in which they are simultaneously exercising 
forms of power as well as being acted on by forms of power. What becomes lost with 
the adoption of the base/superstructure model is thus the important insight, recognised 
by Hegel in the master/slave dialectic, that hegemonic power (or a hegemonic 
ideology) cannot function autonomously, that it must necessarily enter into or 
engender relations of recognition, acquiescence or resistance, all of which being 
forms of power as well. 
 
I have argued that the functional role of ideology can be situated within the context of 
Foucault’s vision of societies structured by the workings of power exercised through 
apparatuses of knowledge, or discourse; as essentially being a reaction against the 
general tendency of discourse towards constant evolution and adaptation. Ideological 
discourse, in contrast to discourse in general, utilises a semblance of stabilisation and 
constancy in order to gain momentum; it is thus in the breakdown of hegemonic 
power, in the re-emergence of localised conflicts, that ideological formations are most 
active – they work as a supplement to discourse, effecting an ostensible equilibrium in 
an otherwise volatile environment. Ideological discourse is both the most potent form 
of discourse, insofar as it relates to individuals on an aesthetic/psychological level, as 
well as being one of the most vulnerable forms of discourse – as its potency lies in the 
promise of some form of social harmony and stability, and thus it must eschew from 
any radical transformation dictated by the dynamic and ever-shifting relations of 
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power/knowledge; and so for ideology to sustain itself, it must make constant use of 
such mechanisms as cynical distance, the figure of the Other, repressed enjoyment, 
and so on. It is apt that Christianity and its connection to the messianic tradition has 
been a prominent feature of this study, both as an influence on the progenitors of the 
traditional theory of ideology, and a pertinent case study for a refined conception of 
ideology; as it can be argued that there is a messianic tendency in all ideological 
formations, a propensity towards the presentation of a deliverance from alienation – a 
genuine reconciliation between subject and object. 
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